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Abstract in English 
Microfinance services have received considerable attention over the last two decades as an 
important government strategy to relieve credit constraints caused by market failure in rural areas 
by providing rural residents with more accessible and small-scale credits. Several studies have 
indicated that rural microfinance has the significant potential to alleviate poverty, enhance rural 
economy and improve food security, while the findings from previous studies, particularly the 
studies on the impact of microfinance, appear to be mixed and inconclusive. In addition, the 
positive impacts of participating in microfinance encouraged many microfinance services and 
programs to be mission-oriented or supply-oriented, and not to pay much attention to smallholders’ 
preferences and willingness-to-pay measures for microfinance. Against the background that the 
microfinance has been practiced for more than two decades, the emphasis needs to move from 
mission orientation to demand orientation. Therefore, to motivate the rural financial inclusion and 
to implement the poverty alleviation in the transitional China call for a comprehensive study to 
understand rural households’ preferences for microfinance and the impact of participation in rural 
microfinance on their welfares. This dissertation contributes to the literature by examining rural 
households’ preferences and willingness-to-pay for microfinance products with varying attribute 
combinations as well as the determinants and impact of participation in different microfinance 
programs. The empirical analyses used a dataset that includes a discrete choice experiment from a 
household survey in Sichuan Province in China. 
The study first examines factors that influence rural households’ decision to participate in 
microfinance for farm and off-farm production and the way in which these factors and microfinance 
exert and impact benefits. An endogenous switching regression model that accounts for selection 
bias and treatment effects is applied in this analysis. Second, the determinants of participation in 
various microfinance programs and the differential impacts of microfinance on non-participants 
and three categories of participants in microfinance that include commercial banks, village mutual 
aid funds, friends and relatives are analyzed. A two-stage multinomial endogenous switching 
regression approach is employed to conduct the empirical analysis. The casual effects of selecting 
the different microfinance sources on household income and consumption are also estimated. Third, 
this study examines the smallholder preferences and willingness-to-pay measures for microfinance 
based on a discrete choice experiment. The discrete choice experiment in this study provided 
information on how smallholders value the characteristics of microfinance and willingness to pay 
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for microfinance attributes. The attributes we considered are six vital credit components: credit 
period, interest rate, loan size, collateral method, repayment schedule and transaction costs. Mixed 
logit and latent class models are used to examine the choice probability and sources of preference 
heterogeneity. Endogenous attribute attendance models are applied to account for attribute non-
attendance phenomenon. Finally, in order to capture the impact of experience on rural households’ 
preferences for microfinance, this study applies the Bayesian updating method to account for the 
learning process involved in acquiring experience on microfinance, and employs a generalized 
multinomial logit model that accounts for both preference and scale heterogeneity to estimate the 
choice probabilities and impact of experience on preferences and willingness-to-pay for 
microfinance. 
The empirical results show that family size, farmland size, dependency ratio, local casual wage 
rate, credit information mainly determine the participation in microfinance. In particular, 
households with larger farmland size and more farm inputs, enjoyed more farm extension services 
but fewer off-farm extension services, and those with fewer off-farm workers display a greater 
probability of participation in agricultural loans. Households who earned lower wage from the off-
farm sector but had better information sources are would like to take loans from commercial banks. 
Households with less endowment assets rather obtain credit from friends and family members. 
Although the results indicate that microfinance exerts a weak stimulating effect on small-scale farm 
production, the findings reveal that participation in microfinance tends to increase general income 
and consumption significantly, in which the loan from commercial banks would increase income 
to the largest extent. The results from stated preference demonstrate that preference heterogeneity 
and attribute non-attendance exist. Averagely, rural households prefer longer credit period, smaller 
loan size, lower transaction costs and lower interest rate. Guarantor collateral method and 
installment repayment positively affect their preferences as well. The empirical findings also show 
that experience with microfinance products or lending institutions help households in their 
selections of microfinance institutions. In particular, experience with financial institutions increase 
the scale parameter and help respondents to feel assured about their choices, while experience with 
individual lenders have no such effects. 
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Abstract in German 
In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten haben Mikrofinanzdienstleistungen, als eine wichtige Strategie der 
Regierung den Kreditzugang in ländlichen Regionen zu verbessern, erheblich an Bedeutung 
gewonnen. Durch die Bereitstellung von leicht zugänglichen, kleinen Krediten für die ländliche 
Bevölkerung kann ein Marktversagen in dem Kreditmarkt, hervorgerufen durch 
Kreditbeschränkungen, beseitigt werden. In einigen Studien konnte bereits gezeigt werden, dass 
ländliche Mikrofinanzierungen ein bedeutendes Potenzial zur Linderung von Armut, zur 
Verbesserung der ländlichen Wirtschaft und zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit haben.  
Wohingegen vorherige Studien, insbesondere Studien über die Auswirkungen von 
Mikrofinanzierung, keine so eindeutigen oder nicht schlüssig Ergebnisse lieferten. Die positiven 
Erfahrungen mit der Mikrofinanzierung motivierten Mikrofinanzierungsdienstleiser- und 
Programme dazu, einen Ziel-orientierten oder Nachfrage-orientierten Ansatz zu verfolgen. Den 
Präferenzen von Kleinbauern und Methoden zur Messung der Zahlungsbereitschaft für 
Mikrokredite wird allerdings zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Obwohl die Mikrofinanzierung 
seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten praktiziert wird, liegt die Gewichtung immer noch auf Seiten des 
Missions-orientierten Ansatzes. Die Gewichtung sollte aber zu einem Nachfrage-orientierter 
Ansatz verlagert werden. Um Kreditvergaben und Maßnahmen zur Artmuslinderung in ländlichen 
Gebieten zu erhöhen sind mehr umfassende Studien nötig, welche die Präferenz von ländlichen 
Haushalten für Mikrokredite und den Einfluss einer Teilnahme an einem Mikrofinanzierungskredit 
auf die Wohlfahrt eines solchen Haushaltes untersuchen. Diese Dissertation trägt einen Beitrag zur 
Lösung dieser Problematik bei, indem die Präferenzen und Zahlungsbereitschaften ländlicher 
Haushalte für Mikrofinanzprodukte untersucht werden. Hierfür werden die Attributkombinationen 
variiert und die Determinanten, sowie die Auswirkungen einer Teilnahme an verschiedenen 
Mikrofinanzierungsprogrammen betrachtet. Für die empirischen Analysen wurde ein Datensatz 
verwendet, welcher mit Hilfe eines diskreten Choice-Experiments generiert wurde. Es wurden 
Haushalte aus der chinesischen Provinz Sichuan befragt.  
In dieser Studie werden zunächst Faktoren untersucht, welche einen Einfluss haben auf die 
Entscheidung ländlicher Haushalte, an einer Mikrofinanzierung für die landwirtschaftliche oder 
nicht landwirtschaftliche Produktion, teilzunehmen. Außerdem wird die Art und Weise untersucht, 
wie sich diese Faktoren und Mikrofinanzierungen auswirken und inwiefern die Haushalte davon 
profitieren. Verwendet wurde ein endogenes Switching-Regressionsmodell, welches den 
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Selektionsbias und Behandlungseffekte berücksichtigt. Des Weiteren werden die Determinanten 
der Teilnahme an Mikrofinanzprogrammen und die differenziellen Auswirkungen von 
Mikrofinanzierungen auf Nicht-Teilnehmer untersucht. Die Teilnehmer an Mikrofinanzierungen 
wurden in drei Kategorien eingeteilt. Zu den Teilnehmern zählen Geschäftsbanken, Fonds für 
gegenseitige Hilfe, Freunde und Verwandte. Ein zweistufiger, multinomialer und endogener 
Switching-Regressionsansatz wurde zur Durchführung der empirischen Analyse verwendet. Die 
zufälligen Auswirkungen der verschiedenen Mikrofinanzquellen auf Haushaltseinkommen und 
Konsum wurden ebenfalls geschätzt. Basieren auf den Entscheidungen aus dem diskreten „Choice-
Experiment“ werden die Präferenzen und die Werte für die Zahlungsbereitschaft für die 
Mikrofinanzierung der Kleinbauern untersucht. Mit Hilfe des diskreten „Choice-Experiments“ 
konnten Informationen darüber gewonnen werden, welchen Wert die Kleinbauern den einzelnen 
Charakteristiken von Mikrofinanzierung geben und wie hoch die Zahlungsbereitschaft für die 
verschiedenen Attribute ist. Die ausgewählten Attribute stellen sechs wesentliche Komponente 
beim Kreditmarktgeschäft dar: Kreditlaufzeit, Zinssatz, Kreditgröße, Sicherheitsmethode, 
Tilgungsplan und Transaktionskosten. Es wurden mixed Logit und ein Latent Class Modell 
verwendet, um die Auswahlwahrscheinlichkeit zu schätzen und die Quellen für  Präferenz 
Heterogenität zu untersuchen. Endogene Attributanwesenheitsmodelle werden angewendet, um die 
„Attribut-nicht-Anwesenheit“ Problematik zu berücksichtigen. Um den Einfluss von Erfahrungen 
auf die Präferenz für Mikrofinanzierung von ländlichen Haushalten zu erfassen, wurde die 
„Baynesische Inferenz Methode“  verwendet. Dadurch wird der Lernprozess berücksichtigt, der an 
dem Erwerb von Erfahrung mit der Mikrofinanzierung beteiligt ist. Durch die Anwendung eines 
generalisierten, multinominalen Logit Modell wird Heterogenität in Präferenzen und der Skala 
berücksichtigt. Mit dem Modell wird die Auswahlwahrscheinlichkeit geschätzt und der Einfluss 
von Erfahrung auf die Präferenzen und die Zahlungsbereitschaft für Mikrofinanzierung.  
Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Familiengröße, Ackerlandgröße, Abhängigkeitsquote, 
lokaler Lohnsatz, Kreditinformation hauptsächlich die Teilnahme an Mikrofinanzierung 
bestimmen. Haushalte mit größeren landwirtschaftlichen Flächen und mehr landwirtschaftlichen 
Betriebsmitteln nutzten landwirtschaftlicher Beratungsstellen häufiger, jedoch nicht 
landwirtschaftlichen Beratung seltener, als Haushalte mit weniger Fläche und Betriebsmitteln. 
Haushalte mit weniger nicht landwirtschaftlichen Arbeitern zeigten eine höhere 
Wahrscheinlichkeit landwirtschaftsbezogene Kredite aufzunehmen.  
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Haushalte mit niedrigeren Löhnen aus dem außerlandwirtschaftlichen Sektor hatten, aber mit 
bessere Informationsquellen, bevorzugen Kredite von Geschäftsbanken. Haushalte mit weniger 
Vermögen erhalten eher Kredite von Freunden und Familienmitgliedern. Obwohl die Ergebnisse 
einer Studie darauf hindeuten, dass Mikrofinanzierungen eine eher schwache, stimulierende 
Wirkung auf die kleinbäuerliche Produktion ausüben, zeigen die Ergebnisse einer anderen Studie, 
dass die Teilnahme an Mikrofinanzierungen tendenziell das allgemeine Einkommen und den 
Konsum signifikant erhöht. Ein Darlehen von einer Geschäftsbank würde das Einkommen am 
stärksten steigern. Die Ergebnisse der angegebenen Präferenz demonstrieren, dass 
Präferenzheterogenität und eine geringere Beachtung einiger Attribute in dieser Studie aufgetreten 
sind. Im Durchschnitt bevorzugen ländliche Haushalte eine längere Kreditlaufzeit, geringere 
Kreditvolumen, niedrigere Transaktionskosten und niedrigere Zinssätze. Die „Bürgen-Sicherheits-
Methode“ und Ratenzahlungen wirken sich positiv auf die Präferenzen für einen Kredit aus. Die 
empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Erfahrung mit Mikrofinanzprodukten oder 
Kreditinstituten den Haushalten bei der Auswahl von Mikrofinanzinstitutionen hilft. Vor allem die 
Erfahrung mit Finanzinstituten erhöht den Skalierungsparameter und hilft den Befragten, sich über 
ihre Entscheidungen sicher zu fühlen, während die Erfahrung mit einzelnen Kreditgebern keine 
solchen Auswirkungen hat. 
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Chapter 1 General Introduction 
Chapter 1  General Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
As a result of market failure, rural residents often face difficulties in accessing credit from financial 
institutions, making it difficult to invest in income-generating activities in many developing 
countries. Modern microfinance, fueled by the Nobel Prize awarded in 2006 to Mohammad Yunus, 
who founded the Grammen Bank, has therefore received considerable attention over the last two 
decades as an important strategy for enhancing rural residents’ access to financial resources by 
providing more accessible and small-scale financial services to rural households and micro-
enterprises that have been suffering from the shortage of traditional commercial banking services. 
This resource reallocation strategy in the rural financial market has been regarded as an efficient 
pathway for rural development and poverty reduction (Ahlin and Jiang 2008; Hermes and Lensink 
2009; Imai et al. 2012). Given the significant role of microfinance in rural areas, authorities and 
researchers have increasingly attached importance to the evolution and reformation of 
microfinance programs in the promotion of the financial inclusion system. Although some 
remarkable successes have been achieved in relation to financial inclusion in the world over the 
last fifteen years, there are still several key challenges to achieving sustainable and long-term 
financial inclusion. 
A number of studies have claimed that microfinance has the potential to contribute to many aspects 
of households’ welfare, such as income and consumption (Berhane and Gardebroek 2011; Li et al. 
2011; Kaboski and Townsend 2012), food security (Islam et al. 2016), quality of life (Mazumder 
and Lu 2015) and women’s household bargaining positions (Porter 2016). These findings in return 
have encouraged policy makers to design and implement financial inclusion projects in rural areas. 
However, other studies have indicated that these benefits are limited, since microfinance only leads 
to fewer businesses and lower subjective well-being (Karlan and Zinman 2011), and that 
contributions rely on investments in income generating activities (Hermes and Lensink 2009). 
Recent studies have even shown that microfinance does not have a significant impact on 
smallholders’ welfare (e.g., Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman 2015; Banerjee 2015; Crépon et al. 
2015). Given the mixed and inconclusive results from these empirical analyses, further research is 
needed to shed more light on this issue. 
 2 
 
Chapter 1 General Introduction 
Analyses of the impact of microfinance have always received considerable attention in previous 
studies, in which the poor are always considered as an important treatment group, since the primary 
target of microfinance is poverty alleviation. However, the results obtained from recent studies 
regarding the impact of microfinance on the poor are inconclusive. Some studies have found that 
the poorest of the poor are most likely to benefit from participating in microfinance (e.g., Islam 
2015; Akotey and Adjasi 2016). On the other hand, other studies have suggested that microfinance 
is not an appropriate intervention to help the poor and that it can even increase their poverty (e.g., 
Rooyen et al. 2012; Lønborg and Rasmussen 2014). Since the effects of microfinance are not 
constant across individuals, even when borrowing from the same microfinance institution, 
borrowers’ benefit from microfinance services will differ (Beck et al. 2017). One important reason 
that has been put forward by the literature is the income-generating activities (e.g., Hermes and 
Lensink 2009; Augsburg et al. 2015; Ganle et al. 2015). In the process of urbanization in China, 
young, educated and male rural residents are more likely to migrate to urban areas due to the 
economic attractions of the secondary and tertiary industries (Chen et al. 2014; Gong 2018), and 
the migration of huge numbers of people gradually intensifies the decrease in agricultural 
productivity (Li et al. 2017). Against the background of the declining attractiveness of agricultural 
production and of the agricultural labor force, one important issue that needs to be addressed is the 
identification of who really benefits the most from microfinance participation. 
Even so, to the extent that microfinance schemes undoubtedly have significant impacts on rural 
livelihoods, several studies have analyzed the determinants of participation in these schemes and 
the impacts of participation on household welfare (e.g., Kaboski and Townsend 2012; Nghiem et 
al. 2012; Bruhn and Love 2014; Lahkar and Pingali 2016). These studies have agreed that 
participation in microfinance tends to contribute to welfare and poverty alleviation by helping 
households to purchase agricultural inputs or invest in non-farm businesses. However, the literature 
has focused little on the selection of various credit sources, while generally differentiating between 
formal and informal financial institutions, and has argued that these sources of credit are 
complementary (Ayyagari et al. 2010; Mallick 2012). None of the studies have analyzed the 
impacts of the different formal microfinance programs on household welfare in the same period. 
The main sources of microfinance for the rural poor include commercial banks, individuals, and 
non-bank credit organizations as well as specific programs that are tailored to meet the needs of 
poor rural households. However, the selection of the most beneficial source is still in its initial 
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stage and subject to debate. This selection is important, because microfinance not only provides 
credit for rural residents and the poor to eradicate poverty but also plays a significant role in the 
financial inclusion system, which helps rural areas to avoid falling into the trap of long-term 
backward development. Therefore, understanding the barriers to and drivers of participation in 
microcredit selection and the impact of participation on household welfare will help in the design 
of effective policies to reduce rural poverty.  
The positive effects of microfinance services have encouraged various explorations of operation 
modes in developing economies. Meanwhile, due to their specific role in helping rural economies 
to grow, many microfinance organizations have been found to be mission-oriented or supply-
oriented, and not to pay much attention to the borrowers’ willingness to pay. However, since 
microfinance has been practiced for more than two decades, the emphasis needs to move from the 
mission orientation to the demand orientation. Evidence has shown that the characteristics of the 
demand for financial services tend to influence the type of financial services and the achievement 
of their social and profit objectives (Ritchie 2007). A well-functioning set of credit attributes should 
therefore be tailored to potential borrowers’ needs (Tsukada et al. 2010). Financial decisions 
involve complexity, meaning that individuals frequently have difficulty in understanding the issues 
depending on their education, information, experiences, assets, and social networks (Yesuf et al. 
2009; Cai et al. 2015). Individuals with different financial habits might prefer different types of 
contracts. The preferences for formal or informal loans, group or individual loans, and even no 
loans vary as well (Ayyagari et al. 2010; Tsukada et al. 2010; Attanasio et al. 2015). However, the 
literature has placed little emphasis on the reason for borrowers’ choice of a certain microfinance 
option, and very little is known about the optimal contract structure of credit loans. Some studies 
have even used the revealed preference method to analyze households’ preferences for 
microfinance (Tsukada, Higashikata, and Takahashi 2010; Dehejia, Montgomery, and Morduch 
2012; Lønborg and Rasmussen 2014), this method is typically used for decisions concerning actual 
alternatives. Very few studies have used experimental and stated preference methods to analyze 
the behavioral aspects of microfinance at an early stage of the policy cycle. Therefore, one 
important and fundamental issue that needs clarification is smallholders’ preferences and willing-
to-pay measures for microfinance. 
In the decision-making process of rural households, information about goods and services is always 
incomplete. People face difficulties in making optimal decisions based on their utility analyses due 
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to bounded rationality, uncertainty and complexity. The potential outcomes and costs are unknown 
in advance for smallholders when they make decisions about whether to participate in microcredit. 
People’s decisions are always made according to the limited information that financial agencies 
and peers provide as well as their prior conceptions that they have formed from their own 
experiences. Given the two types of information sources that contribute to individuals’ preferences 
for microfinance, there is another important issue that needs clarification: whether the microfinance 
experience influences rural residents’ preferences for microcredit. The importance lies in the 
information asymmetry problem, which is normally more serious for rural residents than for their 
urban counterparts and tends to influence people who depend more on experiences when making 
decisions. Although the issue of households’ preferences for microfinance based on the given 
information has received considerable attention in the theoretical and empirical literature (e.g., 
Ayyagari et al. 2010; Tsukada et al. 2010; Turvey et al.2012; Cheng and Ahmed 2014) and the 
importance of experience and its impact on “experience goods” with unobserved quality 
characteristics has received considerable attention in recent studies (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 2013; 
Czajkowski et al. 2014; Bradbury et al. 2015), little is known about the effect of personal 
experience on households’ preferences for microfinance. Therefore, more research is needed to 
shed light on this issue. 
This dissertation is presented to contribute to those research gaps and literature by examining rural 
households’ preferences for microfinance and the impact of microfinance participation on 
household welfare in China. Many different types of agriculture and distinct economic situations, 
as well as pilot microfinance projects, make Sichuan Province an appropriate study area. The policy 
design aims to enhance the microfinance participation of rural residents and exploit the positive 
effects of microfinance effectively in raising households’ welfare.  
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1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Agricultural Sector in China 
 
Source: National Geographic Information Bureau  
Figure 1.1 Map of the People’s Republic of China 
China, officially called the People’s Republic of China, is the third-largest country by total area in 
East Asia, with a population of around 1.4 billion. It consists of 23 provinces (including Taiwan), 
4 municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin), 5 autonomous regions (Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia) and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong 
and Macau). Peking is the capital city. 
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Source: Compiled from the data of the World Bank 
Figure 1.2 Economies by nominal GDP in 2015 
China is the largest developing country in the world, and it has been among the world’s fastest-
growing economies since the economic reform that moved towards a more market-oriented 
economy in 1978. With the acceleration of economic globalization, China became the world’s 
second-largest economy in terms of nominal GDP in 2014. In 2015, China contributed about 14% 
of the global GDP following the United Sates (23%) and the European Union (21%) (see Figure 
1.2).   
 
Source: Compiled from the data of the China Statistical Yearbook 2017 
Figure 1.3 Sectional contribution of China’s GDP in 1979-2016 
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Agriculture plays a considerable role in the development of the gross national economy; it feeds 
over 20% of the population in the world with only 7% of the arable land on the planet. As shown 
in Figure 1.3, even though the proportion of agriculture in the entire GDP decreased from over 30% 
in 1979 to less than 10% in 2016, the output increased substantially, by a wide margin. The 
remarkable increase in the agricultural GDP is based on the efforts made in agricultural production 
to overcome many endogenous obstacles, such as constraints on arable land and water resources, 
climate changes, rising costs of materials and labors, and impacts from the international market. 
 
 
Source: Compiled from the data of the China Statistical Yearbook 2016 
Figure 1.4 Output of major farm products in 2015 
Rice, wheat and corn are the major grain crops contributing to the farm products, accounting for 
more than 50% of the total output, as shown in Figure 1.4. Among them, rice is the most important 
crop, raised on more than 26% of the cultivated area. The majority of rice is grown in the south, 
such as in the Zhu Jiang delta area and the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan. Wheat is 
the second-most-prevalent grain crop, grown in most parts of the country but especially in areas 
such as the North China Plain and the provinces of Jiangsu, Hubei and Sichuan. Fruit and sugarcane 
are two important cash crops, accounting for 26.72% and 10.73% of the total output, respectively.  
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In the international market of agricultural products, China is the largest importing country, with 
170.08 billion USD in 2014, followed by the US (156.89 billion USD) and Germany (118.91 billion 
USD). Moreover, China is an important exporting country of agriculture products, with 74.47 
billion USD in 2014, behind the US (182.24 billion USD), the Netherlands (112.06 billion USD), 
Germany (100.78 billion USD), and Brazil (87.89 billion USD). Oil, straw, dairy and livestock are 
the major agricultural products imported; aquatic and marine products, vegetables and fruits are 
the main export categories.1 
China has the world’s largest population, of around 1.4 billion, of which 42.65% lives in rural areas 
and is directly or indirectly engaged in agricultural activities. Despite the incomes of both urban 
and rural residents constantly increasing, the income gap has also been expanding. In 2006, the gap 
of per capita disposable income between urban and rural residents was 8,173 yuan, while it was 
increased to 21,253 yuan in 2016. The rapid process of urbanization and the economic attractions 
in the secondary and tertiary industries led to an outflow of the rural population. The majority of 
the migrant workers are young adults; those left behind tend to be the elderly, women and children, 
who are called the “386199 Army”2. 
Against the background of the declining attractiveness of agricultural production and the 
agricultural labor force, the Chinese Government has launched many measures to develop the rural 
economy and raise farmers’ income. One such effort is the rural financial inclusion strategy, which 
is designed to provide access to useful and affordable financial products and services for rural 
households facing financial constraints. 
 
                                                          
1 Source: Compiled from the WTO database. 
2 Source: Compiled from the China Statistical Yearbook 2016. Note: The number “386199” refers to 8 March, 1 June 
and 9 September by the lunar calendar; they are the holidays honoring women, children and the elderly.  
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1.2.2 Overview of Rural Microfinance in China 
 
Source: Compiled from the World Bank, Global Findex 2015 
Figure 1.5 Credit sources of rural borrowers 
Rural finance is one important ingredient for enhancing long-lasting economic, social and 
institutional development in rural areas by providing the capital needed to stimulate production and 
investment. In spite of the confirmation of the importance of rural finance and the progress made 
during the past two decades, financial systems in developing countries still exclude large segments 
of rural households.3 As can be seen from Figure 1.5, rural borrowing in the majority of the 
developing countries relies heavily on friends and relatives, and more than 50% of the total loans 
were borrowed from this source. In only three of the twenty countries (Brazil, Germany and the 
United States) did the ratio of loans from financial institutions exceed the loans from family or 
friends. This indicates that informal borrowing remains high even in different financial structures. 
Accordingly, the consideration of microfinance has shifted from access to financial inclusion, with 
greater emphasis on behavioral features such as participation and use. 
Rural microfinance is an important element of the financial system in China and has been an 
integral part of China’s economic reform. Since the early 2000s, China has prioritized the 
broadening of the availability of basic financial services by expanding the physical access points 
                                                          
3 Rural Development Report 2016, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 
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for rural households. China’s rural finance faced serious difficulties around 2005 due to its 
incoherent structure, weak management and poor internal capabilities. As part of the development 
of microfinance in rural areas, the Chinese Government has launched many measures to strengthen 
rural finance since 2006. These measures were partly meant to meet the new challenges involved 
in joining the WTO, which required the permission of foreign banks to develop their banking 
services by the end of 2006.  
 
Figure 1.6 Structure of the rural finance supply system in China 
After years of strengthening and development, China established a broadly covered rural finance 
supply system to improve and consolidate its rural financial markets, including policy banks (e.g., 
the Agricultural Development Bank of China), commercial banks (e.g., the Agricultural Bank of 
China and the Postal Savings Bank of China), cooperative financial institutions (e.g., rural credit 
cooperatives, rural commercial banks and rural cooperative banks), three new types of rural 
banking institutions and some non-banking institutions. The three new rural banking institutions 
are village and township banks, loan companies and rural fund cooperatives. In addition, to relax 
the rural credit constraints for the poor and implement microfinance for the purposes of poverty 
alleviation, China set up poverty village mutual aid funds4 in depressed areas where commercial 
banks have no interests. This program is tailored to help farmers without access to credit sources 
from formal financial institutions and informal lenders by providing small and short-term credit. It 
                                                          
4 Many terms refer to this program. This study uses the term “village mutual aid funds” in accordance with the report 
Access to Finance, Microfinance Innovations in the People’s Republic of China, Asian Development Bank, 2014. 
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works as a method of public financial support that is associated with smallholders’ participation to 
enhance the poor’s access to formal credit and has similar features to the Revolving Loan Funds. 
By the end of 2014, more than 3,500 rural-related financial institutions had been established, 
running a network of about 81,400 branches.  
 
Sources: Compiled from China Rural Finance Service Report 2014 
Figure 1.7 Rural related loan balance and rural households’ income and consumption 
With the progress of the rural financial system, rural-related loans have also increased during the 
last several years. As can be seen from Figure 1.7, the rural loan balance has increased from about 
5 trillion yuan in 2007 to more than 10 trillion in 2015. In 2007, the agricultural loans stood at 
about 1.5 trillion, which was more than the rural households’ loans. Meanwhile, the households’ 
loans outperformed the agricultural loans in 2009 and grew to more than 5 trillion in 2015. 5 Among 
the rural-related loans, cooperative financial institutions, including rural credit cooperatives, rural 
commercial banks, rural cooperative banks and village banks, were the main providers. In the 
meantime, rural households’ income, expenditure and surplus were also stably increasing. The 
slowly growing surplus hinted at increasing deposits of rural households. Although it seems that 
formal credit is pushed to cover most smallholders, the poor are still often excluded (Yuan et al. 
                                                          
5 Notes: Rural loans include loans from rural households as well as loans from rural enterprises and organizations. 
Agricultural loans are provided for the production of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery. Rural 
households’ loans are loans provided by financial institutions to households, including production loans and 
consumption loans. All the loans considered here are provided by formal financial institutions. At the time of the 
survey, 1 yuan ≈ 0.15 US. 
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2015). China therefore continued the movement towards a coordinated approach to financial 
inclusion in 2015 with the launch of the National Plan for Advancing the Development of Financial 
Inclusion (2016-2020), which is highly relevant to the World Bank Group’s commitment to 
achieving universal financial access by 2020. 
 
1.2.3 Rural Microcredit in the study area 
 
Figure 1.8 Diagram of Sichuan Province 
Sichuan Province, containing 21 cities, is located in the southwest of China, and covers a land area 
of about 486,052 square kilometers, the fifth-largest area in China. (In contrast, Germany covers a 
land area of 357,021 square kilometers.) Chengdu is the capital city. Sichuan Province occupies 
most of the Sichuan Basin on the western shore of the Tibetan Plateau and consists of various 
terrains, such as mountainous regions, hills, plains and continental plateaus. These are also the 
main terrains of China. The great differences in terrain make the climate highly variable and enrich 
the agricultural diversity. Sichuan Province has historically been known as the “Province of 
Abundance” and is one of the major agricultural production bases of China. Up to 2015, although 
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agriculture only accounted for 12.2% of the regional GDP, Sichuan ranked fourth in the agricultural 
gross output value, with 637.78 billion yuan. Grain, including rice, wheat and corn, is the primary 
food crop; vegetables, citrus fruits, rapeseed and sugarcane are the major commercial crops. 
Sichuan had the largest output of pork among all the provinces. It is also a province with a large 
rural population of 63.17 million accounting for 69% of the total household population. 
Many different types of agriculture and economic statuses make Sichuan Province an important 
pilot and promotion area for rural microfinance. For example, Sichuan was one of the earliest 
provinces that to pilot the village mutual aid funds (VMAFs). Starting in 2008, more than 1,600 
VMAFs were established. As part of the poverty alleviation strategy, rural finance has been 
promoted further. In 2015, the balance of agriculture-related loans increased by 11.6%, which was 
0.3% more than the growth of other categories of loans. In particular, the loan growth rate of 67 
poor counties was 3.2% higher than the provincial average loan growth rate, and the proportion of 
new loans increased by 1.8% over the last year. 
In recent years, to target poverty-stricken households and rural areas, Sichuan Province has 
innovated and launched specific microfinance for poverty alleviation, providing microfinance that 
is characterized by non-guarantee, free mortgages, a loan size smaller than 50,000 yuan, a loan 
period of less than 3 years and the benchmark interest rate of the People’s Bank of China. In 
addition, the Government provided the poor with discount loans and subsidized financial 
institutions. At the end of 2016, the balance of poverty alleviation loans reached 28.18 billion yuan, 
an increase of 108.8%. Nearly one-third of the poor households that with productive capacity have 
been supported by microfinance.6 
                                                          
6 Source: Compiled from the Sichuan Financial Report 2015 and the Sichuan Financial Report 2016. 
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Source: Compiled from the Sichuan Financial Report 2015 
Figure 1.9 Sectional numbers and assets of the main financial institutions in Sichuan Province 
With the steady development of the regional economy, by the end of 2015, 14,015 financial 
institutions were running in Sichuan Province, with a total amount of 7.6 trillion assets; rural-
related financial institutions accounted for more than 42% of the total institutions and 
approximately 22% of the total assets, as shown in Figure 1.9.   
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The general objective of this study is to analyze households’ preferences for microfinance 
participation and the associated impacts on household welfare in China. The specific objectives 
include the following: 
To analyze the barriers and drivers influencing the choice of microfinance sources and the impact 
of participation on households’ income and consumption; 
To estimate the different impacts of agricultural and non-agricultural microfinance participation on 
productive benefits; 
To investigate smallholders’ preferences and willingness-to-pay measures for microfinance; 
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To examine the effect of experience on households’ preferences for microfinance; 
To suggest policy recommendations to improve the financial inclusion strategy; and promote 
poverty alleviation and rural betterment based on the findings in China. 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Given the unceasing progress and updating of microfinance in China, the present study contributes 
to the important implications by examining the barriers to and drivers of participation in various 
microfinance programs; and the impact of participation on household welfare. The findings from 
this study contribute to the literature on the disagreement regarding which types of microfinance 
programs and sources are more beneficial for rural households. 
The determinants that affect rural households’ decision to participate in microfinance for farming 
and off-farming production activities, and the way in which these factors and microfinance exert 
and impact on benefits, also have significant implications for policy makers to adjust the emphasis 
of microfinance, particularly against the social background of the declining attractiveness of 
agricultural production and the agricultural labor force. 
This study also contributes to the debate on the optimal design of rural microcredit by assessing 
the preference trade-off of different microcredit attributes more comprehensively than in previous 
analyses. The findings from this study will be helpful for policymakers in their efforts to design 
effective policies to enhance financial inclusion. 
The importance of examining the effects of experience on rural households’ preferences for 
microfinance lies in the information asymmetry problem, which is normally more serious for rural 
residents than for their urban counterparts and tends to influence people who depend more on 
experiences when making decisions. The issue also has fundamental importance for the 
implications of microfinance strategies and measures. 
In addition, the discussions in the analytical frameworks, such as the endogeneity problem, the 
attribute non-attendance phenomenon, and preference and scale heterogeneities theoretically 
contribute to the literature for further associated studies.  
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This dissertation is a collection of journal articles. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction, 
chapters 2 to 5 contain four journal articles, and chapter 6 presents the conclusions and policy 
recommendations.  
Chapter 2 examines the factors that influence farm operators’ decisions to participate in 
microfinance for farming and off-farming production activities, and how these factors and 
microfinance tend to impact on farm and off-farm income. An endogenous switching regression 
model is used to account for selectivity bias and treatment effects. To ensure the identification in 
the participation specification, we consider the potential endogeneity problem that may arise from 
the variable, such as membership of village mutual aid funds, by inserting an observed endogenous 
variable and a vector of the residual term from the first-stage regression of the endogenous variable 
into the participation equation, in accordance with Rivers and Vuong (1988), Abdulai and Huffman 
(2005). 
Chapter 3 analyses the factors that influence rural households’ decision to participate in different 
types of microfinance and the impact of participation on per capita income and consumption, using 
household-level data in China. We employ a multinomial endogenous switching regression model 
that accounts for the selection bias arising from both observable and unobservable factors. The 
various microfinance sources that we consider include commercial banks, village mutual aid funds, 
and friends and relatives. In particular, we augment the impact equation by exploiting the average 
village-varying variables to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU), as well as 
base heterogeneity and transitional heterogeneity, are also estimated.  
Chapter 4 examines smallholders’ preferences and willingness-to-pay for microfinance products 
with varying attribute combinations. To identify smallholders’ heterogeneous preferences for 
microfinance, we conduct a discrete choice experiment. Mixed logit and latent class models are 
estimated to examine the choice probability and the sources of preference heterogeneity. 
Endogenous attribute attendance models are applied to account for the attribute non-attendance 
phenomenon, focusing on the separate non-attendance probability as well as the joint non-
attendance probability. 
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Chapter 5 focuses on the impact of experience on rural residents’ preferences for microfinance 
attributes. The impact is modeled by taking experience as a latent variable influencing individuals’ 
choices based on McFadden’s random utility theory and as partial utility based on Bayesian 
inference under the consideration of preference heterogeneity and scale heterogeneity, respectively.  
The last chapter summarizes the results and suggests policy implications based on the findings in 
the dissertation. 
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Abstract 
This paper employs household-level data to examine factors that influence farm operators’ 
decisions to participate in microfinance for farming and off-farming production activities, and the 
impact of participation in microfinance on farm and off-farm income. The study applies an 
endogenous switching regression model to account for selection bias and potential endogeneity 
that arise as a result of self-selection into participation. The empirical findings show that the 
coefficients of farmland size, farm inputs, extension services and off-farm worker mainly 
determine the participation in microfinance for farming operation. The results also reveal that 
small-scale farm operators tend to benefit more from off-farm income than income from farm 
activities due to participation in microfinance.  
Key words: farm operator, benefit, microfinance, endogenous switching regression, China 
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2.1 Introduction 
Microfinance services have received considerable attention over the last two decades as an 
important government strategy to relieve credit constraints caused by market failures in rural areas 
in developing countries by providing rural residents with more accessible small-scale loans. The 
findings from a number of studies have shown that microfinance has the potential to contribute to 
households’ welfare, such as total income and consumption expenditures (Berhane and Gardebroek 
2011; Li et al. 2011; Kaboski and Townsend 2012), food security (Islam et al. 2016) and quality of 
life (Mazumder and Lu 2015) as well as women’s household bargaining positions (Porter 2016). 
These findings in return have encouraged policy makers to design and implement financial 
inclusion projects in rural areas, such as the World Bank Group’s Universal Financial Access 2020. 
However, other studies have recently claimed that microfinance does not significantly help in 
increasing household welfare (e.g., Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman 2015; Banerjee et al. 2015; 
Crépon et al. 2015). For example, in a study on India, Banerjee et al. (2015) found that microfinance 
did not appear to help households escape from poverty, even if it successfully leads some borrowers 
to expand their production. To the extent that the results are mixed and inconclusive, an important 
issue that needs to be addressed is the identification of who really benefits the most from 
microfinance participation.  
Given the significance and the aim of microfinance in rural poverty alleviation, the poor are always 
considered as an important treatment group, although the results obtained in recent studies are 
inconclusive. For example, Islam (2015), Akotey and Adjasi (2016) found that the poorest of the 
poor are most likely to benefit from participating in microfinance. However, the evidence provided 
by Rooyen et al. (2012), Lønborg and Rasmussen (2014) suggested that microfinance is not the 
right intervention to help the poor and can even increase their poverty. 
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Since the effects of microfinance are not constant across individuals, even when participating in 
the same microfinance program, the benefits that borrowers gain from microfinance services tend 
to vary (Beck et al. 2017). Many personal characteristics and external factors have generally been 
used to explain these differences. One such reason that has been mentioned in the literature is the 
income-generating activities (e.g., Hermes and Lensink 2009; Augsburg et al. 2015; Ganle et al. 
2015). As pointed out by Crépon et al. (2015), even if there are no benefits in terms of measured 
income and consumption from microfinance participation, the profit from self-employment 
activities will increase. However, few of the previous studies have focused on the benefit that farm 
operators obtain from microfinance. In a related study, Jia et al (2013) focused on off-farm 
production in China and found that microfinance has a positive effect on off-farm self-employment. 
Fenton et al. (2016) indicated the significance of microfinance in improving the agriculture-related 
coping capacity, which may latently contribute to farm work. Nevertheless, no research has 
highlighted the extent to which microfinance contributes to farm-related production. Therefore, a 
significant gap in the empirical literature remains the impact of microfinance on farm operators’ 
welfare. 
The importance of this issue also lies in its contemporary relevance. First, labor, technology and 
land are the fundamental cells in productive activities. In the process of urbanization in China, 
young, educated and male rural residents are more likely to migrate to urban areas due to the 
economic attractions of the secondary and tertiary industries (Chen et al., 2014; Gong, 2018). 
However, the migration of large numbers of laborers gradually results in the decline in agricultural 
productivity (Li et al., 2017). Given declining attractiveness of agricultural production and 
decreasing agricultural labor force, the question of whether microfinance is still beneficial to the 
development of small-scale farming deserves more attention. Second, capital is another vital 
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element of production, while the lack of credit is a primary constraint for people who want to start 
up and engage in off-farm activities (Jia et al. 2013). In addition, although the initial goal of 
microfinance is to alleviate poverty, the next step after poverty alleviation is another new issue, 
since the Chinese Government plans to lift all of its poor out of poverty by 2020. Therefore, this 
paper intends to examine the factors that affect rural residents’ decision to participate in 
microfinance for farm and off-farm activities and the way in which these factors and microfinance 
influence the associated outcomes. 
Several studies have analyzed the determinants of microfinance participation and the impact of 
participation on household welfare in the absence of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) (e.g., 
Duvendack and Palmer-Jones 2012; Mazumder and Lu 2014; Akotey and Adjasi 2016; Beck et al. 
2017). In their investigations using a propensity score matching (PSM) method, Duvendack and 
Palmer-Jones (2012) differentiated participants by gender and found that there is only a small 
gender difference regarding the impacts of microfinance. Using the same method, Mazumder and 
Lu (2015) focused on the difference between NGO and GO microfinance programs. They found 
that the positive effects of microfinance, such as food security, nutrition, sanitation and education, 
are more conspicuous among NGO microfinance recipients than among GO recipients. However, 
the common weaknesses of the above studies lie in the strong conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) of the PSM method, because this assumption requires selection to be independent of the 
potential outcome and the outcome is solely based on the observable variables. As argued by Imai 
et al. (2010), the determinants of participation are always affected by potential unobservable factors. 
These unobservable factors could easily incur biased results (Dehejia and Whaba, 2002). In a recent 
study on Ghana, using Heckman selection and instrumental variables, Akotey and Adjasi (2016) 
differentiated between microcredit with and without micro insurance and found that microcredit 
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benefits the poor sustainably if the poverty-trapping risks are appropriately managed by micro 
insurance. However, the Heckman selection and instrumental variable methods are restrictive, 
because they assume that the credit selection exerts an average impact on the outcome instead of 
an influence from different factors. Besides, Heckman selection treats unobservable factors as an 
omitted variable problem, and the estimator is the limited information maximum likelihood. 
Our study differs from these studies in terms of model consideration and empirical strategy. We 
use an endogenous switching regression model proposed by Lee (1978) and Maddala (1983) to 
address the limitations of selection bias and endogeneity by taking observable and unobservable 
factors into consideration. The selection that people face is between participating and not 
participating in microfinance. In addition, we differentiate between the participants who invest the 
loans in farming and those who invest them in off-farm production, respectively, to compare the 
changes between these two categories. The loans that we consider are productive loans from formal 
microfinance organizations, excluding consumption loans and loans from informal sources. The 
difference in the changes between the participants and the non-participants in farming and the 
changes between the two groups in off-farm activities allows us to investigate whether small-scale 
farm operators benefit more from microfinance participation. 
The structure of the study is as follows. The next section describes the background and the data 
used in the analysis. Section 2.3 presents the conceptual framework, and section 2.4 presents the 
empirical results. The final section presents conclusion and implication. 
2.2 Background and data 
Rural microfinance is playing an important role in establishing the financial inclusion system in 
China, and its importance has been increasing over the last decade. As shown in Figure 2.1, rural-
related loans, including rural loans, agricultural loans and rural households’ loans, have achieved 
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steady growth in the past. In particular, the rural loan balance experienced the most prominent 
growth from around 5 trillion in 2007 to more than 23 trillion in 2016. This trend relies on several 
specific microfinance programs that are tailored to meet the needs of rural households and 
contribute to the reform, innovation and development of rural-related finance. The village mutual 
aid funds is one of such programs designed to provide small and productive loans to poor rural 
households, particularly those facing financial constraints from financial institutions such as the 
Agricultural Bank of China, the Rural Credit Cooperatives and the Postal Savings Bank of China, 
as well as those experiencing difficulties in borrowing money from individual lenders. 
 
Figure 2.1 Rural-related loan balance in China 2007-20167 
 
Nonetheless, the growth rate of agricultural loans and rural households’ loans has been far lower 
than the growth rate of rural loans. Market failure has always been argued to be the reason for the 
rural poor being often excluded from formal financial institutions (Yuan and Xu 2015). This result 
                                                          
7 Rural loans include loans from rural households as well as loans from rural enterprises and organizations. Agricultural 
loans are provided for the production of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery. Rural households' loans 
are loans provided by financial institutions to households, including production loans and consumption loans. All the 
loans considered here are provided by formal financial institutions. 
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Sources: Compiled from China Rural Finance Service Report, National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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then led to the informal financial market in rural China being supplementary to the services 
provided by formal services (Cheng and Ahmed 2014). Another reason is probably the lower 
returns on agricultural investment of farmers, particularly compared with the wage income from 
urban areas. During the period from 2007 to 2016, the average producer price index for farm 
products was 6.84, while the average wage bill index of employed persons in urban units was 
15.02.8 The number of migrant workers increased from 242.13 million people in 2010 to 281.71 
million people in 20169. This phenomenon reflects the attractiveness of off-farm income causing 
the outflow of the farm labor force. The returns on investment activities of rural households are 
affected by many factors, such as resource endowments, entrepreneurial abilities and social 
networks. Funds are the first pillar across projects. Taking into account the promotion and pilot 
experiments of microfinance programs, as well as the growing demands of rural households for 
credit, it is particularly important to examine the impact of microfinance on their investment 
activities.  
The data used in this study were collected from a household survey conducted between October 
and December 2015 in Sichuan Province, in China. Many types of agriculture and distinct 
economic situations, as well as pilot microfinance projects, make Sichuan Province an appropriate 
laboratory for examining the effect of microfinance. Using information from Sichuan Statistical 
Yearbook, and taking into account the households’ income and consumption in regions, we 
purposively selected six regions. 552 respondents were selected from 27 villages in proportion to 
their populations, according to a multistage random sampling approach. Information from 
                                                          
8 Source: China Statistical Yearbook. Notes: Producer prices index for farm products reflect trend and degree of 
changes in producers’ prices received by farmers when they sell farm products during a given year. Wage bill index 
of employed persons in urban units reflect change of total wage of employed persons at different year.  
9 Source: Migrant Workers Monitoring and Survey Report 2016. Notes: Migrant workers refer to rural labor force who 
obtained employment outside their registered towns and townships. 
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respondents was gathered through face-to-face interview, covering questions on demographic 
characteristics, economic and financial status, as well as investment and production activities. 
Enumerators were hired to assist in conducting the interviews. 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. As can be seen 
from this table, income refers to the per capita total household income and is differentiated into 
farm and off-farm incomes. Generally, the off-farm income is close to treble the farm income. The 
data shows that about 60% of households took loans in the last 5 years, with formal financial 
institutions and informal loans from individual lenders accounting for about same proportions. In 
particular, 95 respondents invested the formal loans in general production activities, while 68 
respondents put the loans into agricultural production. The age, gender and education level are 
those of the household heads, since they are always the decision makers in families. The households 
in the sample are have an average family size of 3.65 people and an average farmland size of 3.35 
mu (1 mu = 1/15 hectare). The dependency ratio is estimated as the number of families outside the 
working age range divided by the number of families within that age range (16-60 years old). It 
follows the hypothesis that a lower dependency ratio contributes to household welfare. “Off-farm 
worker” is the number of off-farm laborers divided by the number of all employment laborers. This 
variable is used to capture the off-farm activities. The cost of chemical fertilizer and pesticide 
reflects the inputs of farm production. The coefficient of motorcycle, a common vehicle that is 
more expensive than (electric) bicycles but more affordable than cars in rural China, is used to 
differentiate households with different asset endowments. The coefficient of computer captures the 
probability of proactively acquiring new technology and market information. Distance to the 
nearest financial institution provides information about the transaction costs involved in accessing 
financial institutions. The coefficient of shocks is used to control whether the participation and 
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impact are caused by any unexpected events. Membership of the village mutual aid funds 
constitutes a social network in which individuals have access to specific loans and can obtain more 
information on credit programs. Farm extension service and training service are used to control the 
outcomes of farm production and off-farm production, respectively. In particular, microfinance 
information is used to distinguish people with knowledge about microfinance sources. 
Table 2.1 Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean S.D. 
Income Per capita total household income (1,000 yuan/year) 13.027 22.268 
Farm 
income 
Per capita farm income, including the income from selling 
farm products such as food crops, cash crops and livestock 
(1,000 yuan/year) 
3.944 20.381 
Off-farm 
income 
Per capita off-farm income, such as the income from off-
farm work, retail kiosk (1,000 yuan/year) 
9.083 9.416 
Farm net 
return 
Farm revenue minus costs (1,000 yuan/mu) 1.612 7.858 
Daily 
expense 
Per capita daily living expenses, such as the costs on daily 
food, necessities, children’s education, clothing, bedding 
goods, Water, electricity and fuel(1,000 yuan/year) 
4.628 3.410 
Loans 1 if household had loans in recent 5 years, including formal 
loans from financial institutions and informal loans from 
individual lenders; 0 otherwise 
.598 .021 
Formal 
loans 
1 if household had loans and the loans were provided by 
financial institutions, including production loans and 
consumption loans; 0 otherwise 
.303 .460 
Age Physical age of household head 59.071 11.423 
Gender 1 if the household head is male; 0 otherwise .911 .285 
Education Educational level of household head: 0=No schooling, 
1=Primary (1-6years), 2=Junior middle (7-9yesrs), 3=Senior 
middle (10-12years), 4=Training school (13-15years), 
5=Bachelor (13-16years), 6=Master or higher 
2.172 .791 
Family size Number of persons live in the family and share meals 3.654 1.548 
Farmland 
size 
Arable land, including the rent and cultivated land (Mu) 3.346 3.090 
Dependency 
ratio 
The number of families outside the working age range 
divided by the number of families aged within that age (16-
60 years old) 
1.073 .855 
Off-farm 
worker 
The Number of off-farm labor divided by the number of total 
employed workers 
.946 .936 
Farm inputs Cost of chemical fertilizer and pesticide (1,000 yuan/mu) .216 .268 
Motorcycle 1 if the household owns and uses motorcycle; 0 otherwise .299 .458 
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Computer 1 if the household owns and uses computer; 0 otherwise .167 .373 
Distance Distance to the nearest financial institution (Km) 3.631 3.284 
Shocks 1 if household has experienced any kind of shocks such as 
illness, fire, natural disasters within the last 12 months prior 
to the survey period; 0 otherwise 
.755 .430 
Membershi
p 
1 if household joint Village Mutual Aid Funds organization; 
0 otherwise 
.286 .452 
Information  Level of knowledge on microfinance information: 1=Very 
poor, 2=Poor, 3=Average, 4=Good, 5=Very good 
3.080 1.131 
Farm 
extension 
1 if household obtained extension service for farm 
productions, such as information and services on crops, 
inputs, techniques; 0 otherwise 
.261 .440 
Training 
service 
1 if household obtained training service for off-farm 
activities, such as employment training, information on 
migrate works; 0 otherwise 
.098 .297 
Area 1 1 if household is located in Ya’an; 0 otherwise .159 .366 
Area 2 1 if household is located in Guangyuan; 0 otherwise .183 .387 
Area 3 1 if household is located in Nanchong; 0 otherwise .178 .382 
Area 4 1 if household is located in Mianyang; 0 otherwise .185 .388 
Area 5 1 if household is located in Guang’an; 0 otherwise .179 .384 
Area 6 1 if household is located in Leshan; 0 otherwise .116 .320 
Note: 1 yuan (Chinese currency) ≈ 0.15US dollar at the time of survey. 1 mu = 1/15 hectare 
 
Table 2.2 presents the differences in households’ characteristics of participants and non-
participants. In total, 95 participants participated in formal microfinance with productive purposes 
against 457 non-participants. It is evident from the table that there are significant differences 
between participants and non-participants. For example, the mean values of participants for overall 
income and farm income are 19,409 and 11,086 yuan, significantly more than those of non-
participants, respectively, indicating huge differences in benefits, particularly in farm income. 
Although the magnitude is small, the farm net return of participants is 1.1 times larger than that of 
non-participants. The differences in off-farm income and daily expenses between the two 
categories are not significant. The results briefly imply that participation in formal microfinance 
with productive loans plays an important role in improving farm production. In terms of other 
significant household characteristics, participants appear to have a younger household head, higher 
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education levels and larger farmland sizes than non-participants. In addition, participants exhibit 
lower dependency ratios and short distances to the nearest market, which are hypothesized to have 
positive impact on welfare. The significantly higher farm inputs might be a factor that contributes 
to the higher net return. Moreover, there appear to be significant differences between participants 
and non-participants in the membership of village mutual aid funds, microfinance information and 
farm extension services. Although the comparison displayed above shows some significant 
differences between the participants and their counterparts, the discussion is not enough to support 
the final results, since it does not account for the decision process, self-selection and unobservable 
factors.  
Table 2.2 Household characteristics of participants and non-participants 
Variable 
Participants Non-participants Diff. 
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
Income 19.409 4.363 11.700 .688 7.709*** 2.492 
Farm income 11.086 4.314 2.489 .522 8.627*** 2.271 
Off-farm income 8.323 .777 9.241 .456 -.918 1.062 
Farm net return 2.848 1.562 1.355 .241 1.493* .885 
Daily expense 4.867 .357 4.578 .159 .288 .385 
Age 57.274 1.304 59.444 .520 -2.170* 1.286 
Gender .884 .033 .917 .013 -.033 .032 
Education 2.326 .083 2.140 .037 .186** .089 
Family size 3.695 .160 3.646 .072 .049 .175 
Farmland size 4.261 .505 3.156 .118 1.105*** .346 
Dependency ratio .933 .075 1.102 .041 -.169* .096 
Off-farm worker .905 .109 .954 .042 -.049 .106 
Farm inputs .258 .032 .207 .012 .051* .030 
Motorcycle .368 .050 .284 .021 .084 .052 
Computer .189 .040 .162 .017 .027 .042 
Distance 3.020 .235 3.758 .161 -.738** .369 
Shocks .779 .043 .751 .020 .028 .049 
Membership .653 .049 .210 .019 .443*** .047 
Information  3.705 .108 2.950 .052 .755*** .123 
Farm extension .442 .051 .223 .019 .219*** .049 
Training service .095 .030 .099 .014 -.004 .034 
Number of observations 95 457   
Note: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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2.3 Conceptual framework 
2.3.1 Theoretical model 
In this section, we specify a model of participation in microfinance for different purposes and 
participation’s impact on households’ associated outcomes. We model the participation in 
microfinance under the assumption that individuals choose between participation and non-
participation in microfinance. We assume that household 𝑖  is risk neutral and maximizes its 
expected utility 𝑌𝑖𝑃 and 𝑌𝑖𝑁 derived from participation and non-participation, respectively. The two 
utility equations can be specified as 
𝑌𝑖𝑃 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑃 + 𝜇𝑖𝑃 ,                                                                                                                      (1a) 
𝑌𝑖𝑁 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖𝑁 ,                                                                                                                     (1b) 
where 𝑋 is a vector of relevant explanatory variables; 𝛽𝑃 and 𝛽𝑁 are vectors of parameters; 𝜇𝑖𝑃 and 
𝜇𝑖𝑁 present error terms that are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. A household 
will choose to participate in microfinance if the expected utility obtained by participating is higher 
than that obtained by not participating in, that is, 𝑌𝑖𝑃 > 𝑌𝑖𝑁.  
However, the expected utilities in both participation and non-participation at the time of decision 
making cannot be observed, while it is possible to assume that this unknown expected utility will 
be derived from their choice to participate by a latent variable 𝐷𝑖
∗, which can then be captured by 
households’ observed characteristics. The latent variable can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗      𝜀~(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) ,                                                                                                                    (2) 
with 𝐷𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ > 0
0 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
} , 
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where 𝑍 represents observed variables that influence the likelihood of participation, such as socio-
demographic and household characteristics; 𝛼 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; 𝜀 denotes 
an idiosyncratic unobserved stochastic component; and 𝐷𝑖 is a binary variable taking the value 1 
when individual 𝑖 participates in associated microfinance. 
2.3.2 Empirical specification 
In the previous discussion, rural residents are assumed to maximize their expected economic 
welfare when facing the option of whether to participate in formal microfinance (𝐽𝑃) or not (𝐽𝑁), in 
which participation is specified as borrowing for productive activities. Farm income and non-farm 
income are used as outcome variables to analyze the impact of participation on household welfare. 
In the decision and outcome equations, despite the observable characteristics of individuals that 
are involved in self-selection, such as household characteristics, village traits, economic zone and 
experience of previous shocks, some unobservable attributes that contain useful information and 
affect their choice decisions and outcomes may result in self-selection bias. Even if the random 
sampling approach is implemented, the data are not a random sample of the total population, and 
one period of data may not capture the complete influence of credit because it takes some time 
before the full effects of microfinance are realized (Berhane and Gardebroek, 2011). In particular, 
entrepreneurial abilities, social networks and transaction costs are supposed to be the unobserved 
factors. Rural residents’ entrepreneurial abilities lie in their productive capabilities and profitability 
in using funds rather than being based only on their observable education level. The functioning 
mechanism of social networks formed by individuals can hardly be captured. For instance, 
individuals have different motivations regarding the decision and the different ways in which they 
obtain loans. Their contact with neighbors will also be diverse and unobservable, even without 
considering moral risk. Besides, the transaction costs involved in searching for information, 
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negotiating with credit lenders and even repaying loans are difficult to capture. As noted by Abdulai 
and Huffman (2014), if these unobserved variables are not measured, there will be a correlation 
between the independent variables and the error term, in which case standard regression techniques, 
such as OLS, would produce inconsistent coefficient estimates. 
Given that individuals choose whether to participate or not, the outcome estimation model for 
each possible regime (𝑗) can be stated as: 
{
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑃|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑃 + 𝜇𝑖𝑃
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑁|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑁 + 𝜇𝑖𝑁
 ,                                                                                                   (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the outcome of household (𝑖) in regime(𝑗) (𝑗 = 𝑃,𝑁) and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of household 
characteristics. Vectors 𝛽 and 𝛼 (in equation (2)) are associated parameters that will be estimated. 
𝜇 presents the unobserved disturbance, which satisfies 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 0 and𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝜎𝑗
2. 
Notably, though 𝑋 and 𝑧 could overlap, at least one variable in 𝑧 should not appear in 𝑋 to ensure 
proper identification. 
For equation (3), to correct the selection bias arising from the correlated error terms 𝜇 and 𝜀, we 
assume a joint-normal distribution for the error terms 𝜇𝑃, 𝜇𝑁 , 𝜀 with mean zero and a covariance 
matrix(𝛺) to control the selection bias: 
𝛺 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑃, 𝜇𝑁 , 𝜀 ) = [
𝜎𝑃
2 𝜎𝑁𝑃 𝜎𝜀𝑃
𝜎𝑃𝑁 𝜎𝑁
2 𝜎𝜀𝑁
𝜎𝑃𝜀 𝜎𝑁𝜀 𝜎𝜀
2
]                                                                                      (4) 
where 𝜎𝑃
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑃), 𝜎𝑁
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑁), 𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝜀), 𝜎𝑃𝑁 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑃, 𝜇𝑁), 𝜎𝑃𝜀 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑃, 𝜀) and 
𝜎𝑁𝜀 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜇𝑃𝑁, 𝜀) . According to Maddala (1986), it gives rise to an endogenous switching 
regression when 𝜎𝑃𝜀 ≠ 𝜎𝑁𝜀 ≠ 0, namely a correlation between the error terms of the selection 
equation and the outcome equation, that is, 𝜌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜇, 𝜀). Conversely, it results in an exogenous 
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switching regression when 𝜎𝑃𝜀 = 𝜎𝑁𝜀 = 0. Specifically, 𝜌 > 0 represents a negative selection bias, 
indicating that individuals with below-average outcomes are more likely to participate in 
microfinance, while 𝜌 < 0  represents a positive selection bias, denoting that individuals with 
above-average outcomes are more likely to participate.  
Following Johnson and Kotz (1970), the conditional expectation of the truncated error terms 𝜇𝑃, 𝜇𝑁 
can be given as: 
𝐸(𝜇𝑃|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑃|𝜀 > −𝑍𝛼) = 𝜎𝑃𝜀
𝜑(𝑍𝛼/𝜎)
Ф(𝑍𝛼/𝜎)
≡ 𝜎𝑃𝜀𝜆𝑃 ,                                                          (5a) 
𝐸(𝜇𝑁|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑁|𝜀 ≤ −𝑍𝛼) = 𝜎𝑁𝜀
−𝜑(𝑍𝛼/𝜎)
1−Ф(𝑍𝛼/𝜎)
≡ 𝜎𝑁𝜀𝜆𝑁 ,                                                    (5b) 
where 𝜑 and Ф are the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard 
normal distribution, respectively; 𝜆𝑃 and 𝜆𝑁 are the ratio of 𝜑 and Ф estimated at 𝑍𝛼, referred to 
as the inverse Mills ratio, that accounts for the selection bias.  
The ESR model follows a two-step approach. The first stage is a probit model, capturing the 
probabilities of choosing (equation (2)). The accordingly generated estimates 𝑍 and 𝛼 can be used 
to estimate the 𝜆  in the second impact estimation stage (equation (5)). The drawback of this 
approach is the heteroscedasticity that arises from inconstant variances. The heteroskedastic 
residuals cannot be used to derive consistent standard errors without cumbersome adjustments. 
Lokshin and Sajaia (2004) proposed the full-information maximum likelihood (FILM) method to 
address this limitation by estimating these two equations simultaneously with the movestay 
command in STATA. 
Empirically, to obtain more consistent results, we augment the selection and outcome equations by 
exploiting the village-varying variables ?̅?𝑖  to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Because financial institutions always non-randomly place services across villages, some 
unobserved factors might be taken into account by microfinance providers, which can cause 
inconsistent estimates. We hence take the rate of off-farm workers, education level and farm land 
size as the village-varying variables. These three variables refer to the factors of production and 
vary across different villages. In particular, the mean rate of off-farm workers indicates whether 
the development of the village is driven by agriculture. The mean education level indicates the 
overall educational level, and the mean farm land size indicates the village resource endowment. 
We assume that these variables are linearly related to unobservable factors in both selection and 
outcome equations, that is, 𝜇𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖𝜃𝜇 + 𝜖𝑖𝜇  and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = ?̅?𝑖𝜃𝜀 + 𝜖𝑖𝜀 , where 𝜖𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜑
2)  and 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖|?̅?𝑖) = 0; 𝜃 is the corresponding coefficient vector.  
Another issue that needs to be considered is the potential endogeneity problem that may arise from 
variables such as membership of village mutual aid funds. This variable strikingly indicates that 
people are willing to participate in microfinance for production investments. To ensure the 
identification in the participation specification, we follow Rivers and Vuong’s (1988) approach to 
address the potential endogeneity problem. This method is carried out by inserting the observed 
endogenous variable and the vector of the residual term from the first-stage regression of the 
endogenous variable into the participation equation. A suitable instrument should strongly 
influence the endogenous variable, but not influence the selection decision (Abdulai and Huffman 
2005). We employ the distance to VMAFs as the instrument for the membership of VMAFs. This 
instrument is tested and identified as significantly affecting the endogenous variable but not the 
participation, respectively (see appendix Table 2.7 A1-1 and Table 2.8 A1-2). For the model 
identification, a variable is used that affects the selection but not the outcome as the identifying 
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instrument. In this study, credit information and distance to the nearest market are used for this 
purpose.  
Our interest is in the average treatment effect of participation in microfinance on the effect of the 
outcomes. The difference in the outcomes between participation and non-participation can be 
captured by the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect on 
the untreated (ATU), which can be specified as: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑃|𝐷𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑁|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖(𝛽𝑃 − 𝛽𝑁) + 𝜆𝑃(𝜎𝑃𝜀 − 𝜎𝑁𝜀) ,                              (6) 
𝐴𝑇𝑈 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑃|𝐷𝑖 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑁|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖(𝛽𝑃 − 𝛽𝑁) + 𝜆𝑁(𝜎𝑃𝜀 − 𝜎𝑁𝜀) ,                              (7) 
where 𝜎 represents the covariance of the error terms and 𝜆 represents the inverse Mills ratios.  
2.4 Empirical results 
The estimates of the determinants of participation and the influence of participation on benefits are 
presented in this section. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 contain the endogenous switching regression results 
for the selection and impacts of participation on farm income and off-farm income, respectively, 
in which the participants are set as treatment groups.10 
Given that the coefficients of the selection equation are determined by probit estimation, we will 
discuss the probabilities of participation in both tables together. As indicated previously, the 
residual derived from the first-stage regression for the potential endogenous variable, which is 
membership of VMAFs, is added in the selection equations in both specifications. The estimates 
                                                          
10 In the farm income specification, the participants are those who borrowed money for agricultural-related productive 
activities, and the sample only includes the respondents who engaged in farm work, so the number of observations is 
409. In the off-farm income specification, the participants are those who borrowed money for all productive 
investments, due to the fact that the number of pure off-farm production loans was quite small. 
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report that the residuals (Membership_res) in Tables 3 and 4 are not significantly different from 
zero, indicating that the coefficients have been estimated consistently.  
In the farm income specification, the variables representing distance to the nearest market and 
credit information are used as identifying instruments. The results show that they are statistically 
significant drivers of participation in microfinance, but not of farm income for both participants 
and non-participants (see appendix Table 2.9 A2). Similarly, credit information is used as a valid 
instrument to identify the off-farm income, since it does not significantly influence the outcome 
for given participants or non-participants. The 𝑥2  statistics for the over-identification test are 
insignificant, indicating that the instrumental variables are valid. The likelihood ratio tests for joint 
independence of the three equations are also reported. The significantly positive estimates indicate 
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the equations are dependent, denoting that ignoring 
selection bias would render the estimates biased and inconsistent. 
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Table 2.3 ESR results for selection and impact of agricultural loans participation on farm income 
Variable  
Selection Participants Non-participants 
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
_cons -3.739*** 1.329 -1.289 2.765 -1.145 .698 
Age -.011 .013 -.0001 .022 -.003 .007 
Gender -.134 .364 .544 .566 -.029 .194 
Education -.031 .145 .211 .264 -.029 .079 
Family size .012 .102 -.227 .175 -.248*** .052 
Farmland size .061** .031 .050 .046 .188*** .025 
Dependency ratio -.168 .161 -.584* .346 .015 .081 
Off-farm worker -.115 .174 -.653** .318 -.160* .091 
Farm inputs .941** .339 -.760 .526 .149 .218 
Motorcycle -.449 .275 -.157 .449 .143 .137 
Computer .566* .323 2.126*** .859 .549*** .157 
Shocks -.045 .259 .391 .411 -.259** .127 
Farm extension .404* .231 .814** .421 .370*** .137 
Training service -.724* .373 .436 .716 -.471* .242 
Membership 2.119*** .336 -.140 .874 -.078 .209 
Mean education .941*** .323 .354 .835 .844*** .155 
Mean farmland size -.212** .115 .219 .210 -.084* .048 
Mean off-farm worker -3.136*** 1.142 -.213 2.642 -1.501** .658 
Membership_res -.011 .640     
Distance .132*** .040     
Information .226** .121     
LnσP   .196** .086   
ρPε   -.409*** .009   
LnσN     .001 .040 
ρNε     .312* .158 
Log likelihood -697.188      
Over identification test 2.083[.353]      
Wald𝑥2(17) 77.41***      
LR test of indep. eqns. 𝑥2(1) 39.44***      
Number of observation  409      
Note: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. P-value in square brackets. 
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Table 2.4 ESR results for selection and impact of production loans participation on off-farm 
Variable  
Selection Participants Non-participants 
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
_cons -3.082*** .938 -.853 1.554 .065 .524 
Age -.009 .009 -.002 .012 .010** .005 
Gender -.315 .271 -.612* .316 .056 .159 
Education .027 .105 -.190 .146 .136** .060 
Family size .078 .073 .217** .099 .010 .038 
Farmland size .084*** .028 .034 .029 -.030 .019 
Dependency ratio -.162 .121 -.305 .193 -.161*** .063 
Off-farm worker -.116 .117 .447*** .145 .727*** .067 
Farm inputs .593** .266 .409 .330 .140 .169 
Motorcycle -.022 .181 -.026 .243 .029 .105 
Computer .311 .218 .579 .372 .372*** .128 
Shocks -.064 .185 .199 .242 -.189* .100 
Farm extension .047 .182 .379* .228 -.025 .109 
Training service .754*** .283 .827** .379 .332** .163 
Distance .046 .028 .043 .053 -.001 .014 
Membership 1.708*** .281 .434 .467 .175 .153 
Mean education .582*** .222 .350 .339 -.190 .131 
Mean farmland size -.076 .073 .014 .098 .097** .039 
Mean off-farm worker -1.226** .576 -.220 .860 1.530*** .551 
Membership_res -.475 .503     
Information .163** .080     
LnσP   -.118 .135   
ρPε   .188** .083   
LnσN     -.125*** .035 
ρNε     .493 .278 
Log likelihood -889.359      
Over identification test .455[.500]      
Wald𝑥2(18) 134.69***      
LR test of indep. eqns. 𝑥2(1) 2.45*      
Number of observation  552      
Note: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. P-value in square brackets. 
 
The variables in both specifications display statistically similar effects on participation. The 
variable representing farmland size is positive and significantly different from zero. This result 
indicates that the probability of participation increases with increasing farmland size. The 
coefficients of fertilizer and pesticide inputs are positive and significant in both tables, indicating 
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that households that use more agriculture-related inputs are more likely to participate in 
microfinance programs. The coefficients of farm extension service are positive in both 
specifications. In particular, they are significantly different from zero in Table 2.3, denoting that 
farm extension services contribute significantly to participation in agricultural loans. The 
coefficients of training service are significantly negative for participation in agricultural loans in 
Table 2.3, but positive for participation in general production loans in Table 2.4. This result 
indicates that people who take part in more training services are less likely to take advantage of 
loans for farm production, but tend to borrow money for off-farm investments. The village-varying 
variables are significantly different from zero, indicating significant cluster effects and some 
unobserved heterogeneity in the selection and outcome estimations. In particular, the significantly 
positive coefficient of mean education reveals that a higher regional education level contributes to 
participation in microfinance. Besides, the negative coefficients of mean farmland size and mean 
off-farm workers indicate that people who live in the villages with smaller average farmland sizes 
and fewer off-farm workers are more likely to participate in microfinance. 
An interesting finding in both specifications is the sign and significance of the covariance terms 
(ρPε and ρNε) between the error terms in the selection and outcome equations. The results show 
that the covariance terms for the participants are all statistically significant, indicating that selection 
bias from participation resulted from unobservable factors. Moreover, the negative sign for ρPε in 
Table 2.3 indicates a positive selection bias, suggesting that households with an above-average 
farm income have a higher probability of participations in microfinance for agricultural loans. The 
positive sign for ρPε in Table 2.4 indicates a negative selection bias, denoting that households with 
below-average off-farm income possess a higher probability of participation in microfinance for 
non-agricultural loans. The covariance estimate for non-participants (ρNε) in Table 2.3 is positive 
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and significantly different from zero, indicating that people who choose not to participate in 
microfinance earn a lower income than a random individual from the sample would have obtained. 
The statistically insignificant covariance term for non-participants (ρNε) in Table 2.4 suggests that 
there would be no significant difference in the outcome between participants and non-participants 
caused by unobserved factors. The differences between 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝑃  and 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝑁  (i.e.,𝐿𝑛𝜎𝑃 − 𝐿𝑛𝜎𝑁 ) in 
tables 2.3 and 2.4 also reveal that participation contributes to higher incomes than that under 
random assignment. The values of ρNε − ρPε are also positive, indicating that participants earn a 
higher farm income and off-farm income than they would, if they did not participate in 
microfinance, respectively. 
The results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that the personal characteristics have differential impacts 
on participants and non-participants for both farm income and off-farm income specification. 
According to the results, household heads’ characteristics only have significant impacts on off-
farm income for participants and non-participants. In particular, older ages and higher education 
levels of non-participants help in raising their off-farm incomes. Female household heads may lead 
families to earn more off-farm income from participation in production loans. This finding is in 
line with the argument put forward by Boehe and Cruz (2013), Banerjee et al. (2015) that female 
participants improve financial performance.  
The positive and significant coefficient of farmland size in Table 2.3 indicates that, for the non-
participants, larger farmland obtains significantly more farm income than smaller farmland. In the 
off-farm specification, farmland has no significant impact on both the participant and non-
participant groups. These results indicate the significance of farmland in farming production. The 
results of the dependency ratio and off-farm worker coefficients support the hypotheses that lower 
dependency ratio and fewer off-farm workers significantly increase farm income, while lower 
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dependency ratio and higher off-farm workers tend to increase off-farm income. This finding 
highlights the importance of the labor force in improving family welfare.  
The coefficient of the variable representing mean education level is positive, although that of the 
variable representing education level of household head is positive but not significantly different 
from zero. These results suggest that education is important in raising farm income. The coefficient 
of shocks seems to have a negative impact on both income specifications, but it is only significant 
for non-participants. The result may reflect the role of microfinance in relieving risks. It is 
interesting to see that farm extension services significantly contribute to both farm and off-farm 
incomes, while training services did not help to increase farm income. Average farmland size and 
average off-farm workers appear to have differential impacts on farm income and off-farm income. 
The negative and significant coefficients in Table 2.3 indicate that, for non-participants, households 
with smaller average farmland and fewer average off-farm workers obtain a significantly higher 
farm income. However, the positive and significant coefficients in Table 2.4 show that these 
variables have the opposite impacts on off-farm income for non-participants. 
Of significant interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which captures the 
impact of participation on farm income and off-farm income. The results are reported in Tables 2.5 
and 2.6, respectively. According to the results in Table 2.5, the causal effect of participation in 
microfinance for general production loans on farm income is significantly negative, indicating that 
rural households that participated in production loans obtained lower farm incomes than their 
counterparts who did not participate. The causal effect of participation in microfinance for 
agricultural loans on farm income as shown in Table 2.6. The result indicates that households that 
participated in agricultural loans benefited more from farm income than non-participants. In 
contrast, the causal effects of participation in both production loans and specific agricultural loans 
Chapter 2 Do Small-scale Farm Operators Benefit from Microfinance Participation? Evidence from 
Rural China 
  
46 
 
on off-farm income are significantly positive. In particular, the ATT of participation in agricultural 
loans on off-farm income is significantly larger than the ATT on farm income. 
Robustness check is performed by replacing some independent variables and using the coefficients 
of areas as clusters. The results show that the treatment effects are robust.  
The inconsistent effects of microfinance participation on farm income may be the results of farmers 
diverting loans into non-farm activities. Because the majority of microfinance programs are 
designed to help farmers increase output and productivity, it is much easier to obtain agricultural 
loans. 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 also test the average treatment on untreated (ATU) of participation on farm and 
off-farm incomes. The ATU results in both tables indicate that non-participants would obtain a 
higher farm income but a lower off-farm income if they participated. The positive effects on farm 
income may be caused by the selection bias. However, the negative effects on off-farm income 
reveal that for most rural residents, expanding agricultural production is an effective way to 
increase their income, since not everyone has opportunities and capabilities to invest in off-farm 
production. 
Table 2.5 Impact of microfinance participations for production loans on farm and off-farm 
income 
  Participants Non-participants  
  Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. ATT Std.Err. 
Farm income   .478 .119 2.369 .072 -1.891*** .152 
Off-farm income 1.545 .104 .586 .044 .959*** .107 
 Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. ATU Std.Err. 
Farm income   .266 .129 .193 .046 .073 .111 
Off-farm income 1.477 .096 1.689 .039 -.212** .096 
Note: As the dependent variable in the outcome equation is logarithm of income measured in thousand yuan/capita, 
the predictions are also given in logarithms. *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Impact of microfinance participations for agricultural loans on farm and off-farm 
income 
  Participants Non-participants  
  Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. ATT Std.Err. 
Farm income   .596 .160 .246 .081 .350* .195 
Off-farm income 1.264 .126 .612 .049 .652*** .139 
 Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. ATU Std.Err. 
Farm income   .803 .141 .186 .042 .617*** .114 
Off-farm income 1.311 .093 1.720 .038 -.409*** .106 
Note: As the dependent variable in the outcome equation is logarithm of income measured in thousand yuan/capita, 
the predictions are also given in logarithms. *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper analyses the factors that influence rural households’ decision to participate in 
microfinance for farm and off-farm activities, and the impact of two categories of participation on 
farm income and off-farm income, using household survey data from China. An endogenous 
switching regression model is used to account for selectivity bias and to capture the differential 
impacts of microfinance on participants and non-participants. 
The empirical results highlight some common features of participating in microfinance, either for 
farm or for off-farm production. Generally, farmland, farm inputs, extension services, credit 
information and mean education levels have a significant influence on the likelihood of 
participation in microfinance. In particular, households with larger farmland sizes and more farm 
inputs, enjoyed more farm extension services but fewer training services, and those with fewer off-
farm workers display a greater probability of participation in agricultural loans. The empirical 
results indicate that participation may not have had the same effect on non-participants if they had 
participated. Specifically, the positive selection bias term in the farm income specification suggests 
that households with above-average agricultural income are more likely to participate in 
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microfinance for their production investments. Regarding the impact of participation on household 
incomes, the results reveal that microfinance exerts a weak stimulating effect on small-scale farm 
production, while it plays a robust role in promoting off-farm production. 
Overall, the findings reported suggest that microfinance can help in improving the welfare of rural 
households. The “divergent” results suggest that the further focus of rural microfinance should be 
directed to tailoring some programs to households’ off-farm operations, especially in relation to 
the status quo of the continuously decreasing attractiveness of small-scale agricultural production 
in China. Given the factors contributing to microfinance participation and higher income in both 
specifications, effective policies should, meanwhile, include measures to improve both farm and 
training services, help households in overcoming information barriers, and improve the mean 
education level.  
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Appendix 
Table 2.7 A1-1 First-stage regression of the endogenous variable Membership 
Variable Coef. Std.Err. 
_cons .334 .946 
Age .008 .009 
Gender -.145 .263 
Education .064 .104 
Family size -.090 .068 
Farmland size -.017 .027 
Dependency ratio .015 .114 
Off-farm worker .119 .118 
Farm inputs -.031 .309 
Motorcycle -.043 .181 
Computer -.924*** .246 
Shocks .564*** .193 
Farm extension .400** .168 
Training service 1.236*** .222 
Mean education -.669*** .252 
Mean farmland size -.084 .074 
Mean off-farm worker .016 .820 
Distance_VMAFs -1.327*** .386 
Distance -.188*** .039 
Information .427*** .074 
Log likelihood -201.966  
LR 𝒙𝟐 257.08***  
Pseudo R2 .389  
Number of observation  552  
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Table 2.8 A1-2 Correlation between the instrumental variable and the selection equations 
Outcome Instrumental variable Coef. Std.Err. 
Participation in agricultural loans Distance_VMAFs -.088 .215 
Participation in general production loans Distance_VMAFs -.134 .195 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.9 A2 Test of the validity of identifying instruments 
Outcome 
Identifying 
instrument 
Coef. Std.Err. 
Farm income by participants of agricultural 
loans 
Distance -.187 .143 
Information .396 .521 
Farm income by non-participants of 
agricultural loans 
Distance -.054 .092 
Information .026 .054 
Off-farm income by participants of 
production loans 
Information -.088 .136 
Off-farm income by non-participants of 
production loans 
Information .041 .040 
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Abstract 
It is widely accepted that rural microcredit has the potential to contribute to poverty reduction in 
developing countries. This paper examines the factors that affect rural residents’ decisions to 
participate in different types of microcredit, and how these factors impact on household income 
and consumption, using cross-sectional data from a survey in China. A multinomial endogenous 
switching regression model is employed to account for selection bias and treatment effects. The 
empirical findings indicate that family size, dependency ratio, local casual wage rate, credit 
information and shocks mainly determine the selection of different credit sources. Furthermore, the 
estimates reveal that participation in microcredit tends to increase both per capita income and 
consumption significantly. 
Key words: microcredit, self-selection, impact assessment, multinomial endogenous switching, 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 An Analysis of the Factors Influencing Choice of microcredit Sources and Impact of 
Participation on Household Income 
 
56 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As a result of market failure, rural residents often face problems in accessing credit from financial 
institutions, making it difficult for them to invest in income generating activities (Imai et al., 2010; 
Attanasio et al., 2015; Mookherjee and Motta, 2016). Microcredit has therefore received significant 
attention over the last two decades as a strategy of enhancing rural residents’ access financial 
sources. The main sources of microcredit for the rural poor include commercial banks, individuals, 
nonbank credit organizations, as well as specific programs that are tailored to meet the needs of 
poor rural households. Given the different types of microcredit programs and sources, there is still 
disagreement as to which type is more beneficial for rural households. The selection is important 
because microcredit not only provides credit for rural residents and the poor to help eradicate 
poverty and improve food security, but also plays a significant role in the financial inclusion system 
that helps to avoid rural areas falling into the trap of long-term backward development. Therefore, 
understanding the barriers and drives of participation in microcredit selection, and the impact of 
participation on household welfare will help in the design of effective policies to reduce rural 
poverty.  
Given the significance of microcredit in rural poverty alleviation, the Chinses government has 
launched many microcredit programs to reform and strengthen the rural financial system. One of 
such efforts is the Village Mutual Aid Funds, which is designed to provide loans to rural households 
facing financial constraints, and having difficulties in accessing credit from both financial 
institutions and money lenders. 
To the extent that microcredit schemes have significant impacts on rural livelihoods, several studies 
have analyzed the determinants of participation in these schemes, and the impacts of participation 
on household welfare (e.g., Mahjabeen, 2008; Nghiem et al., 2012; Kaboski and Townsend, 2012; 
Bruhn and Love, 2014; Lahkar and Pingali, 2016). These studies secondly show that participation 
in microcredit tends to contribute to welfare and poverty alleviation, by helping households 
purchase agricultural inputs or invest in nonfarm activities. 
However, some studies have indicated that these benefits are limited, since microcredit only lead 
to fewer businesses and lower subjective well-being (Karlan and Zinman, 2011), and that 
contributions rely on investments in income generating activities (Hermes and Lensink, 2009). 
Recent studies show microcredit does not significantly impact smallholders’ welfare (e.g., 
Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman, 2015; Banerjee, 2015; Crépon et al., 2015). For example, in a study 
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on Morocco, including both control and treatment groups, Crépon et al. (2015) emphasized that 
microcredit access is able to significantly increase self-employment income, but they found no net 
impact on total labor income and consumption. Mazumder and Lu (2014) also found that 
microfinance helps to increase the basic rights of participants, and improve the quality of life of 
rural households in Bangladesh. The findings from the previous studies on the impact of 
microcredit appear to be mixed and inconclusive. Hence, more research is needed to shed more 
light on this important issue. 
In addition, empirical literature focuses more on participation in microcredit, without any analysis 
on the choice of microcredit sources. Some studies here argued that formal and informal financial 
institutions are complementary (Ayyagari et al., 2010; Mallick, 2012). Turvey and Kong (2010) 
indicate that informal borrowing is preferred to formal because of community trust between 
borrowers and lenders. Other studies have analyzed the participation and impact of some financial 
programs (e.g., Takahashi et al., 2010; Dineen and Le, 2015). However, the studies do not compare 
the impacts of different credit sources to ascertain which microcredit programs are more beneficial. 
The present study contributes to the literature by examining the determinants of participation in 
various microfinance programs, and the impact of participation on household welfare in rural China. 
We employ a multinomial endogenous switching regression model that accounts for selection bias 
arising from both observable and unobservable factors. The various microcredit sources we 
consider include commercial banks, village mutual aid funds, friends and relatives. To the extent 
that these three categories of credit sources have their own outstanding characteristics, 
understanding these difference would help in developing more beneficial microcredit programs for 
rural residents. 
3.2 Background and data 
3.2.1 Background 
In China, rural microcredit plays an important role in the financial system, and its importance has 
been increasing during the last decade. For example, the agricultural loan balance nearly 
quadrupled from 849.03 billion yuan in 2004 to 3339.40 billion yuan in 2014, with the rural 
household loan balance increasing about 7.88 times in 2014, to 5358.70 billion yuan over that in 
2004 with 679.56 billion yuan. These represented average growth rates of 14.82% and 23.09% 
respectively. By contrast, the average growth rate of per capita income was only 13.63% during 
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that period11. This trend contributes to, as well as accompanies a dramatic expansion, innovation 
and pilot experiment of rural-related financial institutions. At this moment, rural banking 
institutions compose of  traditional commercial banks such as Agricultural Development Bank of 
China, Agricultural Bank of China, Rural Credit Cooperatives and Postal Savings Bank of China, 
and three new type of financial institutions such as Rural Mutual Fund Cooperatives, Village or 
Township Banks and Loan Companies.  
Rural credit market has some certain characteristics leading to market failure, which are scarcity 
of collateral security, underdeveloped complementary institutions, covariant risks and information 
asymmetry (Cole, 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2011). Therefore, in order to target the poor rural 
residents, Chinese government launched Village Mutual Aid Funds projects in depressed villages 
since 2007. Majority of this funds is composed by the state poverty reduction funds, and the rest is 
combined with allocated funds from participants. Different from previous poverty reduction 
projects, this program manages the funds using endogenous operating method that only members 
are able to access. It employs the joint-guarantee mechanism that each loan contract requires 
guarantees from two to five households. Even informal credit sources such as friends and relatives 
have been the supplementary to the services provided by formal services (Cheng and Ahmed, 2014), 
not all people have equal access even to informal credit, the poorest of the poor may still have 
credit constraints that be excluded from informal credit markets (Yuan and Xu, 2015). So the 
meaning of VMAFs is to cover the gap of poor groups on microcredit. 
3.2.2 Data 
The data used in this study were collected from household interview conducted between October 
and December 2015 in Sichuan province, China. Many types of agricultural products and 
distinctive economic situations, as well as pilot projects on microcredit and village mutual aid funds 
make this province an appropriate study area. 
A multistage random sampling approach was used to select reasonable study sites and respondents. 
Using information from the Sichuan Statistical Yearbook, we selected six regions from the 
province, taking into consideration the per capita income and consumption in the regions, as well 
as the availability of participants and non-participants in microfinance programs. We then 
randomly selected 552 households from 72 villages in proportion to their populations. Information 
                                                          
11 Source: China Rural Finance Service Report 2014, The People’s Bank of China. China Statistical Yearbook. 1 
yuan ≈ 0.15 US dollar at the time of survey. 
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from individuals were collected via face-to-face interview, including questions on demographic 
characteristics, economic and financial status, agricultural production practices, and village mutual 
aid funds situations.  Enumerators were hired to assist in conducting the interviews.  
 
Table 3.1 Total sample descriptive statistics12 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Income Household income per capita (thousand yuan/year) 13.027 22.268 
Consumption Household consumption per capita (thousand 
yuan/year) 
6.682 8.773 
Credit 1 if respondent had credit in recent 5 years; 0 
otherwise 
.598 .021 
Age Physical age of household head 59.071 11.423 
Gender 1 if the household head is male; 0 otherwise .911 .285 
Farm size Arable land, including the rent and cultivated land 
(Mu) 
3.346 3.090 
Family size Number of persons live in the family and share 
meals 
3.654 1.548 
Off-farm employment 
ratio 
The Number of off-farm employment labor divided 
by the number of all employment labor 
.332 .013 
Dependency ratio The number of families outside the working age 
range divided by the number of families aged within 
that age (16-60 years old) 
1.073 .855 
Motorcycle Ownership of motorcycle = 1; 0 otherwise .299 .458 
Head education Household head’s educational level: 0=No 
schooling, 1=Primary (1-6years), 2=Junior middle 
(7-9yesrs), 3=Senior middle (10-12years), 
4=Training school (13-15years), 5=Bachelor (13-
16years), 6=Master or higher 
2.172 .791 
Business 1if the household runs business; 0 otherwise .078 .268 
Distance Distance to nearest financial institution (Km) 3.617 3.273 
Road Distance to the nearest vehicle usable road (Km) .197 .571 
Off-farm agricultural 
wage rate 
Casual wage rate of local off-farm agricultural 
works (yuan/day) 
53.659 15.963 
Off-farm wage rate Casual wage rate of local off-farm works (yuan/day) 103.986 13.243 
Information Level of knowing the credit information: 1=Very 
poor, 2=Poor, 3=Average, 4=Good, 5=Very good 
3.080 1.131 
Village runs VMAFs 1 if the village runs a village mutual aid funds 
organization; 0 otherwise 
.321 .467 
Shocks 1 if household has experienced any kind of shock 
such as illness, fire, natural disasters within the last 
12 months prior to the survey period; 0 otherwise 
.755 .430 
Area 1 1 if household is located in Ya’an; 0 otherwise .159 .366 
                                                          
12 1 mu = 1/15 hectare. 1 Yuan ≈ 0.15 US dollar at the time of survey. 
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Area 2 1 if household is located in Guangyuan; 0 otherwise .183 .387 
Area 3 1 if household is located in Nanchong; 0 otherwise .178 .382 
Area 4 1 if household is located in Mianyang; 0 otherwise .185 .388 
Area 5 1 if household is located in Guang’an; 0 otherwise .179 .384 
Area 6 1 if household is located in Leshan; 0 otherwise .116 .320 
 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variable used in the analysis. Table 3.8 A2 
presents the descriptive statistics for the different status13. It can be seen from table 3.1 that roughly 
60% of individuals had participated in microcredit in recent 5 years. The income presents the per 
capita household total income, including agricultural cultivation, breeding, business, rent, wage 
and salary, transfer. Consumption includes daily living expenses, productive expenditure, 
education, medical costs, water, electricity and fuel costs. The average farm size of the respondents 
is about 3.35 mu (1 mu = 1/15 hectare). Off-farm employment ratio is the number of off-farm 
employment labor divided by the number of all employment labor. This variable is used to proxy 
for participation in off-farm activities. Dependency ratio is estimated by the number of families 
outside the working age range divided by the number of families aged within that age (16-60 years). 
Education is captured by using the household head’s level of education. Business considered in 
this study is the small and retail business, such as grocery store, kiosk and some other small shops. 
The general crop cultivation and sales of smallholders are not included in the business. Distance to 
the nearest financial institution and to the nearest vehicle usable road were used to represent the 
load conditions. In particular, the variable for distance to nearest financial institution provides 
information about transaction costs involved to access credit from financial institutions. The off-
farm wage rate and off-farm agricultural wage rate capture the reginal economic difference. The 
off-farm wage indicates the casual wage from the junior works such as construction workers, 
service personals, and sanitation workers; and off-farm agricultural wage indicates the agricultural 
works that employed by other farmers or organizations. In order to put the numbers on a reasonable 
scale and ensure the variables are linear, we use log transformation for these two casual wage rate 
variables. Shocks here is used to control if the selection and impact are caused by any unexpected 
events. 
                                                          
13 552 respondents have 574 total selections for the three credit sources, since 22 samples who selected more than one 
options. For example, 4 samples chose both commercial banks and village mutual aid funds, 11 samples chose both 
commercial banks and friends and relatives, and 7 samples chose both village mutual aids funds and friends and 
relatives. In the following analysis, we excluded 22 samples who selected more than one sources since they are quite 
small for each intersection term.  
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3.3 Conceptual framework 
3.3.1 Theoretical model 
In this section, we specify model of participation in microcredit and how participation impacts on 
household welfare. Thus, we model the choice of microcredit under the assumption that individuals 
choose between non-participation and participation in microcredit. Participation involves credit 
sources from commercial banks, village mutual aid funds, friends and relatives.  
We assume individual 𝑖 is risk neutral, and maximizes expected utility 𝑌𝑖𝑗 derived from choosing 
option 𝑗 (𝑗 = 0,1,⋯𝑀), where 𝑀 indicates the number of options. The utility function can be 
specified as: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗                                                                                                                             (1) 
where 𝑋 is a vector of relevant explanatory variables; 𝛽 is vector of parameters; 𝜇 represents the 
error term and is assumed to be independent and identically distributed. Individuals will choose an 
option, if the expected utility obtained by selecting (𝑗) is higher than that obtained from selecting 
another choice (𝑘), i.e.  𝑌𝑖𝑗 > 𝑌𝑖𝑘.  
Since the expected net benefit is unobserved, we represent it with a latent variable 𝐷𝑖, that can be 
expressed as a function of observed households’ characteristics. The latent variable model can then 
be specified as: 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                                                           (2) 
𝐷𝑖 = {
0 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝑖1 > max
𝑘≠1
𝐷𝑖𝑘
⋮  ⋮                           ⋮
𝑀 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐷𝑖𝑀 > max
𝑘≠𝑀
𝐷𝑖𝑘
}                                                                                              (2a) 
where 𝛼 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; 𝜀 denotes an idiosyncratic unobserved stochastic 
component, 𝑍  is a vector of variables that represent socio-demographic and household 
characteristics. 𝐷𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating that individual 𝑖 will choose a certain option if it 
provides greater expected outcome than other strategies.  
3.3.2 Empirical specification 
The previous discussion shows that individuals are assumed to choose credit sources to maximize 
their expected utility. These microcredit sources considered include financial banks (𝐽1), village 
mutual aid funds (𝐽2), friends or relatives (𝐽3). The deterministic component includes household 
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characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education, family size, farm size, and dependent ratio), village 
traits (e.g., casual wage rate and road condition), economic zones, and the experience of previous 
shocks such as pests, natural disasters, illness, death.  
As in equation (2), the basic assumption is that the observed variable 𝑍 is uncorrelated with the 
stochastic component𝜀 , i.e.,𝐸(𝜀|𝑍) = 0 , which implies that 𝜀  is independent and identically 
distributed. In the first stage estimation, in line with McFadden (1973), the probability can be stated 
by a standard multinomial logit model: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑗)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑍𝑖𝛼𝑘)
𝑀
𝑘=1
                                                                                                                         (3) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗  represents the probability that individual 𝑖  chooses option 𝑗 , 𝑍𝑖  represents represent 
household 𝑖 characteristics, 𝛼𝑗 is the vector of parameters relating to option 𝑗. 
To the extent that individuals take self-selection into participating in microfinance credit, 
selectivity bias could lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. In particular, unobserved attributes 
may affect the choice decisions of individuals and impact on the outcomes. Conceptually, selection 
bias occurs when unobservable factors affect the error terms in the selection equation (𝜇), and the 
outcome equation ( 𝜀 ), which means there is a correlation between the two error terms, 
i.e.  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜇, 𝜀) = 𝜌 . Examples of unobservable factors include innate skills and risk attitudes. 
Standard regression techniques such as OLS lead to inconsistent estimates in the presence of 
selectivity bias. 
In the absence of randomized controlled trials (RCTs), Heckman selection, instrumental variable 
(IV), propensity score matching (PSM) and endogenous switching regression (ESR) have been 
widely used in addressing selectivity bias problem with cross sectional data. However, each method 
has its limitations. The ESR model proposed by Lee (1978) and Maddala (1983) has been widely 
used to account for selection bias and endogeneity, by taking both observable and unobservable 
factors into consideration. This method has increasingly being used in estimating the determinants 
of participation and impacts on general economic outcomes (e.g., Di Falco et al., 2011; Kleemann 
and Abdulai, 2013; Tran et al., 2016). The standard ESR model involves two regimes such as 
participants and non-participants. However, when there are more than two alternatives, the 
multinomial ESR is more suitable (e.g., Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013; Park et al. 2014; Kassie et 
al., 2015). We therefore employ the multinomial endogenous switching regression model to capture 
the influence of microcredit sources on individuals’ per capital income and consumption. 
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According to the framework, given three credit selections and one non-participation status, the 
outcome estimation model for each possible regime (𝑗) can be stated as: 
{
 
 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑖0
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽1 + 𝜇𝑖1
⋮
𝐸(𝑌𝑖𝑗|𝐷𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗
                                                                                                     (4) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is the outcome of household (𝑖) in regime(𝑗) (𝑗 =  0,1,2,3); 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of household 
characteristics; 𝐷𝑖 represents participation status, with 𝐷𝑖 = 0 being non-participants; 𝛽 is a vector 
of parameters to be estimated; 𝜇  presents the unobserved disturbance, which satisfies 
𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 0  and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜇𝑖𝑗|𝑋𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝜎𝑗
2 . Notably, though 𝑋  and 𝑍  could overlap, since 
identification regression that at least one variable in 𝑧 should not appear in 𝑋. 
We follow the Dubin and McFadden (1984), Bourguignon et al. (2007) framework to account for 
the potential bias that arisen from the correlation of the error term 𝜇 and𝜀 in equations (1) and (4). 
Given the normalized linearity assumption 𝜇𝑖𝑗 = 𝜎𝑗 ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝜀𝑗𝑗 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗, the outcome equations can be 
specified as: 
{
𝑌𝑖0 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖0 + 𝜎0𝜆0 + 𝑤𝑖0     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖 = 0
𝑌𝑖1 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖1 + 𝜎1𝜆1 + 𝑤𝑖1     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖 = 1
𝑌𝑖2 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖2 + 𝜎2𝜆2 + 𝑤𝑖2     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖 = 2
𝑌𝑖3 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖3 + 𝜎3𝜆3 + 𝑤𝑖3     𝑖𝑓 𝐷𝑖 = 3
                                                                                      (5) 
where 𝜔𝑗 is the residual term which is orthogonal to 𝜀𝑗 due to the basic IIA assumption; 𝜎𝑗 refers 
to the covariance between 𝜇 and 𝜀; 𝑤𝑗 is the residual. 𝜆𝑗 is the bias correction coefficient that can 
be computed from the estimated probabilities in equation (3), which is specified as 𝜆𝑖𝑗 =
𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗) + ∑ 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗)
𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑖𝑗−1
𝐽 . Here 𝑃𝑖𝑗  represents the probability that individual 𝑖  chooses 
option 𝑗  as equation (3); 𝜌𝑗  is the correlation coefficient between 𝜇𝑗  and 𝜀𝑗 ; 𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗)  is the 
conditional expectation, which is used to correct for selectivity effects with 𝑚(𝑃𝑖𝑗) =
∫ 𝐽(𝑣 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑗)𝑔(𝑣) 𝑑𝑣 , where 𝐽(∙)  is the inverse transformation for the normal distribution 
function, 𝑔(∙) is the unconditional density for the Gumbel distribution, 𝑣 = 𝜀𝑖𝑗 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑗 .  
As previously discussed, the first-stage involves a multinomial logit regression to estimate the 
probability of participation, and the parameter 𝛼 in equation (2). These probabilities are then used 
in the outcome equation (5). The drawback of this two-step approach that has been detailed in 
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Bourguignon, Fournier, and Gurgand (BFG) (2007) is the heteroscedasticity that results in biased 
stand errors. Bootstrap method is normally used to deal with this heteroscedastic problem in 
empirical estimation (e.g., Wu, 2010; Parvathi and Waibel, 2016). 
Another challenge is the fact that financial institutions are not randomized over villages. That is, 
some unobserved factors may be considered by microcredit providers, and this needs to be 
accounted for, since that could lead to inconsistent estimates. In particular, we augment the 
outcome equation by exploiting the average village varying variables ?̅?𝑖, to address the issue of 
unobserved heterogeneity in the second stage estimation. These unobserved variables may include 
useful missing information regarding loan and repay abilities and profitability. For example, since 
government projects are always set up at village level, the decisions of farmers may also be affected 
by these factors. Other methods of adding inverse Mills ratio to the second stage and using standard 
fixed effects do not contribute to consistent estimates (Wooldridge 2002; Di Falco and Veronesi, 
2013). This varying variable approach is based on the assumption that the unobservable factors 𝜇𝑖, 
and the average varying variables ?̅?𝑖  are linearly related, i.e. 𝜇𝑖 = ?̅?𝑖𝜃 + 𝜑𝑖 , with 𝜑𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜑
2) 
and 𝐸(𝜑𝑖|?̅?𝑖) = 0 , where 𝜃  is the corresponding vector of coefficients. The village varying 
variables used in this study include the rate of off-farm employment ratio, education level and farm 
land size. These variables can be considered as inputs to income and consumption levels, tend to 
vary across villages. For the model identification, we use distance, road and information as 
instruments. As shown in table 3.7 A1 in the appendix, these variables jointly influence 
participation, but not the outcome from participation. 
The multinomial ESR specifications for participants and non-participants are specified in equations 
(6) and (7), respectively. Specifically, the outcome equations for actual and counterfactual 
scenarios are given in (6a) and (6b) for participants, while the corresponding specifications for non-
participants are given in (7a) and (7b). Table 3.2 presents the relationships among these categories. 
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the average treatment effect on the untreated 
(ATU) are computed as the difference between equations (6a) and (6b), (7b) and (7a), respectively. 
This approach also controls for selection bias due to observed heterogeneity. BH in the table 
indicates the effect of base heterogeneity for individuals, examining the existence of sources of 
heterogeneity. TH is the transitional heterogeneity, capturing the total average effect. 
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{
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖1 + 𝜎1𝜆1
𝐸(𝑌𝑖2|𝐷𝑖 = 2) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖2 + 𝜎2𝜆2
𝐸(𝑌𝑖3|𝐷𝑖 = 3) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖3 + 𝜎3𝜆3
                                                                                                   (6a) 
{
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖0 + 𝜎0𝜆1
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 2) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖0 + 𝜎0𝜆2
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 3) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖0 + 𝜎0𝜆3
                                                                                                   (6b) 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖0 + 𝜎0𝜆0                                                                                                     (7a) 
{
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖1 + 𝜎1𝜆0
𝐸(𝑌𝑖2|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖2 + 𝜎2𝜆0
𝐸(𝑌𝑖3|𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖3 + 𝜎3𝜆0
                                                                                                   (7b) 
Table 3.2 Treatment and Heterogeneity effect for MESR 
Samples 
Decision Treatment 
effect To participate  Not to participate  
Participants 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 1) 6𝑎
1 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1) 6𝑏
1 𝐴𝑇𝑇1 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖2|𝐷𝑖 = 2) 6𝑎
2 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 2) 6𝑏
2 𝐴𝑇𝑇2 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖3|𝐷𝑖 = 3) 6𝑎
3 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 3) 6𝑏
3 𝐴𝑇𝑇3 
Non-
participants 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝐷𝑖 = 0) 7𝑏
1 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 0)  𝐴𝑇𝑈
1 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖2|𝐷𝑖 = 0) 7𝑏
2 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 0) 7a 𝐴𝑇𝑈
2 
𝐸(𝑌𝑖3|𝐷𝑖 = 0) 7𝑏
3 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 0)  𝐴𝑇𝑈
3 
Heterogeneity 
effect 
𝐵𝐻10
1   𝐵𝐻10
0   𝑇𝐻1 
𝐵𝐻20
2   𝐵𝐻20
0   𝑇𝐻2 
𝐵𝐻30
3   𝐵𝐻30
0   𝑇𝐻3 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
The results of first-stage and second-stage estimations are presented in table 3.3 to 3.5. In order to 
obtain full information for all categories, we present the marginal effects of the multinomial logit 
model estimates, providing results on the factors that contribute to the participation in a particular 
microcredit source. According to the results, Wald tests on instrumental variables suggest that 
distance, road and information are jointly significant in the first stage estimation, but do not 
influence the outcome equation (Table 3.7 A1), indicating that these variables statistically and 
significantly improve the model fit. The 𝑥2 statistics for over-identification test are insignificant, 
indicating that the instrumental variables are valid.  
The estimates for the coefficients in the selection equations show that different microcredit sources 
are significantly driven by different factors. Generally, households with less shocks, better road 
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conditions and less credit information are less likely to participate in microcredit. The probabilities 
of participating in different credit sources are diverse. The coefficient of the variable representing 
family size is positive and significantly different from zero, suggesting that larger families are more 
likely to borrow money from banking institutions. Dependency ratio significantly and negatively 
affect VMAFs, indicating that families with more members within working age range are less likely 
to borrow money from this organization. Families with fixed assets like motorcycle appear to be 
less likely to borrow money from friends and relatives. The results also suggest that households 
running small businesses do not tend to borrow money from any credit sources. 
It is interesting to note that off-farm non-agricultural wage rate positively affects the probability of 
choosing VMAFs, while the off-farm wage rate negatively affects the probability of choosing 
commercial banks, suggesting that higher off-farm non-agricultural wage decreases the probability 
of households taking credit from commercial banks. Shocks satisfy the reality that it significantly 
decreases the probability of being the non-participants and choosing commercial banks, while 
significantly increase the probability of borrowing money from individual lenders. The distance to 
nearest financial institution and road condition negatively affect the probability of selecting 
VMAFs. This may be due to the fact that credit from the VMAFs are normally in monthly 
installment, making shorter distances and better traffic conditions decrease transaction costs, 
particularly for individuals living in rural areas. Information appears to be a significate factor 
influencing participation in microcredit. In particular, households with more information are more 
likely to participate in financial institutions, while those with less information tend to borrow from 
friends and relatives.  
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Table 3.3 Marginal effect of determinants of microcredit participation: Multinomial logit model14 
Variable 
Non-
participants 
Commercial 
banks 
VMAFs 
Friends and 
Relatives 
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
Age -.001(.017) .007(.013) -.018(.011) .012(.017) 
Age square .0001(.0002) -.0001(.0001) .0001*(.0001) -.0001(.0002) 
Gender .103(.073) -.033(.045) -.075(.048) .005(.069) 
Farm size -.003(.008) .006(.004) -.006(.004) .003(.007) 
Family size -.013(.015) .027***(.010) -.014(.010) .0001(.015) 
Off-farm employment ratio .105(.079) -.050(.046) -.032(.053) -.023(.076) 
Dependency ratio .026(.029) -.016(.020) -.052**(.020) .041(.027) 
Motorcycle .057(.048) .013(.029) .022(.028) -.092**(.046) 
Head education .017(.029) -.012(.018) .002(.017) -.006(.027) 
Business .003*(.002) .001(.001) -.001(.001) -.003(.002) 
Log off-farm agricultural 
wage rate 
.044(.082) .022(.052) -.134**(.062) .068(.077) 
Log off-farm wage rate .110(.186) -.267**(.125) .384***(.112) -.227(.179) 
Shocks -.110**(.052) -.066*(.035) .029(.035) .148***(.051) 
Area 1 .356(5.203) .251(1.444) -1.196(9.774) .590(3.127) 
Area 2 -.023(.075) .049(.053) .0157(.031) -.042(.076) 
Area 3 -.130(.091) -.0001(.071) .176***(.024) -.046(.092) 
Area 4 .473(4.748) .256(1.318) -1.177(8.919) .709*(.418) 
Area 5 .549(4.206) .220(1.167) -1.244(7.901) .475(2.579) 
Instrument variables     
Distance .002(.007) 0.007(.005) -.010**(.005) .001(.007) 
Road .138***(.049) -.007(.032) -.185***(.066) .054(.041) 
Information -.088***(.017) .056***(.013) .036***(.013) -.232**(.105) 
Wald test on instrumental 
variable (𝑿𝟐) 
114.81*** 107.22*** 340.26*** 81.62*** 
𝑿𝟐 Statistics for over 
identification 
 1.772[.412] .186[.911] 1.254[.190] .358[.836] 
Number of obs. 530    
LR chi2(66) 433.58***    
Pseudo 𝑹𝟐 .303    
Notes: Likelihood ratio test and pseudo R square are estimated from the multinomial logit regression. Stand error in 
the parentheses. P values are in the square brackets. *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
                                                          
14  Variance inflation factor (VIF) is used to check for multicollinearity, where the mean VIF is 1.67. The 
multicollinearity is not high. 
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Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the second stage multinomial ESR model estimations, providing the 
economic impact of participating in different microcredit sources on per capita income and 
consumption, respectively. The estimates generally show that the impacts on income and 
consumption will not only be different from observable characteristics, but are also related to 
specific microcredit sources.  Specifically, the coefficient of age in the consumption specification 
is positive and significantly different from zero for the non-participants, while the coefficient of 
age square is significantly negative. These results indicate that for the non-participants, 
consumption increases with increasing age, but only up to a particular level, after which it decreases 
with age. 
Off-farm employment ratio and dependency ratio support the hypotheses that higher off-farm 
employment ratio and lower dependency ratio significantly increase income and consumption, a 
finding that shows the importance of the labor force in family welfare. This result is in line with 
the findings of Li et al. (2011), Mazumder and Lu (2014), who reported the importance of 
employment and labor in helping the poor with regard to microfinance. The coefficient of the 
variable representing local off-farm wage rate is statistically and positively influencing income and 
consumption, showing the importance of non-farm employment in the livelihoods of rural residents.  
Some of the selectivity correction terms are significant in both tables, indicating that participations 
in commercial banks and friends and relatives have significantly different impacts on non-
participants, if they had chosen to participate in these credit sources. For example, in table 3.4, the 
significant selectivity correction term m3 in the commercial banks column indicates that for those 
people who participated in commercial banks, switching to borrow money from friends and 
relatives will also have a significantly positive effect on income. While the significant m0 in the 
last column indicates that for the people who have already borrowed money from friends and 
relatives, only when switching to be the non-participants the impact on income would be positive. 
In the table 3.5, the significantly negative selectivity correction terms in the last column indicates 
that for the people who borrowed money from individuals, switching to borrow money from 
commercial banks, VMAFs, or to be non-participants would have significantly negative impacts 
on consumption. 
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Table 3.4  MESR results for impact of microcredit participation on per capita income 
Variable 
Non-
participants 
Commercial 
banks 
VMAFs 
Friends and 
Relatives 
Age .096(.090) .413(.864) .136(.375) .053(.165) 
Age square -.001(.001) -.004(.008) -.001(.003) -.0003(.002) 
Gender -.307(.456) .347(2.293) -.632(4.035) .178(.833) 
Farm size -.002(.063) .099(.311) .106(.138) .043(.095) 
Family size .054(.070) .564(.906) -.072(.670) .066(.161) 
Off-farm employment 
ratio 
1.482***(.476) -2.663(3.209) 2.677**(1.256) 1.074**(.495) 
Dependency ratio .020(.172) -1.194(1.651) -.260(.499) -.461***(.154) 
Motorcycle -.152(.224) -2.088(2.571) -.142(.936) .689**(.330) 
Education .065(.130) .562(1.071) .132(.557) .203(.345) 
Business .003(.008) -.043(.060) -.029(.065) .004(.061) 
Log off-farm 
agricultural wage rate 
-.418(.339) .157(3.667) -1.400(2.677) -.082(.568) 
Log off-farm wage rate .126(1.192) 2.019***(.750) 2.596(6.065) .695(2.119) 
Shocks -.002(.252) -.764***(.293) -.207(4.659) .192(.719) 
Mean off-farm 
employment ratio 
-2.537*(1.505) .644(7.771) -.400(9.622) .562(3.657) 
Mean farm size -.043(.106) -.258(.565) .247(.600) -.042(.248) 
Mean high education 
level 
.834**(.416) 3.344*(2.009) -.382(2.117) .429(.892) 
_m0 -.156(1.181) 1.584(1.044) -3.662(5.505) 1.873*(1.056) 
_m1 -.996(1.936) 1.504(3.218) -.449(6.498) -2.110(3.941) 
_m2 .183(1.878) 3.928(8.988) -1.327(2.648) -2.090(3.090) 
_m3 2.755(2.150) 17.832***(6.944) .831(5.082) -.767(1.577) 
_cons -.442(6.784) -7.235(6.830) -8.461(35.126) -6.870(16.797) 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Values in the parentheses are standard 
errors. 
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Table 3.5 MESR results for impact of microcredit participation on per capita consumption 
Variable 
Non-
participants 
Commercial banks VMAFs 
Friends and 
Relatives 
Age .086*(.052) .082(.877) .096(.416) -.111(.144) 
Age square -.001*(.0004) -.001(.008) -.001(.004) .001(.001) 
Gender -.313(.272) -.924(8.810) -.571(.958) -.030(.504) 
Farm size .006(.037) .113(.235) .044(.183) .130*(.074) 
Family size .010(.050) -.517(.761) -.026(.332) -.020(.137) 
Off-farm employment 
ratio 
.666**(.329) .569(2.103) .753(1.250) .126(.732) 
Dependency ratio .006(.098) .786(1.902) -.258(.667) -.529(.230) 
Motorcycle -.098(.192) -1.527(1.681) .156(1.158) .275(.494) 
Education .041(.078) .337(.971) .096(.376) .226(.205) 
Business .003(.005) -.025(.111) .015(.046) .028(.054) 
Log off-farm 
agricultural wage rate 
-.244(.237) .353(2.732) -.801(1.135) -.346(.398) 
Log off-farm wage rate .343(.529) 5.276**(2.179) .953(4.984) 3.372*(1.884) 
Shocks .017(.198) 3.017**(1.503) -.267(1.170) .981*(.569) 
Mean off-farm 
employment ratio 
-1.247(1.159) -8.763**(4.353) 1.767(4.329) -6.107**(2.284) 
Mean farm size -.031(.075) -.330(.515) .092(.471) .080(.134) 
Mean high education 
level 
.519*(.273) 3.153(2.076) -.171(1.791) 1.704**(.751) 
_m0 -.267(.655) -17.552***(5.728) -1.836(10.375) -8.803**(4.151) 
_m1 -.930(1.235) -3.541*(2.122) 1.046(8.351) -4.310**(2.034) 
_m2 -.368(.991) -5.501(5.447) -.751(2.749) -4.076*(2.290) 
_m3 1.805(1.704) 12.766**(5.680) -.687(7.255) 1.308(.907) 
_cons -1.681(3.233) -3.078(3.299) -2.331(3.222) -2.924**(1.394) 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Values in the parentheses are standard 
errors. 
 
Table 3.6 summarizes the average impact of participating in microcredit on individuals’ per capita 
income and consumption under actual and counterfactual scenarios. The results on income reveal 
that all types of microcredit in this study could contribute to income for both participants and non-
participants. According to the percent changes, credit from commercial banks would increase 
income to the largest extent by 106% for the participants. The large difference may be due to the 
fact that the loans from commercial banks tend to be closely linked to applicants’ production 
projects. Only when the projects are assessed as economically viable that the loans are approved 
by the financial institutions. Loans from commercial banks therefore tend to result in higher profits 
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and households income. For participants, credit from VMAFs, friends and relatives result in income 
increases by 18% and 10% from non-participants, respectively.  
The significantly positive value of base heterogeneity for the participants group indicates that there 
is no sources of heterogeneity since participants are more productive than the non-participants, 
with regard to the credit from commercial banks. The significantly negative base heterogeneity in 
the first column denotes the existence of some sources of heterogeneity that makes participants less 
productive than the non-participants, with regard to the credit from friends and relatives. The 
insignificant base heterogeneity in the first column suggests that for the VMAFs, there would be 
no significant difference in income between the actual and the latent participants. In the not to 
participate column, the base heterogeneity effects are significantly positive, indicating that the 
participants are more efficient in raising income than the non-participants, even if they had not 
participated in any credit sources. The transitional heterogeneity effect on commercial banks is 
significantly positive, hinting that, averagely, rural residents who actually participated in 
microcredit would have increased the most income. The significantly negative values indicate that 
people who actually did not participate in VMAFs, friends and relatives would benefit the most, if 
they had participated. 
In terms of the impact on per capita consumption, the results show that microcredit from these three 
credit sources can statistically increase consumption. It is interesting to see that the positive effects 
of friends and relatives are the largest for both participants and non-participants. This result is 
probably due to the fact that individuals normally borrow from friends and relatives to smooth 
consumptions. All the base heterogeneity effects for participations and non-participations are 
positive, suggesting that heterogeneity does not result in participants consuming more than non-
participants. However, all the transitional heterogeneities are significantly negative, implying that 
people who did not borrow money from any credit sources would consume the most, if they had 
participated in microcredit.  
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Table 3.6 Treatment and Heterogeneity effect for MESR 
Samples To Participate 
Not to 
participate 
Treatment effect Changes 
Per capita income 
Participants 
Commercial 
banks 
6.942(.256) 3.375(.091) 3.567***(.272) 105.70% 
VMAFs 3.777(.107) 3.213(.059) .564***(.122) 17.56% 
Friends and 
Relatives 
3.632(.048) 3.302(.047) .330***(.067) 10.11% 
Non-
participants 
Commercial 
banks 
4.787(.162) 2.769(.042) 2.017***(.167) 72.84% 
VMAFs 3.869(.096) 2.769(.042) 1.100***(.105) 39.72% 
Friends and 
Relatives 
3.979(.047) 2.769(.042) 1.210***(.063) 43.69% 
Heterogenei
ty effect 
 2.156***(.328) .606***(.091) 1.550***(.324)  
 -.093(.157) .443***(.073) -.536***(.146)  
 -.347***(.069) .533***(.064) -.880***(.047)  
Per capita consumption 
Participants 
Commercial 
banks 
3.543(.324) 2.799(.058) .744**(.329) 26.59% 
VMAFs 2.732(.117) 2.673(.035) .058(.123) 2.18% 
Friends and 
Relatives 
4.275(.047) 2.743(.028) 1.532***(.055) 55.85% 
Non- 
participants 
Commercial 
banks 
3.450(.166) 2.159(.026) 1.290***(.168) 59.76% 
VMAFs 2.297(.055) 2.159(.026) .138**(.061) 6.39% 
Friends and 
Relatives 
4.022(.078) 2.159(.026) 1.862***(.082) 86.25% 
Heterogenei
ty effect 
 .094(.352) .640***(.057) -.546(.346)  
 .434***(.114) .514***(.044) -.080(.100)  
 .253**(.101) .583***(.039) -.331***(.100)  
Notes: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Values in the parentheses are standard 
errors. As the outcomes used in the second stage estimation are logarithms, the predictions are also given in logarithms. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and implications 
This article analyses the factors that influence rural households’ decisions to participate in 
microcredit, the impact of participation on per capita income and consumption, using household-
level data in China. We use a multinomial endogenous switching regression model to account for 
selectivity bias, and to capture the differential impacts of microcredit on non-participants and three 
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categories of participants in microcredit, that include commercial banks, VMAFs, friends and 
relatives. 
The empirical results show that various factors influence households’ decisions to participate in 
different microfinance programs. In particular, households who earned lower wage from the off-
farm sector and had better information sources took loans from commercial banks. On the other 
hand, households with less endowment assets rather obtained credit from friends and family 
members. The findings also revealed that participation in microfinance helped households to 
increase their income and consumption. Specifically, credit from commercial banks helped 
increase per capita income by 106%, while households that took loans from friends and relatives 
increased their income by 10%. 
Overall, the findings suggest that policies that enhance financial inclusion can help increase the 
welfare of rural households. In particular, effective policy measures to promote the participation in 
microcredit should include measures to improve the education levels and availability of 
employment opportunities in the off-farm sector. The positive impact of participation in formal 
microcredit suggests that these credit providers need to help households to overcome the 
information barriers. Village mutual aid funds can significantly contribute to income and 
consumption increases with more stable changes for both outcomes. This result suggests that this 
program can be extended to poor rural areas, to promote financial inclusion.  
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Appendix 
Table 3.7 A1 Test on the validity of the instrumental variables 
Variable 
Per capital income by 
non-participants 
Per capital consumption 
by non-participants 
 Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
Age .030 .038 .045 .030 
Age square -.0002 .0003 -.0004 .0003 
Gender -.144 .170 -.208 .135 
Farm size -.010 .024 -.003 .019 
Family size .053 .033 .014 .027 
Off-farm employment ratio 1.383*** .187 .589*** .149 
Dependency ratio -.101* .059 -.091* .047 
Motorcycle .019 .101 .060 .080 
Head education .032 .057 .027 .045 
Business .006*** .001 .005*** .001 
Log off-farm agricultural wage rate -.536*** .204 -.382** .163 
Log off-farm wage rate -.947** .422 -.463 .336 
Shocks -.222** .109 -.137* .082 
Mean non-farm worker rate -.500 .728 -.014 .580 
Mean farm size -.002 .043 -.022 .034 
Mean high education level .116 .187 -.057 .149 
Area 1 -.058 .172 -.129 .137 
Area 2 -.400** .182 -.279* .145 
Area 3 -.502* .257 -.563*** .205 
Area 4 .156 .166 .110 .132 
Area 5 -.381* .199 -.412*** .159 
Distance .002 .018 -.011 .014 
Road -.097 .069 -.024 .055 
Information .092 .070 .084 .081 
_cons 7.187*** 2.374 4.438** 1.893 
Number of obs. 222  222  
Wald test on instrument variables 𝑋2 (24) =374.52*** 𝑋2 (24) =221.59*** 
R-squared .588  .485  
Note: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 3.8 A2 Individuals characteristics of different selections 
Variable 
Non-participants Commercial banks VMAFs Friends and relatives 
Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Diff. Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Diff. Mean 
Std. 
Err. 
Diff. 
Income 12.783 1.183 24.163 6.172 11.380*** 9.616 .846 -3.167** 11.014 .969 -1.769 
Consumption 6.130 .380 10.329 2.275 4.199*** 6.216 .697 .086 6.248 .520 .118 
Credit - - .120 .014 - .194 .017 - .284 .019 - 
Age 60.590 .774 52.985 1.211 -7.605*** 60.477 1.100 -.113 58.522 .888 -2.068* 
Gender .919 .018 .894 .038 -.025 .907 .028 -.012 .911 .023 -.008 
Farm size 3.177 .137 4.408 .692 1.230*** 2.891 .300 -.286 3.450 .217 .273 
Family size 3.662 .104 4.303 .162 .641*** 3.168 .153 -.494*** 3.701 .122 .039 
Off-farm 
employment ratio 
.353 .020 .382 .039 .029 .262 .031 -.091*** .330 .024 -.023 
Dependency ratio 1.139 .059 .731 .080 -.408*** 1.071 .073 -.068 1.126 .074 -.013 
Motorcycle .293 .031 .485 .062 .192*** .271 .043 -.022 .248 .035 -.045 
Head education 2.131 .057 2.333 .095 .202* 2.187 .081 .056 2.153 .054 .022 
Business .068 .017 .227 .052 .159*** .037 .018 -.031 .057 .019 -.011 
Distance 3.973 .249 4.088 .430 .115 2.575 .116 -1.398*** 3.627 .267 -.346 
Road .294 .051 .125 .051 -.169* .027 .012 -.267*** .204 .038 -.090* 
Off-farm wage rate 104.595 .877 103.485 1.488 -1.110 103.271 1.346 -1.324 103.822 1.083 -.773 
Off-farm agricultural 
wage rate 
54.685 1.175 53.182 1.729 -1.503 53.178 1.409 -1.507 52.739 1.228 -1.946 
Information 2.725 .077 3.621 .120 .896*** 3.729 .080 1.004*** 2.911 .086 .186* 
VMAFs .162 .025 .136 .043 -.026 1 0 .838*** .159 .029 -.003 
Shocks .712 .030 .621 .060 -.091* .869 .033 .157*** .796 .032 .084** 
Area 1 .149 .024 .303 .057 .154*** - - - .223 .033 .074** 
Area 2 .198 .027 .197 .049 -.001 .196 .039 -.002 .146 .028 -.052* 
Area 3 .068 .017 .045 .026 -.023 .664 .046 .596*** .057 .019 -.011 
Area 4 .207 .027 .273 .055 .066 - - - .242 .034 .035 
Area 5 .243 .029 .106 .038 -.137** - - - .242 .034 -.001 
Area 6 .135 .023 .076 .033 -.059* .140 .034 .005 .089 .023 -.046* 
Sample size 222 55 89 164 
Note: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respective 
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Abstract 
Purpose  
The purpose of this study is to examine smallholders’ preferences and willingness-to-pay for 
microcredit products with varying attribute combinations, in order to contribute to the debate on 
the optimal design of rural microcredit. 
Design/methodology/approach  
Data used in this study is based on a discrete choice experiment from 552 randomly selected 
respondents. Mixed logit and latent class models are estimated to examine the choice probability 
and sources of preference heterogeneity. Endogenous attribute attendance models are applied to 
account for attribute non-attendance phenomenon, focusing on separate non-attendance probability 
as well as joint non-attendance probability. 
Findings 
The results demonstrate that preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance exist in the 
smallholder farmers’ microcredit choices. Averagely, smallholder farmers prefer longer credit 
period, smaller credit size, lower transaction costs and lower interest rate. Guarantor collateral 
method and installment repayment positively affect their preferences as well. Moreover, 
respondents are found to be willing to pay more for the attributes they consider important. The 
microcredit providers are able to attract new customers under the current interest rates, if the 
combination of attributes is appropriately adjusted. 
Originality/value 
This study contributes to the debate by assessing the preference trade-off of different microcredit 
attributes more comprehensively than in previous analyses, by taking preference heterogeneity and 
attribute non-attendance into account. 
 
Key words: willingness-to-pay, microcredit, mixed logit, attribute non-attendance, China 
Paper type: Research paper 
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4.1 Introduction 
Microcredit services have been expanding significantly in developing economies for several years. 
It aims at providing small amounts of capital to poor borrowers who have been suffering from the 
shortage of financial services, to enable them generate higher incomes by investing in productive 
activities. This approach has been regarded as an efficient pathway for poverty reduction. The 
literature places little emphasis on the reason why borrowers choose a certain microcredit option. 
However, the optimal combination of microcredit attributes for attracting the poor is strongly 
debated, since some combinations of the attributes constrain participation amongst smallholder 
farmers (e.g., Madajewicz, 2011; Giné and Karlan, 2014; Cheng and Ahmed, 2014). Therefore, one 
important issue that needs clarification is how much smallholders are willing to pay for microcredit, 
given the major attributes. 
Participation in microcredit has been found to exert positive and significant impacts on household 
income and welfare in many developing countries (e.g., Ahlin et al., 2008; Berhane et al., 2011; 
Imai et al., 2012; Mazumder et al., 2014; Bruhn et al., 2014; Maria, 2016; Ksoll et al., 2016). These 
findings encouraged many microcredit organizations to be mission-oriented or supply-oriented, 
without paying much attention to the willingness to pay by poor borrowers. However, since 
microcredit has been practiced for more than two decades, emphasis needs to move from mission-
oriented to demand-oriented. Evidence shows that the characteristics of demand for financial 
services tend to influence the type of financial services and the achievement of their social and 
profit objective (Ritchie, 2007). A well-functioning set of credit attributes should be tailored to 
potential borrowers’ needs, but also considering the profitability for lenders (Tsukada et al., 2010). 
Generally, the main microcredit attributes that have been used to explain the preferences of poor 
households are interest rate, repayment schedule, loan size, and collateral method (Boucher et al., 
2008; Tsukada et al., 2010; Sagamba et al., 2013; Kong et al., 2015). Interest rate, which is the 
price of financial service, has received the most attention (Janvry et al., 2010; Rashid et al., 2011; 
Khandker and Koolwal, 2016; Tan and Lin, 2016). The consensus has been that low interest rate 
increases lending to the poor, especially the rural poor, without lowering profits for financial 
intermediaries (Hermes et al., 2011; Angelucci et al., 2015). Hence, theoretically, interest rates 
should be set at profit-making levels, based on the notion that even poor customers favor access to 
credit with low interest rates (Dehejia et al., 2012). However, interest rate is not the only factor that 
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appeal to poor customers, since some farmers are willing to obtain more credit, even at higher 
interest rates (Turvey et al., 2012).  
Financial decisions involve complexities that individuals frequently have difficulty in 
understanding depending on their education, information, experiences, assets, and social networks 
(Yesuf et al., 2009; Cai et al., 2015). Individuals with different financial habits might prefer 
different types of contracts. Alternatively, lenders with different levels of sophistication may attract 
different client mixes and offer different contracts. Preferences for formal or informal loans, group 
or individual loans, and even no loans vary as well (Tsukada et al., 2010; Ayyagari et al., 2010; 
Attanasio et al. 2015). However, very little is known about the optimal contract structure of credit 
loans.  
Several studies have used revealed preference method to analyze households’ preferences for 
microcredit (Tsukada, Higashikata, and Takahashi 2010; Dehejia, Montgomery, and Morduch 
2012; Lønborg, and Rasmussen 2014). This method is typically used for the decisions on actual 
alternatives. However, stated preference approach enables us to examine hypothetical choices, or 
ex-ante strategies that allow an analysis of decision-making at an early stage of the policy cycle. 
Very few studies have used experimental and stated preference methods to analyze the behavioral 
aspects of microcredit (Field et al. 2011; Sagamba et al., 2012; Bauer, Chytilová and Morduch 
2012; Weber et al., 2014). In their recent study, Field et al. (2011) found that grace period 
repayment schedule does not contribute to decrease default and delinquency. However, Weber, 
Musshoff and Petrick (2014) found that farmers with flex loans and without grace periods show 
significantly higher delinquencies. Bauer, Chytilová and Morduch (2012) noted the significance of 
the structure of microfinance loans, although they did not establish the specific causal links in the 
structure. In the investigation of preferences of microcredit providers, using a choice experiment, 
Sagamba et al. (2013) found that the main determinant of microcredit for officers is the quality of 
applicant’s project.  
Our study contributes to the literature by using a stated preference approach to examine the 
attributes that affect farmers’ preferences and Willingness-To-Pay for microcredit. Specifically, 
we utilize data from a survey of 552 smallholder farmers in the Sichuan province of China. The 
attributes considered include interest rate, credit period, loan size, collateral method, repayment 
schedule and transaction costs. The present study differs from the previous studies in terms of 
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assessing the preference trade-off of different microcredit attributes more comprehensively. We 
employ a mixed logit model to analyze the choice probability and the existence of preference 
heterogeneity, and a Latent Class model to examine the sources of preference heterogeneity by 
segregating smallholders into groups with similar characteristics.  We also use an endogenous 
attribute attendance model to capture attribute non-attendance phenomenon.  
4.2 Background  
Rural credit system is an important element in the financial system in China, and has been an 
integral part of China’s economic reform. China’s rural credit system faced serious difficulties 
around 2005, due to its incoherent structure, weak management and poor internal capabilities (Herd, 
et al., 2010).  As part of developing microcredit in rural areas, the Chinese government launched 
many measures to strengthen rural finance in 2006. These measures were partly meant to keep with 
the new challenges from joining the WTO, which required the permission of foreign banks to 
develop their banking services by the end of 2006.  
Besides strengthening and reforming the existing rural financial institutions such as Agricultural 
Development Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and Rural Credit Cooperatives, China 
established Postal Savings Bank of China and other three types of rural banking institutions to 
improve and consolidate its rural financial markets. These three rural banking institutions are 
village and township banks, loan companies and rural fund cooperatives. In addition, in order to 
relax rural credit constraints for the poor and implement microcredit for purposes of poverty 
alleviation, China set up Poverty Village Mutual Aid Funds [ 15 ] in depressed areas where 
commercial banks have no interests. This program is designed to help farmers without access to 
credit sources from formal financial institutions and informal lenders, by providing small and short-
term credits. It works as a way of public financial support that is associated with smallholders’ 
participation to enhance the poor’s access to formal credit, and has similar features as the Revolving 
Loan Funds. In China, it seems that formal credits are pushed to cover most of smallholders with 
different income levels. But the poor are still often excluded from formal credits (Shoji et al., 2012; 
Yuan et al., 2015). The informal credit market has been supplementary to the services provided by 
formal markets (Cheng et al., 2014), which indicates that the credit supplies do not meet 
                                                          
[15] Many terms refer to this program. This study uses the term “Village Mutual Aid Funds” according to the report 
Access to Finance, Microfinance Innovations in the People’s Republic of China, Asian Develop Bank, 2014. 
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smallholders’ demands. The development and expansion of some NGO programs then stood up as 
a substitution for institutional lenders and informal financial networks in the rural credit market 
(Xiang et al., 2014). 
4.3 Conceptual framework 
4.3.1 Theoretical model 
The conceptual model used in the analysis is based on Lancaster’s model of consumer choice and 
random utility theory (RUT), indicating consumers’ utility maximization. In this decision-making 
process, we assume smallholders are risk neutral, and credit attributes are the targeted elements 
dominating smallholders’ choice behavior. Smallholders are therefore assumed to choose the 
microcredit option that provides maximum utility.  
To identify smallholders’ heterogeneous preferences for microcredit, we conduct a discrete choice 
experiment. In each choice set, respondents are asked to choose the most satisfactory one from 
distinctive options.  Each option contains six attributes with different levels. These attributes are 
credit period, interest rate, loan size, collateral, repayment method and transaction costs. When 
facing a varying combination of attributes, it is preferable to test smallholders’ attitudes on 
attributes under different conditions. 
In this framework, an individual chooses a credit alternative based on the highest utility expectation 
on numbers of given choice situations. It can be expressed that an individual (n) derives utility (U) 
from choosing an alternative (i): 
𝑈𝑛𝑖 = 𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜇𝑛𝑖                                                                                                                            (1) 
where 𝑉𝑛𝑖 is the deterministic component, and depends on the attributes of alternatives; 𝜇𝑛𝑖 is the 
stochastic error term.  
The probability (P) that alternative (i) will be chosen is given as:  
𝑃𝑛𝑖 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 1|𝑉𝑛𝑖 + 𝜇𝑛𝑖 ≥ 𝑉𝑛𝑗 + 𝜇𝑛𝑗;  ∀𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐶)                                                              (2) 
where Y is the alternative variable, taking the value 1 when alternative (i) is chosen and 0 otherwise; 
(j) indicates another alternative; C is the finite choice set. 
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In line with Maddala (1983) and Train (2009), the logit model is obtained by assuming that each 𝜇 
is an observed random term that is independently and identically distributed type I extreme-value 
(Gumbel distribution). Then a succinct and closed form is given as follows: 
𝑃𝑛𝑖 =
𝑒𝑉𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝑒
𝑉𝑛𝑗
𝑗
                                                                                                                                   (3) 
4.3.2 Empirical specification 
In this study, we assume smallholders’ preferences are heterogeneous. We use random parameter 
logit model (RPL) to calculate the choice probability, which, in comparison with traditional 
conditional logit, can detect unobserved and observed sources of heterogeneity, and also allow 
random preference variation (Ortega et al., 2014). It is superior to the conditional logit in terms of 
overall fitness and welfare estimates (Just and Gabrielyan, 2016).  
In the RPL model, the deterministic component 𝑉𝑛𝑖 takes the form 𝑉𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑛 ∙ 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡, where 𝛽 is a 
vector of random parameters and represents individual-specific tastes; X is a vector of attributes.  
In line with Train (2009) and Ortega (2014), the probability of the standard logit that individual (n) 
chooses alternative (i) from choice set (C) in situation (t) is the integral of conditional probability, 
which is given by:  
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡 = ∫
𝑒𝛽𝑛∙𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑒
𝛽𝑛∙𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑗
𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽                                                                                                            (4) 
where 𝑓(𝛽) is the distribution function for random parameters, with its own mean and variance; 
the coefficient vector consists of parameters associated with individual (n), representing the 
individual’s preference. This model relaxes the limitation of traditional conditional logit model by 
allowing random preference variation within a sample according to a specified distribution, and 
not sensitive to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition (Train 1998; Ortega et 
al., 2014).  
We then estimate a Latent Class model (LC), to segregate smallholders into groups with similar 
characteristics, in order to account for heterogeneity by creating classes. The LC model is able to 
provide a different dimension for describing data, where farmers are expected to have different 
motivations and aims for their choice decisions, and as such potentially belong to discrete groups, 
based on their preferences and latent variables (Bello and Abdulai, 2016b). It is therefore more 
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suitable for examining the sources of preference heterogeneity (Xie et al., 2016). RPL, LC models 
both relax the assumption of homogeneity from a conditional logit model, but RPL accounts for 
heterogeneity in the estimation, LC accounts for it by creating classes.  
More recent studies show that respondents in discrete choice experiment often ignore some 
attributes in their decision-making processes, termed attribute non-attendance (Hensher, et al., 
2005; Hole, 2011; Ortega and Ward, 2016; Bello and Abdulai, 2016a), resulting in biased model 
outputs such as masked sensitives, implausibly assigned random parameter coefficients, and over-
stated taste heterogeneity. Two approaches have been proposed to account for attribute non-
attendance (ANA) in empirical analysis. These include stated ANA and inferred ANA. Stated ANA 
is an experimental approach, accounting for ANA by asking respondents specific follow-up 
questions on which attribute was ignored when making a decision (e.g., Scarpa et al., 2010). 
Inferred ANA is an econometric approach. Inferred ANA provides a better model fit, while stated 
ANA is not consistent.  
Because firstly, the situation that respondents may assign low importance to some attributes which 
might be ignored at first will lead to overestimation (Weller et al., 2014). Besides, incorporated 
responses to the non-attendance questions may cause potential problems of endogeneity bias 
(Scarpa et al., 2012; Hole et al., 2013). Latent class and Endogenous attribute attendance (EAA) 
are widely used econometric models to account for inferred ANA models (Hole, 2011; Hensher 
and Greene, 2010; Hensher et al., 2012; Scarpa et al., 2012). EAA can be viewed as a variant of 
the equality-constrained LC model, and it can comprise all possible attribute subsets and handle all 
combinations of ANA in comparison with conventional LC model (Hole, 2011). In this study, we 
apply five EAA models focusing on the variables with lower non-attendance probabilities step by 
step, to account for ANA.  
In the LC model, 𝛽 is discrete due to different 𝛽 in distinct class (s) (𝑠 = 1,⋯ , 𝑆). The probability 
that individual (n) selects alternative (i) from choice set (C) in a given situation (t) in class (s) can 
be written as:  
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑛𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑒𝛽𝑠∙𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑒
𝛽𝑠∙𝑋𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑗
                                                                                                             (5) 
where 𝛽𝑠 is the special parameter for class (s), and 𝑅𝑛𝑠 is the probability that individual (n) falls 
into class (s) (Broch and Vedel, 2012; Ortega, 2014). Accordingly, 𝑅𝑛𝑠 can be expressed as:  
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𝑅𝑛𝑠 =
𝑒𝑠𝛿𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑘𝛿𝑛𝑆𝑘=1
                                                                                                                             (6) 
where 𝑠 (𝑠 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑆) is a vector of class-specific parameters to be estimated, and 𝛿𝑛 is the 
vector of smallholder characteristics.  
In the EAA model, each choice is considered as a two-step process in which the decision-maker 
first decides which attributes to take into account when comparing the available alternatives, and 
secondly, chooses the alternative with the best characteristics, given his or her preferences (Hole, 
2011). Thus, the basic conditional logit of EAA is given as: 
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡|𝐶𝑘 =
𝑒
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑘∙𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘∈𝐶𝑘
∑ 𝑒
∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑘∙𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘∈𝐶𝑘𝐼
𝑖=1
                                                                                                              (7) 
where, 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝑘  represents individual (𝑛) chooses the value of attribute (𝑘) relating to alternative (𝑖) 
from choice attribute subset (𝐶𝑘) on choice situation(𝑡), 𝛽𝑛
𝑘 is individual-specific coefficient for 
attribute (𝑘).  
As in Hole et al. (2013), the probability that individual (𝑛)  takes attribute (𝑘) into account is 
specified as 𝑒𝛾𝑘𝑧𝑛𝑘 1 + 𝑒𝛾𝑘𝑧𝑛𝑘⁄ , where z is a vector of individual characteristics and 𝛾 is a vector 
of parameters to be estimated. Assuming these probabilities are independent over attributes, the 
probability of choosing attribute subset (𝐶𝑘) is given by: 
𝑃𝑛𝐶𝑘 = ∏
𝑒𝛾𝑘𝑧𝑛𝑘
1+𝑒𝛾𝑘𝑧𝑛𝑘𝑘∈𝐶𝑘
∏
1
1+𝑒𝛾𝑘𝑧𝑛𝑘𝑘∉𝐶𝑘
                                                                                           (8) 
The probability that an individual (n) chooses alternative (i) from choice set (C) in a given situation 
(t) through choosing attribute subset (𝐶𝑘) can be written as:  
𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝐴𝐴 = ∑ 𝑃𝑛𝐶𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ∏ ∏ (𝑃𝑛𝑖𝑡|𝐶𝑘)
𝑌𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1                                                                                      (9) 
where, 𝑌𝑛𝑖𝑡 takes the value 1 when alternative (i) is chosen and, 0 otherwise; 𝑓(𝛽𝑛|𝜃) denotes the 
density for 𝛽𝑛, in which 𝜃 is the parameter of distribution. 
4.4 Survey design and data description 
The framework for understanding smallholders’ heterogeneous preferences for microcredit was 
implemented in China. Questionnaires were filled via face-to-face household interview, and 
conducted between October and December 2015 in Sichuan province, which is one of the major 
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agricultural production provinces in China. Several types of agricultural products and a distinctive 
economic status, coupled with different pilot projects on microcredits make this province a 
reasonable area for studying heterogeneous preferences. 
Data were drawn from six regions according to a multistage random sampling approach, in which 
the mentioned characteristics of the field were purposively taken into account. The regions included 
Ya’an, Guangyuan, Guang’an, Nanchong, Mianyang and Leshan. The percentage of respondents 
in each region, which were sampled in relation to population size, are 15.94%, 18.30% 17.94%, 
17.75%, 18.48% and 11.59%, respectively. Questionnaires were administered to 552 randomly 
selected respondents in 27 villages. Our survey focused on three areas of variables: households’ 
social demographic data, choice experiment and follow-up questions on attributes. 
Table 4.1 Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Age Physical age of household head. 59.071 11.423 
Gender 1 if the household head is male, 0 otherwise. .911 .285 
Education Educational level of household head: 0=No 
schooling, 1=Primary (1-6years), 2=Junior middle 
(7-9yesrs), 3=Senior middle (10-12years), 
4=Training school (13-15years), 5=Bachelor (13-
16years), 6=Master or higher. 
1.172 .791 
Family size Number of persons live in the family and share 
meals. 
3.542 1.529 
Farm size Arable land, including the rent and cultivated land 
(mu) 
3.388 2.014 
Computer 1 if family owns computer, 0 otherwise. .167 .373 
Automobile 1 if family owns automobile, 0 otherwise. .069 .253 
Motorcycle 1 if family owns motorcycle, 0 otherwise. .299 .458 
Total income Total family income (1000 yuan /year). 50.653 100.734 
Annual liquid 
balance 
The difference between total income and total 
expenditure (1000 yuan /year). 
25.096 83.368 
Net return Average agricultural net income per unit (1000 
yuan). 
2.086 12.321 
Credit history Times of loan in recent 5 years. .708 .695 
Credit constraint 1 if an application for a loan was rejected in recent 
5 years, 0 otherwise. 
.165 .371 
Family debt situation Positive for the amount of claim, negative for the 
amount of debt. 
-8.235 -28.144 
Distance Distance to the nearest financial institution (km) 3.587 3.280 
Demand 1 if family has demand for loan, 0 otherwise .386 .487 
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Loan purpose for 
agricultural  
investment 
1 if loan purpose is agricultural productive 
investment, 0 otherwise. 
.286 .452 
Loan purpose for 
non-agricultural 
investment 
1 if loan purpose is non-agricultural productive 
investment, 0 otherwise. 
.112 .316 
VMAFs 1 if the village runs village mutual aid funds, 0 
otherwise. 
.391 .489 
Formal finance 1 if respondent prefers to credit from formal 
financial institutions 
.348 .477 
 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. According to the 
figures, the vast majority of household heads in the sample are males. Average farm size per 
household is around 3.388 mu (1 mu = 1/15 hectare). Education is captured by the educational level 
of household heads, since they are the decision makers in a family. Family economic situation is 
measured by annual total income and annual liquid balance. Net returns is measured as the 
difference between the agricultural income and per unit costs of inputs, including seeds, chemical 
fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, plastic sheets, hired labor costs and equipment rents. As can be 
seen from table 4.1, the average agricultural net income was 2086 yuan. Credit history indicates 
that most respondents had loans within the last 5years.  Distance to the nearest financial institution 
is about 3.6 km, indicating that microfinance institutions are widely distributed. Demand for loans 
shows that around 38.6% of respondents needed to borrow for some reasons at the time of field 
survey. Loan purpose for agricultural investment and for non-agricultural investment are captured 
differently. The former captures the productive investments in agriculture, such as buying 
machinery, livestock and expanding the scale of production, the latter indicates the other productive 
investments besides agriculture, such as running business. The mean value of village mutual aid 
funds indicates that a large majority of the sampled households live in less depressed villages. More 
smallholders there prefer credit from informal financial institutions such as relatives and friends.  
Choice experiment in this study provided information on how smallholders value the 
characteristics of microcredit and their willingness-to-pay for its attributes. Currently, various 
microcredit services are provided to smallholders by formal institutions and informal individuals 
in China. Different traits such as interest rate, loan size, collateral method and repayment schedule 
are designed in each product, aimed at seeking their own utility maximization. These factors are 
the main determinants of rural microloan disbursements (Tsukada et al., 2010; Turvey et al., 2010; 
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Sagamba et al., 2013). In our CE, the credit attributes we consider are six vital loaning components: 
credit period, interest rate, loan size, collateral method, repayment schedule and transaction costs. 
Levels were given on the basis of existing and associated microcredit regulations. Attributes and 
their levels are shown in table 4.2. Specifically, interest rate was given level at 0% for the cases of 
post-disaster reconstruction loans and informal individual loans. (For example, farmers were able 
to obtain a three-year interest-free loan after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, and most of the loans 
coming from relatives and friends have no interest (Cheng et al., 2014).) The 5.1% and 8.25% were 
the lower and upper limits of loan interests set by the People’s Bank of China in May 2015. 8% is 
the guidance interest rate of the Poverty Village Mutual Aid Funds, and it is fixed during the credit 
period. Transaction cost is included to capture the costs involved in the credit transactions. In 
particular, asymmetric information and lower educational level result in high research costs, 
negotiation costs, as well as monitoring costs in the transacting process. These costs, which are 
normally higher for rural residents, compared to their urban counterparts, tend to influence the 
decisions of farmers. 
 
Table 4.2 Attribute descriptions and attribute levels in the choice experiment 
Attributes Description Attribute levels 
Credit period The time before repaying off a loan 1 year, 3 years, 5 years 
Interest rate Annual interest rate 0%, 5.10%, 8%, 8.25% 
Loan size Maximum limitation of a loan (RMB Yuan) 10,000; 50,000; 100,000; 
200,000 
Collateral method Security method against the possibility of 
repayment default 
Pledge assets, Guarantor 
Repayment 
schedule 
The way of repaying Lump sum, Installment 
Transaction costs Cumbersome degree of applying for a loan Low, Medium, High 
 
A full-factorial design for our CE would require 576 profiles, which would be too large for a survey 
to handle. Therefore D-optimal and blocked design were used via JMP 10 (SAS). Given 2nd 
interactions and powers, 72-set was calculated and could be composed as 3 blocks of 24 sets (Table 
4.9 A1). This method can scientifically narrow down choice sets within a reasonable scale. Even 
then, some attributes might be the same for alternative options in one choice set, varying 
combinations of different attributes are able to effectively capture respondents’ preferences. Each 
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respondent saw only one of the randomly assigned blocks with 8 choice situations instead of the 
entire design. So three versions of the questionnaire were used, and total respondents answered 
13248 choice sets. Respondents made decisions among 3 alternatives in a choice situation.  A 
sample choice situation that consisted of three alternatives is presented in table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Sample choice scenario 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 1 year 1 year 
Interest rate 8% 8.25% 8.25% 
Loan size 50,000 50,000 200,000 
Collateral method Guarantor Guarantor Assets pledge 
Repayment method Installment Lump sum Installment 
Transaction costs Medium Medium High 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Random parameter logit estimates  
The results of the random parameter logit model estimations are presented in Table 4.4, where we 
use first level as base for each attribute. All the attributes except the loan size 2 at 50,000 yuan are 
significant. According to the P value, the model is statistically significant. ASC is an alternative 
specific constant, defined as a situation with 0% interest rate option that equals to 1, otherwise 0. 
According to the mean value, on average, smallholders prefer longer credit period, smaller loan 
size, lower transaction costs and lower interest rate. Guarantor and installment would be more 
attractive collateral and repayment method, respectively. The statistical significance of the standard 
deviations for credit period, collateral method, repayment schedule and interest rate indicate 
preference heterogeneity for these attributes.  
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Table 4.4 Estimates of random parameter logit model [16] 
Variable 
Mean SD Prob of 
Coef.(negative) Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. 
ASC -.957*** .267 1.820*** .204 0.700 
Credit Period 2 .486*** .094 .626*** .152 0.219 
Credit Period 3 .392*** .092 -.324** .144 0.887 
Loan size 2 -.131 .116 -.004 .188 0.000 
Loan size 3 -.447*** .128 -.029 .158 0.000 
Loan size 4 -.303*** .117 .264 .171 0.874 
Transaction costs 2 -.535*** .101 .074 .158 0.767 
Transaction costs 3 -1.100*** .129 .683*** .166 0.946 
Collateral method .435*** .082 1.180*** .106 0.356 
Repayment schedule 1.865*** .107 2.125*** .120 0.190 
Interest rate -.691*** .036 .236*** .024 0.998 
Number of obs 13248     
Log likelihood -2633.647     
𝝆𝟐 .138     
LR chi2(11) 841.57     
Prob > chi2 .000     
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
From the magnitudes of the standard deviation related to the mean coefficients, 70% of 
smallholders prefer microcredit with interest rates. In terms of the two credit periods, the mean 
value indicates that smallholders prefer longer credit period in comparison with the base option, 
with 78.1% of them preferring the credit period of 3 years, while only 11.2% prefer 5 years. 
Although smaller credit size is more attractive for smallholders, the loan size of 50,000 and 100,000 
yuan satisfy them all. The largest amount here only attracts 12.6% smallholders. The difference 
exhibiting on the collateral method and repayment schedule shows that only 35% of respondents 
prefer to find pledge of assets as the way to guarantee their credits, 19% of them prefer lump sum 
as the repayment way. Even transaction costs and interest rate indicate that the lower the better, 
5.4% and 0.2% of respondents accept higher transaction costs, and prefer to pay higher interest 
rates, respectively. 
                                                          
[16] Probability of negative coefficient is calculated by100 ∗ Ф(−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛/𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), where Ф is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution. In the empirical estimation, credit period 1 (1 year), loan size 1 (10,000), 
transaction costs 1 (low), pledge of asserts and lump sum repayment way are the base levels. 
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4.5.2 Latent class estimates 
Four latent classes were obtained through comparison, using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). According to the results presented in Table 4.5, 
AIC and BIC are minimized with 6 and 4 classes, respectively. Changes in AIC is smaller from 
class 5 to class 6 than from class 3 to class 4, indicating that adding another class probably does 
not improve the model markedly. Our analysis therefore focuses on the 4 class specification to 
economize on space. The 4 class LC model is substantially better than RPL model with regards to 
the goodness of model fit. This indicates that different customer groups take on different 
preferences for attributes, and also verifies the necessity of using the latent class model. 
Table 4.5 AIC and BIC values for different numbers of classes [17] 
Classes LL Nparam AIC BIC LL0 
 
 
2 -2706.938 38 5489.876 5653.790 -3054.433 .114 
3 -2499.774 65 5129.547 5409.928 -3054.433 .182 
4 -2356.615 92 4897.230 5294.077 -3054.433 .228 
5 -2286.637 119 4811.274 5324.586 -3054.433 .251 
6 -2243.937 146 4779.874 5409.652 -3054.433 .265 
RPL model -2633.647 11 5289.295 5336.744 -3054.433 .138 
 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the latent class model. It shows that four classes of the total samples 
account for 5.8%, 29.3%, 18.5% and 46.4%, respectively. The coefficients of ASC and interest rate 
are significantly negative for all classes, suggesting that all the consumers prefer lower interest rate. 
The difference in preferences is mainly affected by attributes such as credit period, collateral 
method and repayment schedule.  
For example, the coefficients of credit period 2 are positive and significantly different from zero 
for classes two, three and four, indicating that credit period at three years is significantly attractive 
for these classes. Respondents in class one appear to obtain lower utility from choosing credit 
period of five years, since the coefficient of credit period 3 is significantly negative in this class.  
Guarantor mortgage contributes more utility than pledging of assets for respondents in class one.  
Likewise, members in class one, two and four significantly prefer installment repayment, while 
respondents in class three prefer the lump sum option. Notably, larger amount of loan is 
                                                          
[17] 𝜌2 = 1 − (𝐿𝐿) 𝐿𝐿0⁄ . 𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −2(𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃). 𝐵𝐼𝐶 = −2𝐿𝐿 + [𝑃 ∗ ln𝑁] 
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significantly and invariably less attractive than smaller sizes at different levels for the decision 
makers in all classes. This may result from the consideration of profitability and repayment 
pressure. 
The alternative specific constant, transaction costs and interest rate exhibit significantly negative 
preference among the four classes, indicating that lower utility will be obtained when paying for 
higher interest rate and transaction costs. However, respondents in class one appear to be showing 
higher utility for higher transaction costs. If we link class membership estimates to this irrational 
preference, one possible reason might be the preference for loans from formal financial institutions, 
but with less credit history. This is probably because it could be hard for these inexperienced 
consumers to be fully informed and to prepare all the application materials during the initial 
transaction. They may be willing to pay higher costs, such as the costs of information collection, 
material preparation, negotiation with financial institutions, etc., in order to borrow money 
successfully and accumulate experience. 
Socio-demographic variables are included in the latent class model to explain the class probability. 
Negative and significant class membership estimates for family size and annual liquid balance 
reveal that members in classes one, two and three have smaller family size and less liquid balance, 
compared to class four. Nevertheless, these three classes present better total income situation than 
the base class. Respondents in these three classes are more willing to accept credit from formal 
financial institutions than those in the fourth class. With regards to specific differences in each 
class, females are more likely to fall into class one, since the gender is significantly negative. 
Members in class one are more likely to live in poor villages, as the coefficient of village mutual 
aid funds is positive, and also significantly different from other groups. Interestingly, joint 
guarantee is the collateral method of VMAF, and respondents in the first group just prefer guarantor 
collateral method. This confirms the rationality of the classification. Members in class two and 
class three have similar characteristics. For example, their household heads are both younger and 
more likely to be male. Other estimates, such as educational level, credit history, distance to 
financial institutions and loan purpose cannot be used to differentiate respondents into different 
classes according to their preferences.   
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Table 4.6 Estimates of latent class model 
Variable Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
ASC 1.935 1.354 .423 .597 -.801** .407 -1.945** .767 
Interest rate .003 .154 -.243*** .077 -.327*** .055 -1.319*** .108 
Credit Period 2 -.155 .405 .669*** .197 .532*** .148 1.433*** .369 
Credit Period 3 -1.652** .673 .007 .210 .141 .142 1.119*** .309 
Loan size 2 -.406 .606 -.298 .208 -.344* .176 .397 .304 
Loan size 3 -1.601** .626 -.348 .225 -.488** .219 -1.232*** .410 
Loan size 4 -.984** .554 -.107 .198 -.735*** .189 -.852** .358 
Transaction costs 2 .589 .512 -.576*** .210 -1.274*** .175 .366 .344 
Transaction costs 3 1.437** .580 -.588*** .198 -2.236*** .245 .049 .438 
Collateral method 6.364*** 1.005 -.045 .120 .047 .116 -.432** .179 
Repayment schedule .604* .314 3.533*** .264 -.312*** .114 1.461*** .248 
Class membership estimates  
_cons 11.277*** 2.003 .921 .977 .481 1.220   
Age .008 .026 -.025** .011 -.025* .014   
Gender -15.077*** 1.988 .393 .392 .073 .500   
Education -.006 .235 -.100 .115 -.158 .133   
Family size -.454** .206 -.341*** .105 -.226* .119   
Total income .054*** .014 .034*** .011 .033*** .011   
Credit history -.077 .430 .032 .206 .344 .238   
Village mutual aid 
funds 
1.911** .804 -.112 .318 -.847** .399   
Credit constraint -21.713 1.004 .428 .313 -.018 .424   
Family debt situation .034 .026 .004 .006 .018** .008   
Distance to financial 
institution 
-.087 .158 .0001 .037 -.075 .053   
Loan purpose for 
agricultural investment 
.246 .507 .287 .297 .996*** .338   
Loan purpose for non-
agricultural investment 
-21.531 1.052 -.092 .422 .476 .486   
Annual liquid balance -.049*** .016 -.034*** .013 -.026** .013   
Formal financial 
institution preference 
1.878*** .635 .894*** .330 1.468*** .384   
Demand for loan .101 .485 .319 .269 -.075 .322   
Probability of class 5.8% 
 
29.3% 
 
18.5% 
 
46.4% 
 
Number of obs 13248 
       
Log likelihood -2356.615 
       
𝝆𝟐 .228 
       
Prob > chi2 .000 
       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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4.5.3 Endogenous attribute attendance estimates 
Results from the EAA model are presented in table 4.7. The values of overall coefficients in a 
separate non-attendance probability (model 1) are larger than that of the RPL model, with 
qualitatively similar signs. The variables display different significant levels from the RPL and LC 
models, when taking ANA into consideration. Since the non-attendance probabilities are captured 
by attributes, each attribute has only one ANA probability. According to the AIC and BIC tests, 
the first EAA model fits the data better than the random parameter logit model. This finding can 
be taken as evidence of preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance. Model 2 to model 
5 focus on the attributes with lower non-attendance probability.  
In the model 1, Interest rate and repayment schedule significantly present the lowest separate non-
attendance probability, denoting that the probability when interest rate is ignored in one choice 
situation is 11.4%, and the probability when repayment schedule is ignored in one choice situation 
is 39.7%. The most frequently ignored attribute is collateral method, accounting for 94.9%, 
followed by transaction costs, with 90.1%, which then are excluded in model 2. Loan size and 
credit period are insignificant in explaining the ANA probability. 
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Table 4.7 Results of endogenous attribute attendance model 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Coef. ANA Coef. ANA Coef. ANA Coef. ANA Coef. ANA 
ASC -4.131*** .772*** -3.727*** .818*** -3.634*** .841*** -3.887*** .783*** -3.671*** .793*** 
(.320) (.042) (.260) (.090) (.242) (.061) (.244) (.035) (.196) (.024) 
Interest rate -.820*** .114*** -.754*** .152** -.730*** .166*** -.778*** .157*** -.672*** .117*** 
(-.055) (.032) (.043) (.060) (.040) (.044) (.033) (.026) (.027) (.017) 
Repayment 
schedule 
3.387*** .397*** 3.070*** .377*** 2.989*** .344*** 3.081*** .340*** 2.252***   
(.260) (.033) (.235) (.050) (.185) (.329) (.154) (.030) (.103)   
Loan size 2 -.080 .186 .016 .159 .097 .109 -.068   .076   
(.141) (.319) (.134) (.345) (.102) (.300) (.186)   (.236)   
Loan size 3  -.744**   -.580**   -.508**   -.501**   -.200   
(.292) (.256)   (.199)   (.197)   (.243)   
Loan size 4 -.744* -.475*   -.396*   -.337*   -.069   
(.383) (.272)   (.207)   (.183)   (.265)   
Credit Period 2 .629** .201 1.276 .625** -.516   -.001   -.465**   
(-.25) (.322) (.993) (.276) (.563)   (.175)   (.187)   
Credit Period 3 .597**   .974***   -.274   .217   -.291   
(.303) (.267)   (.324)   (.147)   (.215)   
Transaction costs 2 -4.080*** .901*** -3.638***   -3.527***   -1.329***   -2.295***   
(.700) (.017) (.912)   (.865)   (.345)   (.337)   
Transaction costs 3 -21.250**   -7.142***   -7.126***   -2.530***   -4.007***   
(9.630) (2.234)   (1.853)   (.582)   (.566)   
Collateral method 38.118 .949*** 2.394**   2.148***   .663***   1.085***   
(104.223) (.012) (1.099)   (.725)   (.191)   (.212)   
Excluded attributes       .871***   .862***   .491***   .715*** 
      (.043)   (.041)   (.136)   (.059) 
Number of obs 13248   13248   13248   13248   13248  
Log likelihood -2545.154   -2668.623   -2685.746   -2698.726   -2786.767  
Wald chi2(11) 613.650   416.710   493.740   677.870   1005.620  
Prob > chi2 .000   .000   .000   .000   .000  
AIC 5112.307   5359.246   5393.492   5419.452   5595.533  
BIC 5159.756   5406.695   5440.941   5466.901   5642.982  
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Models 2 to 5 are endogenous attribute attendance estimates with jointly estimated attribute non-
attendance probabilities. For example in model 2, transaction costs and collateral method are the 
two excluded variables, which are jointly ignored by 87.1%. Credit period is now significant, and 
tend to explain the non-attendance probability by 62.5%, which is larger than that of interest rate 
and repayment schedule. So credit period is excluded in the following model. In the model 3, the 
excluded attributes, credit period, transaction costs and collateral method will be ignored by 86.2% 
in one choice situation. The ANA probability of interest rate is higher, while that of repayment 
schedule is lower. However, loan size is still insignificant in explaining the non-attendance. The 
ANA probability is the lowest according to the value, indicating that this attribute is less likely to 
play an important role in the decision-making process. Models 4 and 5 treat interest rate and 
repayment schedule as two separate attributes and one combination, respectively, in order to 
compare with other excluded variables. The results reveal that the probability that loan size, credit 
period, transaction costs and collateral method would be ignored in one choice set is 49.1%, and 
the probability that people merely take interest rate and repayment schedule into consideration is 
71.5%. In comparison with ASC and interest rate, the estimate shows that people normally pay 
more attention to how much they can save, instead of whether they have to pay when engaging in 
microcredit choices. 
 
4.5.4 Willingness to pay estimates 
Table 4.8 presents smallholder farmers’ willingness to pay estimates for microcredit. The high 
proportion of respondents take interest rate into consideration, indicating this attribute should be 
regarded as price in terms of willingness to pay. This standard WTP results are shown in price 1 
column. In order to compare the different WTP estimates, price 2 takes ASC as the price, indicating 
the willingness to involve in interest rates-cost credits. Given the definition of ASC in the previous 
section, the signs of the variables in price 2 rightly contrast with those in price 1. 
According to the RPL model, respondents are willing to pay 0.704, 0.567, 0.629 and 2.699 percent 
higher interest rates when a credit is characterized by 3 years period, 5 years period, guarantor and 
installment repayment, respectively. However, they are willing to pay less when the loan size 
becomes larger and the transaction costs have to be taken into account. In comparison with price 
1, the absolute values of attributes in price 2 category are smaller, indicating that when facing only 
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one prior choice issue whether to pay interest rate or not (price 2), such as the issue that borrowing 
from formal financial institutions or relatives and friends, the amount of willingness or 
unwillingness to pay for each attribute is smaller. It reveals that respondents are more sensitive to 
attributes on how much to pay, since the cost is always inevitable. Repayment schedule and interest 
rate display the largest two positive WTP coefficients. And they are also the attributes that take up 
the highest probability of attribute attendance in the EAA estimation.  
Distinct willingness to pay estimates are displayed in different classes based on the LC model. In 
the price 1 column, for example, respondents in class 1 are significantly willing to pay 4.930 
percent less interest rate for a 5-year credit, while members in classes 2, 3 and 4 would like to pay 
more for a 3-year credit. Smallholders in class 3 will be willing to pay 0.955 more for lump sum 
credits, while individuals in classes 1, 2 and 4 are able to accept 1.803, 14.512 and 1.107 percent 
higher interest rates for installment repayment credits, respectively. When the attributes work in 
combination, for example, more than 75% of the respondents (classes 2 and 4) would like to pay 
higher interest rates, if a 3-year microcredit adopts installment repayment schedule. However, the 
magnitude of willingness to pay is incongruent with the size of the coefficient. For example, with 
regard to the loan size, smallholder farmers in class 4 are significantly less unwilling to pay (Table 
4.8), although the coefficient is higher, compare with the other classes, as shown in Table 4.6. This 
is because WTP estimation only investigates people’s attitude to price, which is just one of the 
factors in the utility of each choice. It therefore shows evidence why some elements are replaceable 
and why higher interest rates are acceptable for some borrowers.  
Willingness to pay estimation of EAA only used the separate non-attendance probability model, 
which exhibits a better model fit. Results indicate coefficients on the basis of price 1 are greatly 
larger than that of the RPL model, while coefficients in price 2 are smaller. It suggests that when 
taking attribute non-attendance phenomenon into consideration, people will show stronger attitudes 
on willingness to pay for factors they consider important. 
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Table 4.8 Willingness to pay estimates 
  
RPL model 
LC model 
EAA model 
Class 1   Class 2   Class 3   Class 4  
Price 1 Price 2 Price 1 Price 2 Price 1 Price 2 Price 1 Price 2 Price 1 Price 2 Price 1 Price 2 
ASC  -1.385***   5.775  1.739  -2.449**  -1.474**  -5.039***  
Interest 
rate  
  .722***  -.002  .575***  -.408***  -.678***  .198*** 
Credit 
Period 2  
.704*** -.508*** .464 -.080 2.748*** -1.580*** 1.627*** -.665*** 1.086*** -.737*** .767*** -.152*** 
Credit 
Period 3  
.567*** -.410*** -4.930** .854** .028 -.016 .431 -.176 .848*** -.575*** .728** -.144** 
Loan size 2  -.189 .137 -1.211 .210 -1.225 .705 -1.052* .430* .301 -.204 -.097 .019 
Loan size 3  -.647*** .468*** -4.778** .827** -1.430 .822 -1.493** .610** -.934*** .633*** -.908*** .181*** 
Loan size 4  -.438*** .316** -2.935* .508* -.441 .253 -2.247*** .918*** -.646** .438** -.908** .180** 
Transaction 
costs 2  
-.775*** .560*** 1.759 -.305 -2.367*** 1.361*** -3.893*** 1.590*** .277 -.188 -4.976*** .988*** 
Transaction 
costs 3  
-1.592*** 1.15*** 4.289** -.743** -2.417*** 1.390*** -6.834*** 2.791*** .037 -.025 -25.921** 5.144** 
Collateral 
method  
.629*** -.454*** 18.991*** -3.288*** -.185 .107 .145 -.059 -.327** .222** 46.497 -9.227 
Repayment 
schedule  
2.699*** -1.949*** 1.803* -.312* 14.512*** -8.346*** -.955*** .390*** 1.107*** -.751*** 4.131*** -.820*** 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study used random parameter logit, latent class and endogenous attribute attendance models 
to analyze smallholders’ preferences and willingness to pay for microcredit with the consideration 
of preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance, using data from a discrete choice 
experiment in China. 
The results demonstrated that preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance exist in the 
smallholder farmers’ microcredit choices, indicating that microcredit products cannot be optimally 
designed without targeting different groups and considering the relevant attributes. In particular, 
the estimates from the random parameter logit model indicate that, on average, smallholder farmers 
prefer longer credit period, smaller credit size, lower transaction costs and lower interest rates. 
Guarantor and installment would be more attractive collateral and repayment methods, respectively. 
The findings for the latent class model indicate that preference heterogeneity is related to socio-
demographic features. These various preferences can be classified into 4 groups. Interest rate and 
transaction costs were found to be negatively and significantly influencing individuals’ utility. 
Although there is an exception with regards to the transaction costs, that proportion is quite small. 
The results from the endogenous attribute attendance model showed that when taking ANA 
phenomenon into consideration, people will show stronger attitudes on willingness to pay for 
factors they consider important. 
The findings also revealed that high transaction costs tend to lower utility and the willingness to 
pay. Potential ways to reduce the transaction costs should include clean loan terms and simplifying 
application procedures, since distance to financial institutions is insignificant to smallholders. The 
results further showed that smallholders characterized by higher educational level, larger family 
size and better annual liquid balance prefer to use guarantor as collateral method. Because these 
traits are able to support the assumption that these respondents are impossible to side-step a 
responsibility of repayment and bear the blame from relatives or friends of breaking a credit 
contract. 
The findings of this study provide some policy implications for adjusting rural microcredit 
strategies and improving microcredit development. Generally, they suggest that microcredit 
providers are able to attract new customers under the current interest rates, if the combination of 
interest rate, repayment schedule, loan size, credit period and collateral method is appropriately 
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adjusted. For example, repayment schedule exhibits the lowest non-attendance probability besides 
interest rate, and most smallholders are willing to pay more when a credit product includes 
installment repayment method. Formal microcredit suppliers who intend to expand services for 
smallholders in rural areas may need to combine more small-scale credit products with installment 
repayment schedule. In particular, for some non-profit credit service organizations, such as Poverty 
Village Mutual Aid Funds, clear target group is needed to ensure effective operation and goal 
implementation. Furthermore, government ought to take the responsibility to improve the 
identification of assets in rural areas, in order to reduce financial institutions’ bad debt risk and 
transaction costs. 
This study focused on microcredit in rural areas. Further research can consider comparing the 
difference between the rural and urban individuals on this issue, given that China is in a process of 
rapid urbanization. 
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Appendix 
Table 4.9 A1 Total choice sets of the choice experiment 
Choice 
sets 
Credit 
Period 
Interest 
rate 
Loan size 
Collateral 
method 
Repayment 
method 
Transaction 
costs 
1 3 years 8% 50,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
1 1 year 8,25% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
1 1 year 8,25% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
2 5 years 8% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
2 1 year 5,10% 200,000 Guarantor Installment High 
2 5 years 8% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
3 1 year 8% 100,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
3 1 year 0% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
3 5 years 8% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
4 3 years 8% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
4 5 years 0% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
4 5 years 5,10% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
5 5 years 8% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
5 5 years 5,10% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
5 3 years 5,10% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
6 3 years 0% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
6 5 years 8,25% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
6 1 year 8% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
7 5 years 0% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
7 3 years 8,25% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
7 3 years 0% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
8 1 year 0% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
8 3 years 8,25% 200,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
8 5 years 8,25% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
9 3 years 8% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
9 5 years 0% 200,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
9 1 year 5,10% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
10 1 year 0% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
10 5 years 5,10% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
10 5 years 8,25% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
11 5 years 5,10% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
11 5 years 5,10% 100,000 Guarantor Installment High 
11 1 year 5,10% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
12 3 years 0% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
12 5 years 8,25% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
12 1 year 8% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
13 1 year 0% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
13 3 years 5,10% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
13 5 years 8,25% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
14 5 years 0% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
14 5 years 0% 10,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
14 5 years 0% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
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15 1 year 8,25% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
15 1 year 8% 50,000 Guarantor Installment High 
15 1 year 0% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
16 3 years 8,25% 50,000 Guarantor Installment High 
16 1 year 0% 100,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
16 3 years 8% 200,000 Guarantor Installment High 
17 1 year 5,10% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
17 1 year 8% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
17 3 years 8% 10,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
18 3 years 8% 100,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
18 3 years 5,10% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
18 5 years 5,10% 50,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
19 3 years 8,25% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
19 3 years 0% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
19 1 year 8,25% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
20 3 years 0% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
20 3 years 5,10% 200,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
20 5 years 8% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
21 3 years 8,25% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
21 1 year 5,10% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
21 1 year 0% 50,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
22 1 year 0% 200,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
22 1 year 8,25% 200,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
22 5 years 0% 100,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
23 3 years 5,10% 100,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
23 5 years 8,25% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
23 1 year 8,25% 10,000 Guarantor Installment High 
24 5 years 8% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
24 1 year 5,10% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
24 1 year 8% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
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Abstract 
This article examines the impact of experience on rural households’ preferences for microfinance 
attributes, using household data from Sichuan province in China. We use the Bayesian updating 
method to account for the learning process involved in acquiring experience on microfinance. We 
then employ the generalized multinomial logit model that accounts for both preference and scale 
heterogeneity to estimate the choice probabilities and impact of experience on preferences and 
willingness-to-pay for microfinance. The empirical findings show that experience with 
microfinance products or lending institutions help households in their selections of microfinance 
institutions. In particular, experience with financial institutions increase the scale parameter and 
help respondents to feel assured about their choices, while experience with individual lenders have 
no such effects. The results also indicate that the willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates vary across 
experiences, with WTP for installment credit displaying the biggest change, and the Bayesian 
updating making the changes even much larger. 
Key words: experience, microfinance, scale and preference heterogeneity, generalized 
multinomial logit model, Bayesian inference 
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5.1 Introduction 
Information about goods and services is always incomplete in the real world. People face 
difficulties in making optimal decisions based on their utility analyses because of bounded 
rationality, uncertainty and complexity. As an important financial service, microfinance has been 
an issue of growing consideration in many developing economies over the last two decades. A 
great deal of literature has affirmed that rural microfinance can bring significantly positive effects 
on the economic wellbeing of participants (e.g., Ahlin and Jiang 2008; Crépon et al. 2015; Rahman 
et al. 2015; Kersten et al. 2017). However, the potential outcomes and costs are unknown in 
advance for smallholders when they make decisions about whether to participate in microfinance 
or not to participate (Shapiro 2015). Instead, these decisions are constantly made according to the 
limited information that financial agencies and peers provide, as well as people’s prior conceptions 
that they have formed from their own experiences. Given the two types of information sources that 
contribute to individuals’ preferences for microfinance, an important issue that needs identification 
is whether the experience with microfinance influences rural residents’ preferences for 
microfinance. The significance arises from the information asymmetry problem, which is usually 
more severe for rural residents, compared to their urban counterparts, and tends to influence people 
in relying more on experiences when making decisions. Therefore, understanding the effects of 
experience on rural residents’ preferences for microfinance will help in promoting financial 
inclusion. 
Given the significance of microfinance in poverty alleviation and improving food security, several 
studies have examined households’ preferences for microfinance under given information 
conditions (e.g., Ayyagari et al. 2010; Tsukada et al. 2010; Turvey et al.2012; Cheng and Ahmed 
2014). In these studies, farmers’ preferences for microfinance are generally differentiated between 
sources from formal and informal agencies, and they are captured by attributes such as collateral 
requirements, repayment schedules and credit scales. Household characteristics such as family 
income, family size, farmland size and education level are always used to characterize the 
differences among respondents. In their study on Indonesia, Tsukada et al. (2010) found that 
respondents prefer small-scale loans from formal financial institutions with no collateral 
requirements, while the findings from Cheng and Ahmed (2014) show that households with older 
heads and tight social networks prefer loans from informal sources. Despite the growing literature 
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on households’ preferences for microfinance, little is known about the effect of personal experience 
on households’ preferences for microfinance.  
Experience is a significant factor in the context of households’ preferences for a number of reasons. 
First, utility, which is normally used to capture the economic outcome, theoretically represents the 
sense of satisfaction that individuals experience from goods or services. This indicates that people 
always seek a satisfactory option rather than an optimal one. Even if utility can be substituted by 
some observable outcomes, information about the probability distributions over the outcomes is 
incomplete for decision makers (Hadar 2009; Bradbury et al. 2015). In addition, consumers are 
affected by many external inputs that can modulate their cognitive, emotional, volitional and even 
automatic behaviors in relation to the selection of different products or services (Font-i-Furnols 
and Guerrero 2014). According to these unobservable inputs, people do not always know exactly 
how much they value a good and even do not fully incorporate information that tend to contradict 
their prior choices (Kuhnen and Knutson 2011; McGee 2013; Matsumoto and Spence 2016). As a 
result, consumers’ attitudes, buying intentions and preferences rely heavily on experiences, even 
when descriptive information is available to them (Lejarraga and Gonzalez 2011; Claret et al. 2014; 
Maltz 2016). Second, “preference” is the result of a series of dynamic and experienced choices. As 
indicated by Wright et al. (1995), direct experience leads to more strongly held beliefs, which 
contribute to higher attitude–behavior consistency. With the accumulation of individuals’ 
selections, their preferences are updated. This updating forms preferences on principle (Neuman et 
al. 2010). People then may use their own principles to compare attribute levels when they make 
selections or purchase decisions on goods and services. People without such existing knowledge 
need to spend some time developing these standards (Bettman and Park 1980). To some extent, 
experience can improve decision efficiency and reduce transaction costs.  
The importance of experience and its impact on “experience goods” with unobserved quality 
characteristics have received considerable attention in recent studies (e.g., Neuman et al. 2010; 
Kaufmann et al. 2013; Czajkowski et al. 2014; Bradbury et al. 2015). In their study on the effect 
of experience on preferences for health services, Neuman et al. (2010) found that experience is 
stable and does not affect preferences. They examined the effect by comparing different experience 
categories, without including experience in the utility equation, in which case the experience 
variable did not influence the outcomes. Focusing on experience, Kaufmann et al. (2013) and 
Bradbury et al. (2015) applied experimental approaches and found that investment decisions can 
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be considerably improved with experience, since experience prepares individuals to better 
anticipate potential losses. The results from the within-subject and close-to-real-world 
experimental design, however, are had to be explained by sampling bias or information asymmetry. 
Considering the limitations of the above methods, Czajkowski et al. (2014) applied a Bayesian 
framework to capture the effect of experience on environmental public goods. Even though this 
framework provides useful implications, this study did not take into account the quality of 
experience. The research gap and the limitations mentioned above indicate that more research is 
needed to shed light on the impact of experience on rural households’ preferences for microfinance. 
The premise of this study lies in the fact that microfinance belongs to the category of experience 
goods. The approach we use in this study derives from significant insights from the consumer 
choice literature, which shows the impact of informative advertising on both experienced and 
inexperienced consumers (Ackerberg 2003; Bradbury 2015). In addition, the levels of various 
microfinance attributes are probably accessible for rural households, but the economic values and 
effects of attributes are previously unknown before their experiences. Even if the preferences 
among respondents were alike, their prior experiences and the conceptions they previously formed 
can still differ. 
The present study contributes to the research gap by taking experience as a latent variable 
influencing personal specific tastes and as an integral part of total utility of rural households in 
their decision-making. We develop a conceptual framework that is based on McFadden’s Random 
Utility Theory and Bayesian inference. We use data from a recent choice experimental survey that 
was conducted in Sichuan province in China. We employ a generalized multinomial logit model 
(G-MNL) to capture the choice probability and the impact of experience on preferences and 
willingness-to-pay for microfinance. These two specifications make it possible to compare the 
difference in using information from descriptions and experiences, and to capture the preference 
heterogeneity and scale heterogeneity. The issue of scale heterogeneity is particularly important in 
this study since the preferences of households will be apparently differentiated between with and 
without experiences. Scale heterogeneity can provide the information that differs across 
households, but not across choices. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the conceptual framework 
used in the study. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis, while section 4 presents the 
empirical results. The final section presents conclusion and implication. 
5.2 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework used in the study is based on Lancaster’s model of consumer choice 
and random utility theory, in which individuals are assumed to maximize expected utility in their 
decision-making processes. The general utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗  that individual 𝑖  derives from choosing a 
microfinance alternative 𝑗 can be specified as a linear utility function: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 ,                                                                                                                  (1) 
where ∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑟  is the deterministic observable component; 𝑥𝑗𝑟 is a particular attribute indexed by 
𝑟  in alternative 𝑗 ; 𝛽𝑖𝑟 is the parameter to be estimated, representing the respondent’s taste on 
attribute 𝑟 ; 𝜀𝑖𝑗  is the stochastic part of the utility. The probability 𝑃  that alternative 𝑗  will be 
preferred can be expressed as:  
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 1|𝑈𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑖𝑗∗;  ∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑗
∗, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐶) ,                                                                               (2) 
where Y is the alternative variable, taking the value 1 when alternative 𝑗  is chosen and zero 
otherwise; 𝑗∗ represents one of the other counterpart alternatives; and C is the finite choice set. 
In line with Maddala (1983) and Train (2009), the logit model is obtained by assuming that each 𝜀 
is an observed random term that is independently and identically distributed. Then a succinct and 
closed form of the probability conditional on 𝛽 is given as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑒
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑟
∑ 𝑒
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟?̃?𝑖𝑟𝑟
𝑗
 ,                                                                                                                           (3)   
We proceed in two steps to analyze the impact of experience on households’ preferences for 
microfinance. We first consider experience as a latent variable that influences respondents’ tastes, 
and in a second step, we introduce experience as partial utility in deriving the expected utility. 
The discussion in the previous section shows that experience on the various types of microfinance 
is related to the parameter 𝛽 in the deterministic component of utility as expressed in equation (1). 
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Now if we consider experience as a latent variable influencing respondents’ tastes, we can specify 
the taste parameter 𝛽𝑖𝑟 as follows: 
 𝛽𝑖𝑟 = 𝛽𝑟 + ∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝛼𝑟𝑚𝑚 + 𝜇𝑖𝑟 ,                                                                                                     (4) 
where the parameter 𝛽𝑟  provides information about the mean preference for attribute 𝑟 ; 𝑧𝑖𝑚 
indicates the respondent’s observable characteristics 𝑚, such as experience; 𝛼𝑟𝑚 is the associated 
parameter, capturing the effect of individual heterogeneity with regard to characteristics 𝑚 on 
attribute 𝑟; and 𝜇𝑖𝑟 captures the effect of unobservable factors, assuming 𝜇𝑖𝑟~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑟
2). 
If we assume that peoples’ preferences for microfinance are randomly distributed, then mixed logit 
model, which is a specific type of G-MNL model, can be used to estimate the choice probability 
and the impact of experience on microfinance. This model is superior to the traditional conditional 
logit model, since it is insensitive to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and able to 
detect unobserved and observed sources of heterogeneity. Therefore, the probability that individual 
𝑖 chooses alternative 𝑗 is the integral of conditional probability, given by: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ∫
𝑒
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟𝑟 (𝛽𝑟+∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝛼𝑟𝑚𝑚 +𝜇𝑖𝑟)
∑ 𝑒
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑟𝑟 (𝛽𝑟+∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝛼𝑟𝑚𝑚 +𝜇𝑖𝑟)
𝑗
𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣 ,                                                                                 (5) 
where 𝑓(𝑣) is a joint distribution function for random parameters, taking 𝑓(𝑣)~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑟
2). 
In the empirical estimation, a simulation method is well suited, since the log likelihood for equation 
(5) cannot be solved analytically. The simulated average probability is approximated through 
simulation for a given draw value of 𝑣 from 𝑓(𝑣) with 𝑀 repetition, which is expressed as: 
?̌?𝑖𝑗 =
1
𝑀
∑
𝑒
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑘 (𝛽𝑘+∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝛼𝑘𝑚𝑚 +𝜇𝑖𝑘)
∑ 𝑒
∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑘 (𝛽𝑘+∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝛼𝑘𝑚𝑚 +𝜇𝑖𝑘)
𝑗
𝑀
𝑚=1  ,                                                                                     (6)  
A simulated log likelihood is obtained by inserting the ?̌?𝑖𝑗 into the log-likelihood function as 𝑆𝐿𝐿 =
∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖 𝑙𝑛?̌?𝑖𝑗, where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 1 if respondent 𝑖 chose alternative 𝑗, and zero otherwise. 
As indicated previously, if experience is considered as partial utility, the utility that a household 
derives from selecting a specific microfinance can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑟 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,                                                                                                         (7) 
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where 𝑋𝑗𝑟 represents the attribute 𝑟 relating to alternative 𝑗; 𝛽𝑖𝑗 represents the average personal (𝑖) 
corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated; and 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 is the new utility component, which 
is defined as “experience utility” following Ackerberg (2003). 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 is a scalar variable capturing 
the utility that individual 𝑖 obtains from experiences that are not directly observable before the 
selection at time 𝑡. Hence, the experience utility will contribute to the next selection after “one-
consumption” (𝑡 + 1)  process. This method is applicable because microfinance is always the 
strategy that provides rural households more accessible small-scale loans, households may take 
more than one times of using microfinance. Since the expected utility may be based on more than 
one selection experience, the experience utility can be specified as: 
𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 ,                                                                                                                    (8) 
where 𝛿𝑖𝑗 is the mean prior experience utility that individual 𝑖 enjoyed from microfinance products, 
and 𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 is the random idiosyncratic component that may result from the variation in features and 
combinations of attributes of the microfinance, or the situations when an individual makes 
decisions. In contrast to the random parameter 𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1, 𝛿𝑖𝑗  is persistent over time; thus, a normal 
population distribution of 𝛿𝑖𝑗 (𝛿𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛿
2)) can be assumed. 𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 is assumed i.i.d. and subject to 
normal distribution (𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)).  
Because individuals are able to use experience information from 𝛿𝑖𝑗 to learn about the value of the 
attributes involved in previous microfinance products, the selection issue can be modeled in a 
Bayesian learning framework. That is, although 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 will not exactly reveal 𝛿𝑖𝑗, it still provides 
some information about 𝛿𝑖𝑗. Therefore, the likelihood of the invariant component 𝛿𝑖𝑗 should be 
previously captured. In line with DeGroot (2005) and Ackerberg (2003), the priors are assumed to 
be normally distributed: 𝛿𝑖𝑗
0~𝑁(0, 𝜎0
2) . After K borrowing experiences of a microfinance, a 
learning process is generated, such that the posterior distribution of 𝛿𝑖𝑗  can be expressed as 
𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝐾~𝑁(𝜇𝑘, 𝜎𝑘
2), where 𝜇𝑘 =
∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1𝐾
𝑡=1
𝐾+
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2
𝜎0
2
, 𝜎𝑘
2 =
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2
𝐾+
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2
𝜎0
2
. 18 
                                                          
18 2 The derivation and deformation of 𝜇𝑘 and 𝜎𝑘
2 are presented in the appendix. 
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In order to show how the posteriors are affected, we can rewrite the mean 𝜇𝑘 and variance 𝜎𝑘
2 as 
follows.19 In particular, we can have: 
 
1
𝜎𝑘
2 =
𝐾
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2 +
1
𝜎0
2 ,                                                                                                                         (9) 
where 
1
𝜎𝑘
2  represents the posterior precision, 
𝐾
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2  represents the data precision, 𝜎𝛿
2 + 𝜎𝜇
2 
represents the associated variance of the likelihood and 
1
𝜎0
2 represents the prior precision. According 
to equation (9), the posterior precision is negatively influenced by 𝜎0
2 and 𝜎𝛿
2 + 𝜎𝜇
2, but positively 
influenced by K. This indicates that if individuals are clearer about their prior preferences – that is, 
a smaller 𝜎0
2 – and have more experiences – a larger K – the posterior estimates will be more precise.  
Likewise, we can also have: 
 𝜇𝑘 = 𝜇0 (
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2+𝐾𝜎0
2) + ?̅? (
𝐾𝜎0
2
𝜎𝛿
2+𝜎𝜇
2+𝐾𝜎0
2),                                                                                 (10) 
where 𝜇0 is the prior mean and ?̅? depends on the maximum likelihood estimate of the prior. The 
terms in the brackets capture the weights. Accordingly, a decrease in 𝜎0
2, which means people are 
more assured about their prior estimates, will lead to a decrease in the denominator in the first 
bracket and cause an increase in the weight towards the prior. A decrease in 𝜎0
2  will have an 
opposite effect on the second term, since it appears in both the denominator and the numerator. 
This relation indicates that a lower prior variance contributes to a better estimate. Similarly, an 
increase in  𝐾  causes a decrease in the prior estimation. This change indicates that more 
experiences will result in less weight for the prior. In addition, if the term 𝜎𝛿
2 + 𝜎𝜇
2 decreases, which 
means a type of likelihood has a lower variance, it will cause a decrease for the prior but an increase 
for the likelihood. This indicates that a larger sample size makes the prior less important. To sum 
up, the mean and variance functions suggest that this theoretical framework not only captures the 
deterministic observable component, but also refers to the error variances (the scale parameters) of 
the stochastic component. 
In the empirical estimation, we use a Generalized Multinomial Logit model type II  (G-MNL) to 
capture the observable selections and unobservable factors such as the prior experience utility and 
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random disturbing component (Fiebig, et al. 2010). The model is suitable for estimating the 
posterior means of individual-level parameters and also to deal with the scale parameter problem. 
According to the previous discussion, the stochastic component 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the experience utility 𝛿𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 
in equation (7) are unobservable. A new component 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is specified, where 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗
𝑡+1 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, and 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 is identified by a scale parameter 𝜎 as 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 𝜎⁄ . Assuming 𝜎 is heterogeneous in the 
population, the new utility function can be expressed as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (𝛽𝑖𝑗σ𝑖)𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,                                                                                                     (11) 
where σ𝑖  represents the scale parameter of individual 𝑖 , and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 represents the average 
corresponding vector of coefficients. 
In line with Fiebig et al. (2010), the scale parameter σ𝑖 is assumed to be log-normal with mean 𝜎 
and standard deviation 𝜏; that is, σ𝑖~𝐿𝑁(𝜎, 𝜏
2). Because 𝜎 is assumed as the personal specific 
scale of the error term 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, the actual mean of 𝜎 is a function of personal features that will weigh 
the final utility. The mean is therefore updated as 𝜎 + 𝜃𝑧𝑖, where 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of characteristics 
of individual 𝑖 that distinguishes σ𝑖 from other individuals, and 𝜃 is the parameter to be estimated. 
In this case, 𝑧𝑖  represents the prior experience, and 𝜏 captures scale heterogeneity. In order to 
capture the preferences for each attribute and personal characteristic, σ?̅?  is set to 1 as natural 
normalization, so that 𝛽 is the mean vector of utility weight. Since σ𝑖 is assumed as log-normally 
distributed, 𝐸σ𝑖 = 𝑒
?̅?+𝜏2 2⁄ = 1 . Hence,  𝜎  is set to −𝜏2 2⁄ . Then σ𝑖  has the distribution 
𝜎𝑖
,~𝐿𝑁(−𝜏2 2⁄ + 𝜃𝑧𝑖, 𝜏
2) . After an exponential transformation, 𝜎𝑖
, = 𝑒−𝜏
2 2⁄ +𝜃𝑧𝑖+𝜏𝜑 , 
𝜑~𝑁(0,1). Accordingly, an increase in experience and a decrease in the scale heterogeneity 𝜏 will 
raise the magnitude of the scale parameter σ𝑖, indicating that people will be more assured about 
their choices with more experiences and lower scale heterogeneity 𝜏. 
In order to capture the parameter 𝛽𝑖𝑗 in the utility equation (7), it is assumed to take the following 
form: 
𝛽𝑖𝑟
, = 𝛽𝑖𝑟
, + 𝜇𝑖𝑟
,
 ,                                                                                                                      (12) 
where 𝛽𝑖𝑟
,
 provides the mean of the individual specific taste on attribute 𝑟 in alternative 𝑗, and 𝜇𝑖𝑟
,
 
is the vector of the person-specific deviations from the mean. Therefore, the simulated average 
probability in the GMNL model is expressed as: 
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?̌?𝑖𝑗
, =
1
𝑀
∑
𝑒
𝜎𝑖𝑗
,
(𝛽𝑗𝑟
,
+𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑟
,
)
∑ 𝑒
𝜎
𝑖𝑗
,
(𝛽
𝑗𝑟
,
+𝜇
𝑖𝑗𝑟
,
)
𝑗
𝑀
𝑚=1  ,                                                                                                  (13) 
Similarly, we obtain a simulated log likelihood by inserting the ?̌?𝑖𝑗 into the log-likelihood function 
as 𝑆𝐿𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖 𝑙𝑛?̌?𝑖𝑗
,
, where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = 1 if respondent 𝑖 chose alternative 𝑗 and zero otherwise. 
Both specifications can be employed to estimate willingness-to-pay values for the different 
attributes. In particular, the WTP that can be computed as the rate of change in the attribute divided 
by the rate of change in the price, and is expressed as: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 = −(
𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑥⁄
𝜕𝑈 𝜕𝑝⁄
) = −
?̃?𝑖𝑟
𝛾𝑖𝑟
 ,                                                                                                    (14) 
where 𝑥 is a vector of the microfinance attributes, 𝑝 is the price. 𝛽𝑖𝑟 represents the coefficient of 
non-price attributes, 𝛾𝑖𝑟 represents the coefficient on price. 
5.3 Data 
The empirical analysis examines the effect of experience on smallholders’ preferences for 
microfinance by using a household survey from a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) that was 
conducted in six regions in Sichuan province, in China. The questionnaires were filled out via face-
to-face household interviews conducted between October and December 2015. Many types of 
agricultural products and distinctive economic status quo, as well as different pilot projects on 
microfinance, make Sichuan province an appropriate study area. A multistage random sampling 
approach was used to select reasonable study sites and respondents. Using information from the 
Sichuan Statistical Yearbook, six regions were selected from the province, taking into 
consideration the per capita income and per capita consumption in the regions. Enumerators were 
hired to assist in conducting the interviews. 
The dataset that provides information on smallholders’ preferences for microfinance attributes is 
suitable for this issue because it contains previous experiences with microfinance participation 
decisions. The microfinance attributes considered here are six vital loaning components: credit 
period, interest rate, loan size, collateral method, repayment schedule and transaction costs. These 
factors are the main determinants of rural microloan disbursements that are designed in each credit 
product (Tsukada et al. 2010; Turvey et al. 2010; Sagamba et al. 2013). 
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For each attribute, levels were given on the basis of existing and associated microfinance 
regulations. Attributes and their levels are shown in Table 5.1. For example, interest rate was given 
a level at 0% because governmental interest-free loans and informal individual interest-free loans 
are taken into account. The 5.1% and 8.25% were the lower and upper limits of loan interest rates 
set by the People’s Bank of China in May 2015. 8% was the guidance interest rate of the Poverty 
Village Mutual Aid Funds,20 and it is fixed during the credit period. Transaction cost is included 
to capture the costs involved in credit transactions. In particular, asymmetric information and low 
educational levels result in high search costs, negotiation costs and monitoring costs in the 
transaction process. These costs, which are normally higher for rural residents, are assumed to be 
important factors influencing households’ decisions. 
Table 5.1 Attribute descriptions and attribute levels in the choice experiment 
Attributes Description Attribute levels 
Credit period The time before repaying off a loan 1 year, 3 years, 5 years 
Interest rate Annual interest rate 0%, 5.10%, 8%, 8.25% 
Loan size Maximum limitation of a loan (RMB Yuan) 10,000; 50,000; 100,000; 
200,000 
Collateral method Security method against the possibility of 
repayment default 
Pledge assets, Guarantor 
Repayment 
schedule 
The way of repaying Lump sum, Installment 
Transaction costs Cumbersome degree of applying for a loan Low, Medium, High 
 
A full-factorial design for the DCE would require 576 profiles; hence, D-optimal and blocked 
designs were used. Given second interactions and powers, a 72-set was calculated and composed 
as three blocks of 24 sets (Table 5.8 A1). This method can scientifically narrow down choice sets 
within a reasonable and efficient scale. In the choice experiment, each respondent saw only one of 
the randomly assigned blocks, with eight choice situations. Questionnaires were administered to 
552 randomly selected respondents in 27 villages, according to a multistage random sampling 
approach. In total, 13,248 choice sets were obtained. A sample choice situation that consisted of 
three alternatives is presented in Table 5.2.  
                                                          
20 Poverty Village Mutual Aid Funds is a specific program that is tailored to help the poor to access small, formal 
credit.  
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Table 5.2 Sample choice scenario 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 1 year 1 year 
Interest rate 8% 8.25% 8.25% 
Loan size 50,000 50,000 200,000 
Collateral method Guarantor Guarantor Assets pledge 
Repayment method Installment Lump sum Installment 
Transaction costs Medium Medium High 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
In addition to the theoretical premise previously made, it is also assumed that the preference is an 
updating process, and that the purpose of individuals’ credit decisions is to obtain loans. When 
applicants fail to obtain the full loans they applied for, they would reconsider their preferences and 
reapply for loans. Therefore, experience considered in this study is classified into two categories: 
successful and unsuccessful experiences. A successful experience is one in which a respondent has 
borrowed money from a financial institution or individual lender, while an unsuccessful experience 
refers to a situation where a respondent has tried to borrow money but failed to obtain the entire 
loan applied for, due to some specific reasons. The two categories capture experiences with 
different qualities. In particular, given that for the first time applicants who were applying for loans, 
we specify both of their successful experiences and unsuccessful experiences as zero, since their 
first times of learning process were not completed. In other words that in the experience utility 
equation (8) of this category of applicants, the experience utility would be the stochastic error term 
if the time 𝑡 is zero, that is 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 0. Given that the experiment was hypothetical, we 
employed a “cheap talk” method to reduce hypothetical bias (Lusk 2003). The cheap talk statement 
asked respondents to make selections like they would be making when faced with real microfinance 
decisions. 
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Table 5.3 Major characteristics of the sample households21 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev. 
Gender Gender of household head: 1 if the household head is male; 
0 otherwise 
.911 .285 
Age Physical age of household head 59.071 11.432 
Education Educational level of household head: : 0=No schooling, 
1=Primary (1-6years), 2=Junior middle (7-9yesrs), 3=Senior 
middle (10-12years), 4=Training school (13-15years), 
5=Bachelor (13-16years), 6=Master or higher 
2.172 .791 
Household size Number of persons live in the family and share meals 3.654 1.548 
Farmland size Arable land, including the rent and cultivated land (mu) 3.346 3.090 
Dependency 
ratio 
The number of families outside the working age range 
divided by the number of families aged within that age (16-
60 years old) 
1.073 .855 
Farming 1 if the household engages in farming work; 0 otherwise  .741 .439 
Income Household income per capita (1,000 yuan/year) 13.027 22.268 
Credit 1 if respondent had credit in recent 5 years; 0 otherwise .598 .021 
EXP_INS Times of successful experience with financial institutions .258 .513 
EXP_IND Times of successful experience with individual lenders .256 .504 
F_INS Times of unsuccessful experience with financial institutions .040 .252 
F_IND Times of unsuccessful experience with individual lenders .252 1.225 
 
Major characteristics of the sample households are presented in Table 5.3. Most (91%) of the 
household heads were male, and the average age of household head was 59 years. Educational level 
of the household head was on average primary education. The household size was about more than 
three persons. The average farmland holding was lightly more than three mu (1 mu = 1/15 hectare). 
Seventy-four percent of the households engaged in farming works. The dependency ratio of 
households was about one, indicating that one individual within the working age (16-60 years old) 
will support one child or one elder. The household per capita income was about 13,027 yuan, which 
compares less with the provincial average per capita annual income of 14,561 yuan in 201522. The 
average value of credit was around 0.6, indicating that approximately sixty percent of the 
households had credit in the past 5 years. EXP_INS, EXP_IND, F_INS and F_IND represent the 
reported times of each category of experiences. The average times of successful experience with 
financial institutions and the average times of successful experience with individual lenders was 
                                                          
21 1 mu = 1/15 hectare. 1 Yuan ≈ 0.15 US dollar at the time of survey. 
22 Data source: Sichuan statistical yearbook 2016. 
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0.258 and 0.256, respectively. The average times of unsuccessful experiences with financial 
institutions and individuals was 0.04 and 0.25, respectively. 
5.4 Results 
Estimates of the impact of experience on respondents’ preferences for microfinance attributes are 
presented in this section. Dummy codes are used for each attribute. Credit period 1 (1 year), loan 
size 1 (10,000), transaction costs 1 (low), pledge of assets and lump sum repayment way are set as 
base levels. The reported times of failed experience (F_) and successful experience (EXP_) are 
used as viable proxies of people’s experience with microfinance. Quadratic and interaction terms 
are included to capture potential non-linearity, as well as partial effects. In order to capture more 
specific experiences, experiences with formal financial institutions (_INS) and those with 
individual lenders (_IND) are differentiated. 
 
Table 5.4 Results of choice model estimates 
Variable 
Mixed logit G-MNL 
Model without 
experience related 
covariates 
Model with 
experience related 
covariates 
Model without 
experience related 
covariates 
Model with 
experience related 
covariates 
Coef. S.E Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
 Mean        
Price -.430*** .013 -.533*** .019 -.610*** .026 -.595*** .021 
Credit Period 2 .466*** .081 .460*** .082 .985*** .155 .755*** .118 
Credit Period 3 .147* .079 .249*** .080 .524*** .139 .399*** .099 
Loan size 2 -.042 .098 -.087 .102 -.124 .291 -.172 .132 
Loan size 3 -.244** .107 -.349*** .110 -.395 .294 -.203 .129 
Loan size 4 -.150 .100 -.213** .102 -.567* .340 -.298** .132 
Transaction costs 2 -.333*** .087 -.423*** .089 -.942*** .188 -.688*** .119 
Transaction costs 3 -.814*** .113 -.887*** .115 -1.842*** .389 -1.368*** .172 
Collateral method .291*** .074 .332*** .076 .328** .153 .535*** .101 
Repayment schedule 1.721*** .103 1.749*** .104 3.983*** .507 3.358*** .271 
 SD        
Credit Period 2 -.361** .159 -.364** .170 1.402*** .383 .704*** .145 
Credit Period 3 .216 .173 .135 .182 .938*** .260 -.905*** .114 
Loan size 2 -.163 .176 -.203 .197 -.691** .281 .582*** .136 
Loan size 3 .366** .164 .407** .160 1.161*** .207 -.135 .117 
Loan size 4 .306* .169 .263 .176 1.038*** .261 -.963*** .132 
Transaction costs 2 -.189 .256 -.169 .234 -.060 .136 .156 .139 
Transaction costs 3 .765*** .156 .661*** .169 1.835*** .417 1.055*** .168 
Collateral method 1.128*** .098 1.134*** .100 2.353*** .280 1.911*** .163 
Repayment schedule 1.887*** .106 1.870*** .105 -4.386*** .383 2.959*** .227 
Experience         
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F_IND   -.069 .221   -.261* .158 
F_IND2   -.003 .017   .009 .010 
F_INS   2.002 1.840   .179 .558 
F_INS2   -1.348 1.840   .336 .252 
EXP_IND   .654** .305   -.525** .241 
EXP_IND2   -.170 .173   .158 .128 
EXP_INS   2.386*** .266   1.091*** .238 
EXP_INS2   -.725*** .132   -.502*** .134 
F_IND* F_INS   -1.037 .803   -2.807* 1.438 
EXP_IND*EXP_INS   -.160 .273   .294 .269 
F_IND*EXP_IND   .021 .113   .291*** .106 
F_INS*EXP_INS   -.413 .544   -2.244** 1.071 
F_IND*EXP_INS   -.042 .211   .027 .186 
F_INS*EXP_IND   1.035** .482   1.118* .578 
Tau (𝝉)     1.225*** .100 1.054*** .061 
Log Likelihood -2812.051  -2737.024  -2610.422  -2578.330  
AIC 5662.102  5540.048  5260.844  5224.660  
Likelihood-ratio test   150.05***    64.18***  
No. of observation 13248  13248  13248  13248  
Note: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
The estimations were performed using Stata 13.1, using 500 draws to simulate distributions of 
random parameters. Table 5.4 presents the results of the mixed logit and G-MNL models with and 
without experience related covariates. The mean values in the two models show that the preferences 
for microfinance attributes are quite similar. In particular, they indicate that respondents prefer 
lower prices, longer credit periods, smaller credit sizes, lower transaction costs, guarantor collateral 
and installment repayment methods. These preferences are changed a little but not radically by the 
experience factors. The model’s goodness of fit is performed by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and likelihood ratio test. The results of AIC suggest that the model with experience outperforms 
the model without experience, and the likelihood ratio tests also indicate that adding experience 
significantly improves the model fit. 
Of significant interest is the effect of experience on respondents’ preferences. It is interesting to 
note that the coefficient of EXP_IND displays significantly different impacts in the two models. 
The difference lies in the fact that the experience variable contained in the mixed logit model is 
used to capture taste heterogeneity, while the one in the G-MNL model is taken as a component 
influencing the scale parameter. In particular, the positive coefficient of EXP_IND in the mixed 
logit model indicates that the credit experience with individual lenders makes people more likely 
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to participate in microfinance. The negative experience related covariate EXP_IND in the G-MNL 
model denotes that credit experience with individual lenders decreases respondents’ willingness to 
take advantage of microfinance, and it also leads to a smaller scale parameter, which on the other 
hand indicates that the preferences tend to weight more on unobservable error terms. 
In both models, the coefficient of EXP_INS is positive and significantly different from zero, while 
the coefficient of EXP_INS2 is significantly negative. These results suggest that successful 
experience with financial institutions significantly increases individuals’ willingness to take 
advantage of microfinance, but only up to a particular level, after which the willingness decreases 
with further experience. The interaction coefficient of F_INS*EXP_IND is also positive and 
significantly different from zero in the two models, suggesting that even when people have negative 
experience with financial institutions, successful experience with individual lenders will make 
them more likely to participate in microfinance. 
Looking at the G-MNL models, the coefficient of 𝜏 in the model with experience related covariates 
is significantly positive, but smaller than the 𝜏 in the model without experience related covariates, 
indicating that the model with experience has a significantly larger scale parameter than the model 
without experience, since the scale heterogeneity indicator 𝜏 is negatively influencing the scale 
parameter. The larger scale parameter denotes that experiences generally help people to feel 
assured about their choices.  
 
Figure 5.1 Probabilities of choosing 
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The probabilities of negative coefficient of the choice models are estimated to obtain the magnitude 
of households’ preferences for microfinance under different specifications. The results are 
presented in Table 5.9 A2 in the appendix. Figure 5.1 illustrates the probabilities of choosing each 
attribute according to the results. The figure shows that credit period, transaction costs and 
repayment schedule are the attributes for which over 80% of the respondents possess the same 
preferences with regards to longer credit periods, lower transaction costs and installment repayment 
methods. However, the results did not show any consistent changes within the two models. 
In order to achieve more specific results about the effect of experience and the differences in 
willingness-to-pay (WTP), the preferences with the different experiences are estimated. Because 
the results in Table 5.4 affirmed that the G-MNL model fits better than the mixed logit model 
particularly when scale heterogeneity is taken into account, which in line with the findings of Fiebig 
et al. (2011), we only perform the results of G-MNL model. 
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Table 5.5 G-MNL model estimates with different experience measures 
Variable F_IND F_INS EXP_IND EXP_INS 
F_IND* 
F_INS 
EXP_IND* 
EXP_INS 
F_IND* 
EXP_IND 
F_INS* 
EXP_INS 
F_IND* 
EXP_INS 
F_INS* 
EXP_IND 
 Mean          
Price 
-.595*** -.604*** -.609*** -.582*** -.603*** -.609*** -.610*** -.595*** -.618*** -.603*** 
(.021) (.021) (.022) (.020) (.021) (.021) (.022) (.021) (.022) (.021) 
Credit Period 2 
1.142*** 1.051*** 1.159*** .776*** 1.077*** 1.118*** 1.264*** 1.129*** 1.118*** 1.022*** 
(.152) (.142) (.157) (.114) (.129) (.121) (.202) (.149) (.158) (.143) 
Credit Period 3 
.600*** .554*** .597*** .389*** .502*** .548*** .541*** .578*** .635*** .499*** 
(.126) (.120) (.131) (.086) (.111) (.112) (.142) (.122) (.124) (.123) 
Loan size 2 
-.265** -.302** -.373** -.291** -.299*** -.230* -.360** -.256** -.205 -.125 
(.134) (.149) (.179) (.114) (.116) (.121) (.164) (.130) (.152) (.150) 
Loan size 3 
-.410** -.202 -.251 -.328** -.411*** -.317** -.693*** -.391** -.486** -.368* 
(.160) (.175) (.186) (.139) (.137) (.135) (.212) (.159) (.200) (.198) 
Loan size 4 
-.549*** -.578*** -.488*** -.494*** -.594*** -.534*** -.825*** -.536*** -.734*** -.548*** 
(.154) (.164) (.199) (.136) (.134) (.133) (.194) (.153) (.195) (.197) 
Transaction 
costs 2 
-.929*** -.790*** -1.114*** -.697*** -1.030*** -1.005*** -1.121*** -.923*** -1.170*** -.895*** 
(.167) (.143) (.173) (.104) (.130) (.131) (.177) (.158) (.183) (.149) 
Transaction 
costs 3 
-1.816*** -1.641*** -2.053*** -1.360*** -1.957*** -1.809*** -2.135*** -1.786*** -2.277*** -1.914*** 
(.235) (.242) (.293) (.202) (.194) (.183) (.262) (.230) (.288) (.251) 
Collateral 
method 
.298** .383*** .531*** .461*** .275*** .286*** .461*** .309*** .139 .325** 
(.119) (.106) (.148) (.102) (.097) (.097) (.152) (.119) (.092) (.131) 
Repayment 
schedule 
3.458*** 3.828*** 4.143*** 3.310*** 3.350*** 3.351*** 3.848*** 3.420*** 4.846*** 3.905*** 
(.288) (.337) (.377) (.315) (.228) (.231) (.344) (.281) (.462) (.360) 
 SD          
Credit Period 2 
.774*** -1.321*** 1.095*** .855*** .811*** .863*** 1.182*** .759*** 1.846*** 1.139*** 
(.162) (.236) (.200) (.144) (.134) (.116) (.215) (.159) (.226) (.221) 
Credit Period 3 
.826*** .785*** 1.291*** -.099 .889*** .934*** 1.012*** .833*** .742*** .814*** 
(.169) (.136) (.227) (.133) (.129) (.121) (.180) (.161) (.168) (.159) 
Loan size 2 
-.343** -.557*** .670*** .296** -.401*** -.304** .423* -.340** -.670*** -.581*** 
(.170) (.182) (.189) (.144) (.132) (.143) (.224) (.172) (.138) (.132) 
Loan size 3 
.575*** .507*** -.222* .543*** .413*** .404*** .733*** .569*** 1.097*** 1.010*** 
(.130) (.110) (.122) (.138) (.090) (.092) (.138) (.123) (.170) (.170) 
Loan size 4 
-1.045*** .992*** 1.299*** .985*** -.906*** -.911*** -1.555*** -1.013*** 1.435*** 1.002*** 
(.178) (.142) (.180) (.132) (.152) (.150) (.274) (.173) (.194) (.159) 
Transaction 
costs 2 
.033 -.224** -.755** .044 -.355*** -.377*** -.451*** .059 .092 -.095 
(.239) (.112) (.184) (.112) (.101) (.101) (.145) (.231) (.161) (.133) 
1.848*** 1.649*** 2.001*** 1.330*** 1.819*** 1.871*** 2.095*** 1.823*** 2.229*** 1.868*** 
Chapter 5 What Can We Learn From Experience? An Impact Analysis of Experience on Households’ 
Preferences for Microfinance 
 
128 
 
Transaction 
costs 3 
(.205) (.218) (.258) (.254) (.188) (.189) (.286) (.203) (.256) (.225) 
Collateral 
method 
2.268*** 2.473*** 2.738*** 1.928*** 2.319*** 2.210*** 2.449*** 2.227*** 2.690*** 2.298*** 
(.275) (.252) (.297) (.201) (.180) (.179) (.310) (.282) (.244) (.217) 
Repayment 
schedule 
-4.259*** -4.646*** -5.159*** -3.530*** -4.174*** -4.179*** -4.987*** -4.214*** -4.901*** -4.557*** 
(.338) (.467) (.496) (.323) (.281) (.293) (.480) (.331) (.454) (.404) 
Experience           
F_IND 
-.064          
(.093)          
F_IND2 
-.003          
(.011)          
F_INS 
 1.299***         
 (.327)         
F_INS2 
 -.326***         
 (.112)         
EXP_IND 
  -.695***        
  (.268)        
EXP_IND2 
  .436**        
  (.181)        
EXP_INS 
   1.032***       
   (.237)       
EXP_INS2 
   -.375***       
   (.123)       
F_IND* F_INS 
    -1.915      
    (5.910)      
F_IND* 
F_INS2 
    .146      
    (.711)      
EXP_IND*EX
P_INS 
     2.000***     
     (.612)     
EXP_IND*EX
P_INS2 
     -.462     
     (.322)     
F_IND*EXP_I
ND 
      -.087    
      (.093)    
F_IND*EXP_I
ND2 
      .001    
      (.010)    
F_INS*EXP_I
NS 
       .304   
       (.425)   
F_INS*EXP_I
NS2 
       -.144   
       (.156)   
        1.559***  
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F_IND*EXP_I
NS 
        (.545)  
F_IND*EXP_I
NS2 
        -.351**  
        (.174)  
F_INS*EXP_I
ND 
         2.462 
         (1.821) 
F_INS*EXP_I
ND2 
         -2.044 
         (1.715) 
Tau (𝝉) 
1.199*** 1.289*** 1.278*** 1.221*** 1.200*** 1.210*** 1.279*** 1.207*** 1.372*** 1.231*** 
(.065) (.076) (.072) (.072) (.061) (.061) (.074) (.066) (.079) (.074) 
Log Likelihood -2611.122 -2602.527 -2611.893 -2603.864 -2609.028 -2601.282 -2612.613 -2611.964 -2602.541 -2609.042 
AIC 5246.244 5229.054 5267.786 5231.728 5242.0568 5226.564 5249.225 5247.393 5229.082 5242.084 
No. of 
observation 
13248 
Wald chi2(10) 863.77*** 841.49*** 800.77*** 910.10*** 846.31*** 850.64*** 797.24*** 893.44*** 814.78*** 830.13*** 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Values in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 5.5 presents estimates of the impact of the microfinance attributes on the different types of 
experience measures. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of F_INS, EXP_INS, 
EXP_IND*EXP_INS and F_IND*EXP_INS in the table show that people with more experience 
with financial institutions (failed or successful), with more successful experience with both 
institutions and individuals, or with more failed experience with individuals but successful 
experience with institutions tend to participate more in microfinance. The estimates of the scale 
parameter 𝜏  in the models with the above-mentioned experience related covariates are also 
significantly positive, indicating that with more of these experiences, the magnitude of the error 
terms decreases. In particular, 𝜏  achieved its smallest values in the EXP_IND*EXP_INS and 
EXP_INS columns, indicating that experiences with financial institutions help people feel more 
assured about their choices. It is interesting to note that the experience coefficient of EXP_IND is 
significantly negative, indicating that people with more experience with individuals are less likely 
to participate in microfinance; and the associated scale variance parameter 𝜏 is larger than the 𝜏 in 
the G-MNL model without experience related covariates, indicating that this type of experience 
does not necessarily enhance assurance about individual choices. 
Although the primary objective of this study is to examine the effects of experience and preferences 
for microfinance, we also estimate the willingness-to-pay for the microfinance products, with and 
without experience. These results are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 are used 
to illustrate the differences in WTP estimates between the two model specifications and the 
difference in G-MNL models with and without experience, respectively. Table 5.6 presents the 
willingness to pay estimates of the two choice model specifications. The results show that the WTP 
estimates from the two specifications tend to differ. 23 However, the magnitudes of changes across 
experiences are diverse, with the changes in the G-MNL models being larger than the changes in 
the mixed logit model (as shown in Figure 5.2). In particular, Figure 5.3 illustrates that the major 
                                                          
23 Values in the table present the willingness to pay in percentage. For example, according to the results of the mixed 
logit model in Table 5.6, respondents (without considering experience related covariates) are willing to pay 1.082%, 
0.342%, 0.676% and 3.999% higher interest rates when credit has a three-year period, a five-year period, guarantor 
collateral and installment repayment, respectively. They are willing to pay 0.566% and 1.892% lower interest rates if 
the credit size is 100,000 yuan and the highest transaction costs are taken into account. On the other hand, the 
respondents (with considering experience related covariates) are willing to pay 0.864%, 0.467%, 0.624% and 3.283% 
higher interest rates when credit has a three-year period, a five-year period, guarantor collateral and installment 
repayment, respectively. They are willing to pay 0.654% and 1.665% lower interest rates if the credit size is 100,000 
yuan and the highest transaction costs are taken into account. 
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difference in the WTP lies in the repayment schedule. Experience with individual lenders 
(EXP_IND), as well as failed experience with individuals but successful experience with 
institutions (F_IND*EXP_INS), significantly raises the WTP for microfinance with the installment 
repayment method. Other experiences, such as failed experience with individuals (F_IND), 
successful experience with institutions (EXP_INS) and interaction of failed and successful 
experiences with both individuals and institutions (F_IND*F_INS, EXP_IND*EXP_INS) 
considerably decrease the WTP for installment credit.  
 
Figure 5.2 Difference in WTP estimates of mixed logit and G-MNL models 
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Figure 5.3 Difference in WTP estimates of G-MNL model with different experiences 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Difference in WTP estimates of GMNL model with different experiences (Cont.) 
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Table 5.6 Willingness to pay estimates of choice models with multivariate experiences 
 Mixed logit G-MNL 
 
Model without 
experience 
Model with 
experience 
Model without 
experience 
Model with 
experience 
Variable Coef. S.E Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Credit Period 2 1.082*** .186 .864*** .154 1.614*** .258 1.269*** .195 
Credit Period 3 .342* .184 .467*** .148 .860*** .234 .670*** .164 
Loan size 2 -.097 .228 -.164 .191 -.203 .480 -.289 .222 
Loan size 3 -.566** .249 -.654*** .206 -.647 .488 -.341 .218 
Loan size 4 -.349 .234 -.400** .192 -.930 .565 -.500** .221 
Transaction costs 2 -.775*** .199 -.794*** .162 -1.543*** .290 -1.156*** .196 
Transaction costs 3 -1.892*** .254 -1.665*** .208 -3.019*** .648 -2.298*** .275 
Collateral method .676*** .172 .624*** .141 .538** .246 .900*** .167 
Repayment schedule 3.999*** .227 3.283*** .196 6.528*** .799 5.642*** .424 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 5.7 Willingness to pay estimates of G-MNL models with single experience 
Variable F_IND F_INS EXP_IND EXP_INS 
F_IND* 
F_INS 
EXP_IND* 
EXP_INS 
F_IND* 
EXP_IND 
F_INS* 
EXP_INS 
F_IND* 
EXP_INS 
F_INS* 
EXP_IND 
Credit 
Period 2 
1.920*** 1.739*** 1.903*** 1.333*** 1.786*** 1.835*** 2.073*** 1.898*** 1.809*** 1.695*** 
(.242) (.222) (.252) (.188) (.204) (.188) (.309) (.237) (.246) (.230) 
Credit 
Period 3 
1.008*** .917*** .980*** .668*** .833*** .900*** .888*** .972*** 1.028*** .827*** 
(.210) (.193) (.210) (.145) (.181) (.180) (.231) (.203) (.197) (.202) 
Loan size 2 
-.446** -.500** -.613** -.500** -.495*** -.378* -.591** -.430** -.332 -.207 
(.224) (.245) (.295) (.196) (.192) (.199) (.270) (.218) (.247) (.249) 
Loan size 3 
-.689** -.335 -.412 -.563** -.682*** -.521** -1.137*** -.658** -.787** -.610* 
(.269) (.290) (.306) (.239) (.226) (.221) (.342) (.268) (.322) (.327) 
Loan size 4 
-.924*** -.957*** -801*** -.848*** -.986*** -.877*** -1.353*** -.902*** -1.188*** -.909*** 
(.259) (.269) (.328) (.231) (.218) (.215) (.310) (.258) (.311) (.322) 
Transaction 
costs 2 
-1.563*** -1.307*** -1.830*** -1.199*** -1.709*** -1.650*** -1.838*** -1.552*** -1.895*** -1.485*** 
(.268) (.227) (.271) (.170) (.205) (.206) (.273) (.251) (.281) (.239) 
Transaction 
costs 3 
-3.054*** -2.716*** -3.371*** -2.337*** -3.247*** -2.969*** -3.501*** -3.003*** -3.686*** -3.174*** 
(.365) (.373) (.451) (.330) (.297) (.278) (.387) (.356) (.436) (.400) 
Collateral 
method 
.501** .634*** .872** .793*** .456*** .470*** .756*** .520*** .224 .540** 
(.201) (.177) (.243) (.174) (.161) (.160) (.248) (.202) (.150) (.220) 
Repayment 
schedule 
5.815*** 6.336*** 6.803*** 5.689*** 5.559*** 5.501*** 6.310*** 5.750*** 7.844*** 6.477*** 
(.467) (.501) (.558) (.491) (.338) (.335) (.489) (.456) (.683) (.548) 
Notes: *, ** and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Values in the parentheses are standard errors. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This article focuses on the impact of experience on rural residents’ preferences for microfinance, 
using discredit choice data from China. We present a conceptual framework that shows Bayesian 
updating approach is a consistent method in accounting for the learning process involved in 
acquiring experience. We analyze the effect of experience by taking experience as a latent variable 
that influences individuals’ choices based on Random Utility Theory and as a partial utility based 
on Bayesian inference, under the consideration of preference heterogeneity and scale heterogeneity, 
respectively. We use the G-MNL model to estimate the choice probabilities and impact of 
experience on preferences and willingness-to-pay for microfinance. 
The theoretical predictions for the effects of experience on microfinance are supported by the data 
used in the analysis. In particular, the empirical results from both frameworks show that rural 
households prefer microfinance with lower interest rates, longer credit periods, smaller credit sizes, 
lower transaction costs, guarantor collateral and installment repayment. Specifically, the estimates 
show that the coefficients of the experience related covariates do not completely change 
respondents’ preferences for microfinance attributes, but they increase individuals’ attitudes on 
each attribute. Experiences with financial institutions raise the willingness to participate in 
microfinance to the largest extent. 
The scale heterogeneity captured from the GMNL model indicates that experience with financial 
institutions, whether successful or not, increases the scale parameter and helps respondents to feel 
assured about their choices. The results from the Bayesian learning framework, on the other hand, 
underline that experience with individual lenders does not help respondents to feel certain about 
their choices. In addition, the willingness-to-pay estimates vary across experiences. WTP for 
installment credit displays the biggest change, and Bayesian updating makes all the changes more 
considerable. 
Overall, the findings have some policy implications for improving rural microfinance strategies. 
They suggest that microfinance characterized by longer repayment periods, smaller sizes, easier 
accessibility, the guarantor method and installment repayment schedules will be more welcomed 
by rural households. The significantly positive scale heterogeneity effects of each type of 
experience suggest that effective measures to increase rural households’ understanding of 
microfinance, as well as to assure them about their funding needs, should attract them to participate. 
To attract households into formal financial institutions, the people who have only had experiences 
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with individual lenders, microfinance providers could adjust attributes such as longer repayment 
credit periods, easier accessibility and the installment repayment method even under the current 
interest rates. 
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Appendix 
The derivation of 𝜇𝑘 and 𝜎𝑘
2 
We assume a likelihood is an i.i.d. samples from a normal distribution, 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2)~𝑁(?̅?, 𝑠2), ?̅? and 
𝑠2 are the sample mean and variance, respectively, where, 
?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑠2 =
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
For the data 𝑌 =  (𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛), give the likelihood function 𝐿(𝑦|𝜇, 𝜎
2), the probability density 
of normal distribution is: 
𝐿(𝑦|𝜇, 𝜎2) =  ∏ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖|𝜇, 𝜎
2)
𝑛
𝑖=1
= (2𝜋𝜎2)−
𝑛
2𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
1
2𝜎2
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
) 
We can rewrite 
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑ [(𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?) − (𝜇 − ?̅?)]
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑖
− 2∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝜇 − ?̅?)
𝑖
+∑ (𝜇 − ?̅?)2
𝑖
 
 
Since ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝜇 − ?̅?)𝑖 = [(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑛?̅?](𝜇 − ?̅?) = (𝑛?̅? − 𝑛?̅?)(𝜇 − ?̅?) = 0, 
Then, 
∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
=∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
2
𝑖
+∑ (𝜇 − ?̅?)2
𝑖
= 𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑛(𝜇 − ?̅?)2 
Therefore, the likelihood function 
𝐿(𝑦|𝜇, 𝜎2) =  (2𝜋𝜎2)−
𝑛
2𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
1
2𝜎2
[𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑛(𝜇 − ?̅?)2])
= (2𝜋)−
𝑛
2(𝜎2)−
𝑛
2𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
1
2𝜎2
[𝑛𝑠2 + 𝑛(𝜇 − ?̅?)2]) 
𝐿(𝑦|𝜇, 𝜎2) ∝ (
1
𝜎2
)
𝑛
2
𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝑛𝑠2
2𝜎2
) 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
𝑛
2𝜎2
(𝜇 − ?̅?)2] 
If we ignore the constant term, then we have 
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𝐿(𝑦|𝜇, 𝜎2) ∝ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
𝑛
2𝜎2
(𝜇 − ?̅?)2] 
Because posterior probability ∝ likelihood ∗ prior probability, 
the posterior probability is given by 
𝑃(𝜇) ∝ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
𝑛
2𝜎2
(𝜇 − ?̅?)2] ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
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𝑛
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where the natural conjugate prior has the form 
𝑝(𝜇) ∝  𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2𝜎02
(𝜇 − 𝜇0)
2] 
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1
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)
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Since we have defined 
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then 
𝜎𝑛
2 = (
𝑛𝜎0
2+𝜎2
𝜎2𝜎02
)
−1
=
𝜎2𝜎0
2
𝑛𝜎02+𝜎2
 
𝜇𝑛 =
𝜎2𝜎0
2
𝑛𝜎02 + 𝜎2
(
𝑛?̅?
𝜎2
+
𝜇0
𝜎02
) =
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝜎0
2
𝑛𝜎02 + 𝜎2
+
𝜎2𝜇0
𝑛𝜎02 + 𝜎2
 
In our case, 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝛿
2 + 𝜎𝜇
2, so 
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Table 5.8 A1 Total choice sets of the choice experiment 
Choice 
sets 
Credit 
Period 
Interest 
rate 
Loan size 
Collateral 
method 
Repayment 
method 
Transaction 
costs 
1 3 years 8% 50,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
1 1 year 8.25% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
1 1 year 8.25% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
2 5 years 8% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
2 1 year 5.10% 200,000 Guarantor Installment High 
2 5 years 8% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
3 1 year 8% 100,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
3 1 year 0% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
3 5 years 8% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
4 3 years 8% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
4 5 years 0% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
4 5 years 5.10% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
5 5 years 8% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
5 5 years 5.10% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
5 3 years 5.10% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
6 3 years 0% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
6 5 years 8.25% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
6 1 year 8% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
7 5 years 0% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
7 3 years 8.25% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
7 3 years 0% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
8 1 year 0% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
8 3 years 8.25% 200,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
8 5 years 8.25% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
9 3 years 8% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
9 5 years 0% 200,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
9 1 year 5.10% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
10 1 year 0% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
10 5 years 5.10% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
10 5 years 8.25% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
11 5 years 5.10% 200,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
11 5 years 5.10% 100,000 Guarantor Installment High 
11 1 year 5.10% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
12 3 years 0% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
12 5 years 8.25% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
12 1 year 8% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
13 1 year 0% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment Low 
13 3 years 5.10% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
13 5 years 8.25% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
14 5 years 0% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
14 5 years 0% 10,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
14 5 years 0% 200,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
15 1 year 8.25% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
15 1 year 8% 50,000 Guarantor Installment High 
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15 1 year 0% 10,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
16 3 years 8.25% 50,000 Guarantor Installment High 
16 1 year 0% 100,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
16 3 years 8% 200,000 Guarantor Installment High 
17 1 year 5.10% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
17 1 year 8% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
17 3 years 8% 10,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
18 3 years 8% 100,000 Guarantor Lump sum Medium 
18 3 years 5.10% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum Low 
18 5 years 5.10% 50,000 Guarantor Installment Medium 
19 3 years 8.25% 100,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
19 3 years 0% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
19 1 year 8.25% 100,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
20 3 years 0% 10,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
20 3 years 5.10% 200,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
20 5 years 8% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
21 3 years 8.25% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
21 1 year 5.10% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
21 1 year 0% 50,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
22 1 year 0% 200,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Low 
22 1 year 8.25% 200,000 Guarantor Installment Low 
22 5 years 0% 100,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
23 3 years 5.10% 100,000 Assets pledge Installment Medium 
23 5 years 8.25% 50,000 Assets pledge Lump sum Medium 
23 1 year 8.25% 10,000 Guarantor Installment High 
24 5 years 8% 50,000 Assets pledge Installment High 
24 1 year 5.10% 50,000 Guarantor Lump sum High 
24 1 year 8% 10,000 Assets pledge Lump sum High 
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Table 5.9 A2 Probabilities of negative coefficient of choice models 
Variable 
Mixed logit G-MNL 
Model 
without 
experience 
Model with 
experience 
Model 
without 
experience 
Model 
with 
experience 
Credit Period 2 90.15% 89.73% 24.13% 14.15% 
Credit Period 3 24.77% 3.30% 28.80% 67.04% 
Loan size 2 39.84% 33.38% 42.89% 61.62% 
Loan size 3 74.74% 80.43% 63.31% 6.55% 
Loan size 4 68.85% 79.11% 70.77% 37.85% 
Transaction costs 2 3.91% 0.62% 0.00% 100.00% 
Transaction costs 3 85.63% 91.02% 84.23% 90.26% 
Collateral method 39.82% 38.47% 44.46% 38.97% 
Repayment schedule 18.09% 17.47% 81.81% 12.82% 
Note: Probability of negative coefficient, which is calculated by100 ∗ Ф(−𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛/𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), where Ф is 
the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
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Chapter 6  General Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The movement for achieving sustainable and long-term financial inclusion is garnering 
considerable attention as an important strategy to enhance rural economy and improve food 
security through the resource reallocation with the aim of making up for market failure. In 
particular, rural microfinance is an important element that provides more accessible and small-
scale financial services to rural households and micro-enterprises, especially to those who have 
been suffering from the shortage of traditional commercial banking services. One of the key 
challenges that the financial inclusion needs to shift toward more marked-base and commercial 
sustainable approaches in China calls for this comprehensive study.  
The studies conducted in this dissertation examined the households’ preferences for microfinance 
and the impact of participation on their welfare in China, using the data collected from a household 
interview conducted between October and December 2015 in Sichuan province of China. Both of 
the stated and revealed preferences are taken into consideration regarding to households’ decisions 
to participate in various types of microfinance. Different econometric approaches are employed to 
conduct the empirical analyses to address the issue involved in such as selection bias, endogeneity 
problem, unobserved heterogeneity, preference and scale heterogeneity, and attribute non-
attendance phenomenon. The following subsections outline detail summary and policy 
implications of the key findings of this study. 
 
6.1 Summary of Results 
Chapter 2 analyses the factors that influence farm operators’ decisions to participate in 
microfinance for farm and off-farm production, and the impact of two categories of participation 
on farm income and off-farm income. An endogenous switching regression model is used to 
account for selectivity bias and to capture the differential impacts of microfinance on participants 
and non-participants. This model is superior to the propensity score matching model and Heckman 
selection in addressing the limitations of selection bias and endogeneity by taking observable and 
unobservable factors into consideration. In the empirical estimation, to obtain more consistent 
results, we augment the selection and outcome equations by exploiting the village-varying 
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variables to address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, we also considered the 
potential endogeneity problem that may arise from variables such as membership of village mutual 
aid funds. Because this variable strikingly indicates that people are willing to participate in 
microfinance for production investments. To ensure the identification in the participation 
specification, we insert the observed endogenous variable and the vector of the residual term from 
the first-stage regression of the endogenous variable into the participation equation to address the 
potential endogeneity problem.  
The empirical results highlight some common features of participating in microfinance, either for 
farm or for off-farm production. Generally, the coefficients of farmland, farm inputs, extension 
services and off-farm workers mainly determine the participation in microfinance for farming 
operation. In particular, households with larger farmland size and more farm inputs, enjoyed more 
farm extension services but fewer training services, and those with fewer off-farm workers display 
a greater probability of participation in agricultural loans. The results also show that small-scale 
farm operators benefited more off-farm income than farm income from microfinance participation. 
Chapter 3 analyses the factors that influence rural households’ decisions to participate in 
microcredit, the impact of participation on per capita income and consumption. We use a 
multinomial endogenous switching regression model to account for selectivity bias, and to capture 
the differential impacts of microcredit on non-participants and three categories of participants in 
microcredit, that include commercial banks, VMAFs, friends and relatives. Empirically, we 
augment the outcome equation by exploiting the average village varying variables to address the 
issue of unobserved heterogeneity, but only in the second stage estimation. The average treatment 
effect on the treated and the average treatment effect on the untreated, as well as the base 
heterogeneity and transitional heterogeneity are captured in this study. 
The empirical results show that various factors influence households’ decisions to participate in 
different microfinance programs. In particular, households who earned lower wage from the off-
farm sector and had better information sources took loans from commercial banks. On the other 
hand, households with less endowment assets rather obtained credit from friends and family 
members. The findings also revealed that participation in microfinance helped households to 
increase their income and consumption. Specifically, credit from commercial banks helped 
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increase per capita income by 106%, while households that took loans from friends and relatives 
increased their income by 10%. 
Chapter 4 used random parameter logit, latent class and endogenous attribute attendance models to 
analyze smallholders’ preferences and willingness to pay for microcredit with the consideration of 
preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance, using data from a discrete choice 
experiment. Choice experiment in this study provided information on how smallholders value the 
characteristics of microcredit and their willingness-to-pay for its attributes. The credit attributes we 
consider are six vital loaning components: credit period, interest rate, loan size, collateral method, 
repayment schedule and transaction costs. Levels were given on the basis of existing and associated 
microcredit regulations. A full-factorial design for our CE would require 576 profiles, which would 
be too large for a survey to handle. Therefore D-optimal and blocked design were used. Given 2nd 
interactions and powers, 72-set was calculated and could be composed as 3 blocks of 24 sets. So 
three versions of the questionnaire were used, and total respondents answered 13248 choice sets. 
The results demonstrated that preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance exist in the 
smallholder farmers’ microcredit choices, indicating that microcredit products cannot be optimally 
designed without targeting different groups and considering the relevant attributes. In particular, 
the estimates from the random parameter logit model indicate that, on average, smallholder farmers 
prefer longer credit period, smaller credit size, lower transaction costs and lower interest rates. 
Guarantor and installment would be more attractive collateral and repayment methods, respectively. 
The findings for the latent class model indicate that preference heterogeneity is related to socio-
demographic features. Interest rate and transaction costs were found to be negatively and 
significantly influencing individuals’ utility. Although there is an exception with regards to the 
transaction costs, that proportion is quite small. The results from the endogenous attribute 
attendance model showed that when taking ANA phenomenon into consideration, people will show 
stronger attitudes on willingness to pay for factors they consider important. The findings also 
revealed that high transaction costs tend to lower utility and the willingness to pay. Potential ways 
to reduce the transaction costs should include clean loan terms and simplifying application 
procedures, since distance to financial institutions is insignificant to smallholders. The results 
further showed that smallholders characterized by higher educational level, larger family size and 
better annual liquid balance prefer to use guarantor as collateral method.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on the impact of experience on rural residents’ preferences for microfinance. We 
present a conceptual framework that shows Bayesian updating approach is a consistent method in 
accounting for the learning process involved in acquiring experience. The premise of this study lies 
in the fact that the attribute of microfinance belongs to the category of experience goods. We 
analyze the effect of experience by taking experience as a latent variable that influences individuals’ 
choices based on Random Utility Theory and as a partial utility based on Bayesian inference, under 
the consideration of preference heterogeneity and scale heterogeneity, respectively. We use the G-
MNL model to estimate the choice probabilities and impact of experience on preferences and 
willingness-to-pay for microfinance. This model is superior to the traditional conditional logit 
model, since it is insensitive to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and able to detect 
unobserved and observed sources of heterogeneity. 
The theoretical predictions for the effects of experience on microfinance are supported by the data 
used in the analysis. In particular, the empirical results from both frameworks show that rural 
households prefer microfinance with lower interest rates, longer credit periods, smaller credit sizes, 
lower transaction costs, guarantor collateral and installment repayment. Specifically, the estimates 
show that the coefficients of the experience related covariates do not completely change 
respondents’ preferences for microfinance attributes, but they increase individuals’ attitudes on 
each attribute. Experiences with financial institutions raise the willingness to participate in 
microfinance to the largest extent. The scale heterogeneity captured from the GMNL model 
indicates that experience with financial institutions, whether successful or not, increases the scale 
parameter and helps respondents to feel assured about their choices. The results from the Bayesian 
learning framework, on the other hand, underline that experience with individual lenders does not 
help respondents to feel certain about their choices. In addition, the willingness-to-pay estimates 
vary across experiences. WTP for installment credit displays the biggest change, and Bayesian 
updating makes all the changes more considerable. 
6.2 Policy Implications 
The findings summarized above have important policy implications for improving rural 
microfinance strategies. The positive effects of participation in formal microfinance on households’ 
income and consumption further consolidated the significance of rural microfinance.  
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Chinses policymakers should continue to provide regulatory space for innovations and 
participations in microfinance. The findings from these chapters suggest that policies that enhance 
financial inclusion can help increase the welfare of rural households. In particular, effective policy 
measures to promote the participation in microfinance should include measures to improve the 
education levels and availability of employment opportunities in the off-farm sector. The positive 
impact of participation in formal microfinance suggests that these loan providers need to help 
households to overcome the information barriers. Village mutual aid funds can significantly 
contribute to income and consumption increases with more stable changes for both outcomes. This 
result suggests that this program can be extended to poor rural areas, to promote financial inclusion. 
In addition, the results also suggest that the further focus of rural microfinance should be directed 
to tailoring some programs to households’ off-farm operations, especially in relation to the status 
quo of the continuously decreasing attractiveness of small-scale agricultural production in China. 
The findings of this study also suggest that microfinance providers are able to attract new customers 
under the current interest rates, if the combination of interest rate, repayment schedule, loan size, 
credit period and collateral method is appropriately adjusted. Formal microfinance suppliers who 
intend to expand services for smallholders in rural areas may need to combine more small-scale 
credit products with installment repayment schedule. In particular, for some non-profit credit 
service organizations, such as Poverty Village Mutual Aid Funds, clear target group is needed to 
ensure effective operation and goal implementation. Furthermore, government ought to take the 
responsibility to improve the identification of assets in rural areas, in order to reduce financial 
institutions’ bad debt risk and transaction costs. 
The findings suggest that microfinance characterized by longer repayment periods, smaller sizes, 
easier accessibility, the guarantor method and installment repayment schedules will be more 
welcomed by rural households. The significantly positive scale heterogeneity effects of each type 
of experience suggest that effective measures to increase rural households’ understanding of 
microfinance, as well as to assure them about their funding needs, should attract them to participate. 
To attract households into formal financial institutions, the people who have only had experiences 
with individual lenders, microfinance providers could emphasize attributes such as longer 
repayment credit periods, easier accessibility and the installment repayment method. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Smallholders’ choice on microcredit 
Questionnaire（2015） 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responder’s Name:  
Village/ Township/ 
County/City: 
 
Interviewer Name :  
Date of Interview :  
Questionnaire No.:  
Microfinance is an important strategy for rural development and poverty reduction. The questionnaire has been 
designed to analyze the households’ preferences for rural microfinance, the factors that affect households’ 
decisions to participate in different types of microcredit, and how these factors impact on their welfare.  
All information provided will be treated confidentially and will only be used for research purposes. 
Thank you for participating in this interview! 
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Part A. General Questions 
A1. Name of respondent/household                                    
A2.  Number of persons live in the family (persons live with you and share meals)                         
A3. The family belongs to the identified poor                 (1) Yes        (2) No 
A4. Personal data 
 
 
Relationship to the householder-1 Age-2 Sex-3 Educational level-4 
Health 
condition-5 
Marital 
status-6 
Job-7 
Farming 
time-8 
 1. Household head, 2.Spouse, 3. 
Son, 4. Daughter,  
5. Daughter-in-law, 6. Son-in-law, 
7. Grandson/Granddaughter,  
8. Parents, 9. Brothers/Sisters, 10. 
Parents-in-law, 11. Relatives, 12. 
Adoption/Foster care, 13.Great-
guandson/Great-granddaughter, 
14.Others 
Physic
al age 
1. Male, 
2. Female 
1. No schooling, 2. Primary 
(1-6years), 3. Junior middle 
(7-9yesrs), 4. Senior middle 
(10-12years), 5. Training 
school (13-15years), 6 
Bachelor (13-16years), 7 
Master or higher 
1 health,  
2 disability,  
3 chronic 
disease,  
4 mental 
disease,  
5 other (please 
specify) 
 
1 married, 
2 divorced, 
3 widowed, 
4 unmarried 
1. Full-time farming, 2. Part-
time farming, 3. Rural worker, 
4. Urban worker, 5. Migrant 
worker, 6. Private owner, 7. 
Student, 8. Unemployed, 9. 
Grass-roots cadre, 10. Regular 
employee in town, 11. Others 
Month 
A401 Household head        
A402         
A403         
A404         
A405         
A406         
A407         
 
A5. How many years of farming (farming experience)?              (1) All the life               (2) Years：                 
A6. Landform in which the household is located          (1) plain,    (2) mountainous region,    (3) hills          
A7. How many households in the village where you live?                                
A8. Construction material of dwelling          (1) bricks,     (2) stones,   (3) wood,    (4) soil and wood，   (5) other 
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A9. Construction year                          
A10. Number of rooms (except kitchen and bathroom)                                        
A11. Total surface of residence (m2)                              
A12. Usable area of residence? (m2)                              
A13. Drinking water resource     (1) tap water,   (2) well water,   (3) pit water,   (4) river water,   (5) pond water,   (6) other 
A14. How long does it take to get water?   (Minute)                                  
A15. What is the type of your home toilet?       (1) Flush toilet,      (2) village-type dry toilet,      (3) no toilet 
A16. Which of the following assets do you have? 
 
Assets-1 
Availabiiyt-2 
Number-3 
Yes No 
A1601 Radio    
A1602 TV set    
A1603 Bicycle    
A1604 Electric motor    
A1605 Motorcycle    
A1606 Automobile    
A1607 Telephone    
A1608 Cellphone    
A1609 Computer    
A1610 Internet access    
A1611 Air conditioner    
 
 
A17. Household income (yuan/year)     Total income                  
A1701 Agricultural cultivation  A1702 Breeding  A1703 Business  
A1704 Rent (residence and land)  A1705 Wage and salary  A1706 Transfer  
A1707 Other        
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A17-1. Business income 
 1st-1  2ed-2  3rd-3  
A17-101.  Category  1 Agribusiness,2 Education,3 Medical,4 Catering,5 
Transportation,6 Mining,7 Garment,8 Individual 
business,9 Processing,10 veterinarian,11 
Construction,12 Other(note)  
   
A17-102.  Main place 1 Local village,2 Local country,3 Local county, 4 
Local province,5 Other province  
   
A17-103.  Total income  Yuan    
A17-104.  Income for home Yuan    
 
A17-2. Wage and salary income 
Personal  
code  
Type-1 Job-2 
Working 
time-3 
Live-4 
Working 
place-5 
Daily 
wages-6 
Monthly 
wages-7 
Value of 
payment 
in kind-8 
Value of 
payment 
in cash-9 
Annual 
income(wages, 
bonuses, subsidies, 
etc.) -10 
 
1 Non-
agricultural 
wage,  
2 Off-farm 
agricultural 
employment 
1 Local 
employment, 
2 Migrant 
work, 
3 Rural cadre, 
4 Teacher, 
5 Regular 
employee in 
town, 
6 Other(note) 
Month 
1 Not at 
home, 
2 At 
home, 
3 Flexible 
1 Local 
village, 
2 Local 
country, 
3 Local 
county, 
4 Local 
province, 
5 Other 
province, 
6 Oversea 
Yuan/day Yuan/month   Yuan/year  
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A17-3. Other income 
  Unit  
A17-301.  Pension Yuan   
A17-302.  Sale of assets income Yuan  
A17-303.  Relief food Jin  
A17-304.  Value of relied food Yuan   
A17-305.  Five benefits(food, cloth, live, medical care, bury or education) Yuan  
A17-306.  Subsistence allowances or poor subsidies  Yuan  
A17-307.  Subsidies for returning farmland to forest (grassland) Yuan  
A17-308.  Subsidies to grain producers  Yuan  
A17-309.  (Disaster) Relief funds Yuan  
A17-310.  Subsidies for growing superior grain cultivators Yuan  
A17-311.  Subsidies for production data Yuan  
A17-312.  Death benefits  Yuan  
A17-313.  Cash gift Yuan  
A17-314.  Insurance claim Yuan  
A17-315. Others（note） Yuan  
 
A18. Household expenditures (yuan/year)      Total expenses                      
A18-1. Daily consumption expenditures (yuan/year)                         
  Yuan 
A18-101. Daily living expenses (food, tobacco, alcohol and other food consumption) and daily 
necessities 
 
A18-102. Productive expenditure (seed, pesticide, chemical fertilizer, labor costs, etc.)  
A18-103.  Children’s pocket money, accommodation fee, tuition, etc.  
A18-104. Daily necessities  
A18-105.  Clothing and bedding goods (including clothes, shoes, hats, bed sheets, quilts, 
blankets, mosquito nets, etc.) 
 
A18-106.  Transportation costs (including train, car aircraft, ship and other means of 
transportation costs, and maintenance costs for all kinds of vehicle) 
 
A18-107.  Post and telecommunication fee  
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A18-108.  Apartment rent  
A18-109.  House decoration costs (including furniture, decoration materials, household 
appliances and labor, etc.) 
 
A18-110.  Water, electricity and fuel costs (including coal, coal products, firewood, LNG, etc.)  
A18-111.  Education, culture and recreation (including playing mahjong, toys, books, magazines, 
newspapers, stationery, other recreational activities, technical training fees, 
entertainment expenses, entertainment activities, cable TV charges, etc.) 
 
A18-112. Tuition  
A18-113.  Medical expenses and medical insurance premiums (cooperative medical expenses)  
A18-114 Endowment insurance costs  
 
A18-1. Other expenditures (yuan/year)                             
A18-101  Total tax Yuan  
A18-102 Various fine Yuan  
A18-103 Cash gifts Yuan  
 
A19. Local wage status (Yuan/Day) 
  2014 2015 
A1901/A1901a Unskilled non-farm wage (daily or monthly)   
A1902/A1902a Skilled non-farm wage (daily or monthly)   
A1903/A1903a Unskilled farm wage (daily or monthly)   
A1904/A1904a Skilled farm wage (daily or monthly)   
 
A20. How do you rank your living standards in the local area? 
(1) The poorest,      (2) Poorer,        (3) Average,        (4) Richer,         (5) The richest 
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Part B. Transportation condition 
B1. What is the type of access road?  
 (1) Dirt road,      (2) Gravel road,        (3) Cement road,        (4) Asphalt road,         (5) Other 
B2. What is the distance to the nearest vehicle usable road? (Km)                             
 
B3. Distance and costs to various institutions and public facilities 
   Village 
committee 
Market Township 
government 
Nearest 
county 
Nearest 
banking 
financial 
institution 
Mutual fund 
cooperatives 
Nearest 
primary 
school 
Nearest 
health 
clinic 
Nearest 
hospital 
B301 Distance KM          
B302 
Main ways of 
transportation 
1 Walking,  
2 Bicycle,  
3 Bus,  
4 Driving 
motorcycle/elect
ric motor, 
5 Driving 
automobile 
         
B303 
Single trip 
time 
Minutes 
         
B304 
Single trip 
costs 
Yuan 
         
 
B4. Distance to the nearest river? (Km)                               
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Part C. Land utilization 
C1.Land condition 
C101 Farmland areas(paddy field and dry land) Mu  
C102 Among them：Cultivating area Mu  
C103 Uncultivated area Mu-1 years-2 
C104 Orchard area Mu  
C105 Mulberry area  Mu  
C106 Tea plantation area Mu  
C107 Greenhouse area  Mu  
C108 Fish pond area  Mu  
C109 Woodland and grassland area  Mu  
C110 Other Mu  
C2. The situation of additional farmland 
  Rented farmland from others Leased farmland to others 
C201 Area (Mu)   
C202 Type of tenancy (1 fixed rent, 2 
sharecropping) 
  
C203 If it is share cropping, please describe  
C204 Rent (Yuan/Mu/Year; or amount of crop)   
C205 Period (Years)   
C206 Contract (1 Yes, 2 No)   
C207 If yes: 1 formal, 2 oral   
C208 If yes, for how long    
C209 Distance from home (Km)   
C210 Type of agricultural production (code*)   
C211 Why leased the farmland?   (1) No farming labor,  (2) To obtain the rent,  (3) To obtain the income from both the land 
rent and wage via being hired, (4) The area belongs to a program or project, (5) Other 
C212 Who rented the farmland? (1) Other farmers, (2) small company, (3) Large enterprise, (4) Cooperatives, (5) Others 
*Code of agricultural production type：1 Cattle, 2 Pig, 3 Sheep/Goat, 4 Poultry, 5 Food crop, 6 Cash crop, 7 Oil crop, 8  Forestry, 9  
Horticulture, 10  Fruit, 11 Vegetable, 12 Medical materials，13 Other(note) 
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C3. How do you value the soil quality? 
(1) Very good,      (2) Good,      (3) Average,      (4) Poor,      (5) Very poor 
C4. What is the most important type of agricultural production you are engaging in?    Sequence:                             
(1)Cattle,(2)Pig,(3)Sheep/Goat,(4)Poultry,(5)Food crop,(6)Cash crop,(7) Oil crop,(8) Forestry,(9) Horticulture,(10) Fruit,(11) 
Vegetable,(12) Medical materials,(13) Other,(14) No agriculture,(15) Fishery,(16) Slide line of business 
 
Part D. Cooperative organization 
D1.  Participation of cooperatives 
D101 A member of cooperative 1 Yes       2 No  (D110)  
D102 Type of the organization  1 Professional associations,   2 Professional cooperatives  
D103 Year of Joining Year  
D104 Frequency of meeting Times/year  
D105 Regularly attend the meeting  1 Yes       2 No  
D106 Filed of the cooperative  1 Food crops, 2 Cash crops, 3 Economic forestry, 4 Breeding industry, 5 
Handicraft, 6 other (note)  
 
D107 Ways of cooperation 1 Technical training and services, 2 information service, 3 purchase service, 
4 Sales service, 5 Transportation service, 6 Credit service, 7 Production data 
grants, 8 Other (note)  
 
D108 Did you invest in?  1 Yes           2 No   
D109 Amount of investment  yuan  
D110 Why did not participate in 
cooperatives？（up to 3）  
1.No product need to cooperate, 2.No cooperative organizations, 3.do not 
trust cooperatives, 4.No benefits, 5.Do not meet the qualifications, 6.have no 
idea about the organization, 7.Limit production, 8.In efficient, 9.Other (note)  
 
D111 Why participated in 
cooperatives?  
1.Market information, 2.Easier to access to market, 3.Stable trading, 
4.Technique and extension service, 5.Advice from government, 6.Influence by 
collectives and neighbors 
 
D112 Benefits you have got since 
joining cooperatives 
(1) Information service, (2) Market access, (3) Credit service, (4) Technique 
service, (5) Extension service, (6) Other 
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Part E. Labor status 
E1. Numbers of labor during non-agricultural busy season:                  , averagely daily farming hour:                   
E2. Numbers of labor during agricultural bus season:                      , averagely daily farming hour:                   
E3. Will you hire labor during agricultural busy season?         (1) Yes，         (2) No 
E3-1. If yes，how many labors do you usually hire？                        
E3-2. If yes, what is the main job? 
(1) Land preparation, (2) Planting, (3) Weeding, (4) Fertilizer and manure application, (5) Disease/pest control, (6) Birds control,  
(7) Harvesting, (8) Marketing, (9) Transporting, (10) Other 
E3-3. If yes, what is the cost?    day：             *daily wage                
 
 
Part F. Agricultural production 
F1. How do you think of the harvest this year? 
(1) Very good,      (2) Good,      (3) Average,      (4) Bad,      (5) Very bad 
F2. Crops income (top 3) (Yuan/year)                           
 
 Crop 
(See 
crop 
code1)  
Areas 
(Mu)  
Yield 
(Jin)  
Sales 
(Jin)  
Market 
price 
(Yuan/Jin)  
Storage 
(Jin) 
Contract 
1. Yes,   
2. No 
Contract 
period 
(Year) 
Contract 
form 
1.Formal 
written, 
2.Informal 
oral 
Contract 
object 
(see 
code2) 
Contract 
amount 
(Jin) 
Actual 
sale 
amount 
(Jin) 
Planting 
experience 
(Year) 
1              
2              
3              
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Crop code1：1 Wheat, 2 Corn, 3 Rice, 4 Soy, 5 Potato, 6 Sweet potato, 7 Millet, 8 Miliaceum, 9 Sorghum, 10 Buckwheat, 11 Green bean, 
12 Pea, 13 White bean, 14 Rapeseed, 15 Flax, 16 Tobacco, 17 Peanut, 18 Sesame. 19 Sunflower, 20 Cotton, 21 Vegetables, 22 Peach, 23 
Apple, 24 Pear, 25 Walnut, 26 Chestnut, 27 Red date, 28 Orange, 29 Watermelon, 30 Sweet melon, 31 Strawberry, 32 Persimmon, 33 Tea, 
34 Mulberry and cocoon, 35 Edible fungi, 36 Medical herb, 37 Grass, 38 Wood, 39 Other (note) 
Contract object code2: (1) Cooperative, (2) Processing factory, (3) Middle businessman, (4) Government, (5) Other individuals 
F3. Annual input for crop production (Yuan/year)                            
Inputs Costs (Yuan)： 
Seeds  
Chemical fertilizer  
Herbicide, Insecticide   
Plastic sheet   
Labor costs(daily wage*numbers of labor*day)  
Production data rent  
Other   
 
F4. The main farming method?           (1) Machinery,       (2) Manual 
F5. The main harvesting method?                    (1) Machinery,       (2) Manual 
F6. Livestock income (Yuan/year)                              
 Pig Chicken Duck Goose Rabbit Mutton sheep Cattle Other 
Quan
tity 
Value Quan
tity 
Value Quan
tity 
Value Quan
tity 
Value Qua
ntity 
Value Quant
ity 
Value Qua
ntity 
Value Qua
ntity 
Value 
Unit Yuan Unit Yuan Unit Yuan Unit Yuan Unit Yuan Unit Yuan Unit Yuan Unit Yuan 
F601.  At the 
beginning 
of 2015 
On hand                 
F602.  Increased 
in 2015 
Purchase                 
F603.  Newborn                 
F604.  Present                 
F605.  Other(note)                  
 163 
 
F606.  Decreased 
in 2015 
Sales*                  
F607.  Death and 
loss 
                
F608.  Self-
consumption  
                
F609.  Present                 
F610.  Other(note)                 
F611.  By the end 
of 2015 
On hand                 
Note: A unit of livestock had been counted as sale or self-consumption when more than 50% parts of it had been sold or Self-consumed.  
F7.  By-products income (Yuan/year)                               
 By-product  Unit Production 
quantity _1 
Sales 
quantity _2 
Unit 
price(Yuan)_3 
Income 
(Yuan)_4  
F701.  Wool Jin     
F703.  Rabbit Jin     
F704.  Milk Jin     
F705.  Hen’s egg  Number     
F706.  Duck’s egg Number     
F707.  Goose’s egg Number     
F708.  Aquatic 
products 
Jin     
F709.  Cocoon Jin     
F710.  Honey Jin     
F711. Other      
 
F8.  Livestock costs (Yuan/year)                                   
 Inputs Quantity(Jin)_1   Value (Yuan) _2 
F801.  Feed expense   
F802.  Medial expense   
F803.  Labor costs   
F804.  Other (note)   
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F9. Which of the following factors are the top-three bases for agricultural production decision? 
Sequence:                                                        
(1) Self-demand, (2) Previous market price, (3) Price forecast, (4) Planting habit,  (5) Crop rotation requirements,   (6) Government 
policy orientation， (7) Subsidies, (7) Contract or order task,  (8) Suggestions from seed traders, (9) Influences from neighbors, (10) 
According to the suitability of farmland, (11) Extension service, (12) Influence from the cooperative，(13) Market distance and 
transport costs, (14) Family labor condition， (15) Financial situation，  (16) Farming technology and equipment， (17) Income from 
farmland rent， (18) Income from wage 
F10. How many years do you usually make a production plan/decision for?  
(1) 1 year,         (2) 2 years,       (3) 3 years,       (4) 4 years,        (5) 5 and more than 5 years 
F11. How many surrounding famers are engaging in similar production?  
(1) Few,         (2) Small number,       (3) Half,       (4) Large number,        (5) All 
F12. How is your relationship with neighbors?      (1) Very good,      (2) Good,      (3) Average,     (4) Bad,      (5) Very bad 
F13. Do you interact with neighbors on agricultural production and so forth? 
(1) Absolutely yes,         (2) Yes,       (3) Sometimes,       (4) No,        (5) Absolutely no 
F14. Was there any natural disasters leading to reduction of output in the past three years? 
(1) Yes Percent of reduction:                     ,            (2) No 
F15. If yes，What was the disaster? 
(1) Drought,    (2) Flood,    (3) Diseases and insect pests,     (4) Frost,    (5) Storm,     (6) Earthquake,    (7) Other 
F16. In the following disasters, which one do you most worry? 
(1) Drought,    (2) Flood,    (3) Diseases and insect pests,     (4) Frost,    (5) Storm,     (6) Earthquake,    (7) Other 
F17. What is the main measure to cope with these disasters?                                      
(1) Help from government,   (2) Assistance from cooperative,   (3) Self-help,   (4) Depending on agricultural insurance,   (5) Help 
from relatives and friends,   (6) Other 
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F18. What seems to be the first choice to dispose the idle land (if exists)?  
(1) Planting food crops,  (2) Planting cash crops,  (3) Expand existing crops, (4) Planting fruit trees, (5) Rebuilding to be fishpond, 
(6) Paid rent, (7) Unpaid rent, (8) Leave it uncultivated, (9) Other,  (10)Planting vegetables  
F19. What are the top-three ways to get price and marketing information?    Sequence:                                   
(1) Newspaper, television and other media,     (2) Internet,      (3) Local public servant,       (4) Salespersons or processors,     (5) 
Neighbors,       (6) Relatives and friends,     (7) Inputs suppliers,   (8) Cooperatives or organizations,    (9) Specialized literatures,      
(10) Extension service,      (11) Marketing，   (12)Other 
F20. Extension service 
  Public-1 Cooperative-2 Private-3 NGO-4 
F2001 Extension service (Yes or No)     
F2002 Frequency of service (Code1*)     
F2003 Place of servicing (Code2*)     
F2004 Have you ever attended the service? (Yes or 
No) 
    
F2005 If yes, times of attendance per year     
F2006 What is the main content? (Code3*)     
F2007 How do you value it? 1 Very helpful,   2 Helpful,   3 Average,   4 Helpless,   5 Very helpless 
Code 1*: (1) Once per week,  (2) Once per month,  (3) Once per quarter,   (4) Once per half year,   (5) Once per year  (6) More than 
once per year  (7) Two times per month 
Code 2*:  (1) Farmland,   (2) Home,   (3) School, (4) Cooperative’s office, (5) Local authorities’ office, (6) Other place 
(note                   ) 
Code 3*: (1) Crops, (2) Inputs, (3) Technique, (4) Funding， (5) Other (note                     ) 
 
F21. What is the sorely lacking in the agricultural production?  
(1) Funds, (2) Farmland, (3) Technology, (4) Information, (5) Marketing channels, (6) Knowledge, (7) Labor， (8) Other， (9) 
Nothing 
F22. Do you usually use cell phone to obtain market information?              (1) Yes,         (2) No 
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F23. How much is the monthly phone charge?                  
F24. What is the percentage accounting for agricultural production and selling?               %  
F25. How many units of the following agricultural machinery equipment do you have?  
F26. Which of them you are frequently using? 
Equip
ment 
F2501 F2502 F2503 F2504 F2505 F2506 F2507 F2508 F2509 F2510  
Agricul
tural 
vehicle 
Agricul
tural 
tractor 
Drainage and 
irrigation 
machine 
Tractor 
lowing 
plough 
Tractor 
towing 
harrow 
Tractor 
wowing 
planter 
Flour 
and rice 
mill 
Motorized 
threshing 
machine 
Oil press 
machine 
Forage 
press 
machine 
Other 
Unit            
Using            
 
F27. Will you make agricultural production decision under uncertain income and market information? 
(1) Absolutely yes,      (2) Yes,      (3) No opinion,      (4) Not,      (5) Absolutely not 
F28. Do you prefer contract to engage in agricultural production?            (1) Yes,        (2) No 
F39. If yes, the contract is expected to be:       (1) 1 year,        (2) 2-3 years,        (3) 4-5 years,        (4) >5 years 
F30. If yes, the contract is also expected to be:       (1) Formal,        (2) Informal or oral 
 
Part G. Loan and credit 
G1. What is your option when agricultural production lacks of funds?    (1)Borrow money and keep production,       (2) Reduce production 
G2. Do you have information about credit sources?         (1)A large number, (2) Many, (3) Average， (4) Less, （5）Absolutely no 
G3. Where do you usually borrow money or get credit?   
(1)Rural Credit Cooperatives, (2)Agricultural Bank of China, (3)Postal Savings Bank of China, (4) Village bank (5)Micro-credit company, 
(6)Other financial institutions, (7)Neighbors, (8)Relatives and friends, (9)Project funds, (10)Mutual Fund Cooperatives,  (11)Other 
 
G4. Is it easy to borrow money from the following places? 
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G401 Village bank (1) Very easy, (2) Easy, (3) No opinion, (4) Difficult, (5) Very difficult 
G402 Neighbors (1) Very easy, (2) Easy, (3) No opinion, (4) Difficult, (5) Very difficult 
G403 Relatives and friends (1) Very easy, (2) Easy, (3) No opinion, (4) Difficult, (5) Very difficult 
G404 Mutual Fund Cooperatives (1) Very easy, (2) Easy, (3) No opinion, (4) Difficult, (5) Very difficult 
G405 Financial institutions (1) Very easy, (2) Easy, (3) No opinion, (4) Difficult, (5) Very difficult 
 
G5. Have you ever borrowed money in recent 5 years?           (1) Yes (G7),        (2) No (G6) 
G6. If no, what was the reason?  
(1) Unqualified and did not apply, (2) Applied but rejected, (3) No demand and did not apply, (4) Demand but did not apply 
G6-1. If the reason was demand but did not apply, i.e., the (4) option，the reason was? 
(1) Worry about the repayment, (2) Interest and other costs are too high, (3) Believe that cannot get credit even applied, (4) Ashamed， 
(5) Other 
G7.  What was the status about the credit (The credit indicates the loan size larger than 50 yuan and loan period longer than 1 month) 
   _1  _2  _3  _4  _5  
G701.  Date Year      
G702. Month      
G703.  Amount Yuan      
G704.  Source Code 1*      
G705.  Monthly interest ‰/month      
G706.  Period  Month      
G707.  Month of installment Month      
G708.  Amount of installment Yuan      
G709.  Purpose Code 2*      
G710.  
Proportion of the credit on 
agricultural production 
% 
     
G711.  Profit volume Yuan      
G712.  Debt(besides interest) Yuan      
G713.  Mortgage  1 Yes, 2 No       
G714.  What was the mortgage?  Code 3*      
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G715. 
If it was the cash collateral, what 
was the amount? 
Yuan 
     
G716.  Guarantee  1 Yes, 2 No      
G717 
How many times have been the 
source to get this credit?  
Times 
     
G718 
How long did it take for each time 
averagely? 
Minutes 
     
G719 Total costs of transportation Yuan      
G720 Other expenses（gifts）  Yuan      
G721 
Where are they if you loaned from 
privates? 
Code 4* 
     
 
Code 1: Credit source 
1 Rural Credit 
Cooperatives 
7 Private interest 
loan 
2 Agricultural 
Bank of China 
8 private interest-
free loan 
3 Postal Savings 
Bank of China 
9 Project funds  
4 Village bank 10 Mutual Fund 
Cooperatives 
5 Micro-credit 
company 
11 Other
（note） 
6 Other financial 
institutions 
 
 
Code 2: Credit purpose 
1 To buy 
fertilizer 
8 For medical 
treatment  
2 To buy other 
inputs 
9 For weddings 
and funerals 
3 To buy 
livestock 
10 For 
education 
4 To do business 11 For house 
construction  
5 To go out and 
find a job 
12 To repay 
other loans 
6 To buy food 13 Other 
(note）  
7 To buy other 
daily necessities 
 
 
Code 3: Category of mortgage 
1 Bank deposits  
Code 4: Category of individual lender 
1 Local village and my group 
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2 Land 
3 Livestock 
4 House 
5 Other family property 
6 Other 
 
2 Local village and other groups 
3 Other villages 
4 Relatives and friends 
 
 
G8. Has it ever happened that you application for loan been rejected?              (1) Yes (G10),        (2) No (G9) 
G9. If no, have you ever borrowed?              (1) I have never borrowed,        (2) I have borrowed 
G10. If yes, what was the situation? 
  Relatives and friends Neighbors Village Mutual Aid Funds Financial 
institutions 
G1001 Rejected by whom     
G1002 Times being rejected in recent 5 years     
G1003 Times of loaning before being rejected     
G1004 Amount of loaning before being 
rejected 
    
G1005 The reason of rejection (Code1*)     
G1006 The effect of rejection (Code2*)     
The reason of rejection Code1*: (1) The amount is too large, (2) Did not meet the loan requirements, (3) Repayment 
difficulty(Insufficient investment profit),  (4) The purpose of loan were not accepted, (5) Insufficient income，
(6) No guarantor，(7) No mortgage，(8) Formal debt has not been paid off，(9) Application documents 
were not sufficient 
The effect of rejection Code2*: (1) Agricultural production, (2) Business, (3) Fixed assets investment (such as house construction, 
appliances and motor purchasing, etc.),(4) Education, (5) Medical care, (6) Cash flow,(7) Other 
 
 
 
 
G11. Loan capacity 
If you need money for emergency, 
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G1101.  Can you borrow money from Village Mutual Aid Funds?  1.Yes     2.No     3.No opinion 
G1101a How much you can borrow Yuan 
G1102. Can you borrow money from individual lenders? 1.Yes     2.No     3.No opinion 
G1102a.  How much you can borrow Yuan 
G1103.  Can you borrow money from formal banking 
institutions? 
1.Yes     2.No     3.No opinion 
G1103a.  How much you can borrow Yuan 
G1104. Can you borrow money from other non-banking 
institutions? 
1.Yes     2.No     3.No opinion 
G1104a. How much you can borrow Yuan 
G12.Lending and family debt 
G1201. How much money is lent out? ___________yuan? 
G1202. How much is the lending repaid? ___________yuan 
G1203. The money lent to the people in your village is ____________yuan;  
The money lent to the people outside your village is ______________yuan. 
G1204. How much is your family total arrears ________yuan?  
 
Part H. Village Mutual Aid Funds 
H1. Participation of village mutual aid funds 
H101  Do you participate in village mutual aid 
funds? 
1.Yes,     2.No (H103)  
H102  The reason why you participated  1. Need capital, 2. To obtain a loan qualification for future, 
3.Affected by friends and relatives, 4.Mobilized by local cadres, 5. 
To obtain assistance, 6.Others (specify) 
 
H103  The reason why you did not participate 1.Do not need to borrow money, 2.Do not trust this organization, 
3.Cannot afford the pool, 4.Cannot find enough guarantees, 5.No 
willingness, 6.Loan size is small, 7.The repayment way is 
inconvenient, 8.No any information about this organization, 
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9.Interest rate is high, 10.Missed the participation time, 11.No this 
program, 12.Others (specify) 
H104  Did you participate in previous publicities? 1.Yes（H106）    2.No  
H105  Why did not participate? 1.No notification, 2.Not interested, 3.No time, 4.Others (specify)  
H106  How much pool did you pay? Yuan  
H107  Did you buy any insurance within this 
program? 
1.Yes (H108)     2.No  
H108 How much did you pay for the insurance? Yuan  
H109 Any managerial staff from your family 1.Yes       2.No  
 
 
H2. Management of village mutual aid funds (For participants) 
H201  Did one of your family members attend the election of 
management? 
1.Yes(H03), 2.No   
H202  What was the reason why you did not attend? 1.No time, 2.Umimportant, 3.Not care 4.other (specify)  
H203  If attended, did you vote? 1.Yes, 2.No  
H204  Do you think the election process is fair? 1.Fair enough, 2.Fair, 3.No opinion, 4.Unfair, 
5.Absolutely unfair 
 
H205  How many times that the general meeting has been taken place? Times  
H206  How many times you have attended? Times  
H207  Do you think that you or your family have any influence on the 
management of VMAFs? 
1.No, 2.A little influence, 3.No opinion,  
4.Great influence, 5.Strongly influence  
 
H208  Have you or your family ever proposed any comments or advises 
on the management of VMAFs? 
1.Yes, 2.No   
H209  Is it fair to approve and offer loans? 1.Yes, 2.No   
H210  How many days does it take to obtain the loans? Day  
H211  Are you satisfied with the management? 1.Strongly unsatisfied, 2.Unsatisfied, 3.Normal, 
4.Satisfied, 5.Strongly satisfied 
 
H212  Are you a member of mutual aid group?  1.Yes, 2.No   
H213  Is the group composed voluntarily? 1.Yes, 2.No  
H214  Do you share information with other members? 1.Never, 2.Occasionally, 3.Ofen   
H215  Are the signatures from all the members needed when borrowing? 1.Yes, 2.No  
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H216  Do you need to guarantee for each other when borrowing? 1.Yes, 2.No  
H217  Do you help each other in production? 1.Never, 2.Little, 3.No opinion,4.Occasionally, 5.Ofen  
H218 How to help if you help in production? 1.Help at work, 2.Share information, 3.technical 
assistance, 4.Others (specify) 
 
H219 According to your experience, is VMAFs is an effective 
organization that can meet your financial needs? 
1.Strongly disagree,2.Disagree, 3.Normal, 4.Agree, 
5.Strongly agree 
 
H220 Are you satisfied with the service provided by VMAFs? 1.Strongly unsatisfied, 2.Unsatisfied, 3.Normal, 
4.Satisfied, 5.Strongly satisfied 
 
 
 
H3. Usage of village mutual aid funds (For participants) 
H301  Have you ever borrowed money from 
VMAFs? 
1．Yes (H303), 2.No  
H302  If no, what is the reason? 1．No need, 2.Rejected by mutual aid group, 3.Waiting for 
the cash flow, 4.Rejected by the management, 5.Borrowed 
but for other people, 6.The capital pool is insufficient, 
7.Others (specify) 
 
H303  How many times have you borrowed? Times  
H304  How much money have you borrowed? Yuan  
H305  How much have you used for production? Yuan  
H306  How much is also invested in production 
besides the mutual aid funds 
Yuan  
H307  Any profits? 1.Yes, 2.No(H309)   
H308  How much was the profit? Yuan  
H309  What is the reason for no profit? 1．Project was failed, 2.Lack of technology, 3.Price went 
down, 4. Market volatility 5.Project is still going on, 6.Others 
(specify) 
 
H310  Repayment pressure 1.Strongly pressure, 2.Greater pressure, 3.Smaller pressure, 
4.No pressure 
 
H311 Is it possible to obtain loans except the 
mutual aid funds? 
1.No, it is impossible, 2.Yes, but with smaller loan size, 
3.Yes, and with the same loan size, 4.No opinion 
 
H312 Have you received any bonus from VMAFs? 1.Yes,  2.No  
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H313 The time and amount you received the bonus   
 
Part I. Credit preference 
I1.Do you have the demand for funds at this stage?          (1) Yes,      (2) No 
I2.The top five you most care about when you borrowing money：Sequence:                                               
(1)Loan size,  (2)Interest rate,  (3)Loan period,  (4)Mortgage,  (5)Guarantee,  (6)Convenience,  (7)Repayment way and pressure，
(8)Transaction costs,  (9)processing time，  (10)Some hidden costs,  (11)Others  
I3. According to the above consideration, where do you prefer to borrow money? 
(1) Rural Credit Cooperatives,   (2) Agricultural Bank of China,    (3) Postal Savings Bank of China,   (4) Village bank, 
(5) Financial company,   (6) other financial institutions,     (7) Friends and relatives with interest rate， 
(8) Friends and relatives without interest rate,     (9) Project funds   (10) village mutual aid funds,    (11) others  
I4.What do your usually borrow money for? 
(1) Agricultural production,    (2) Business,   (3) Migrant work,   (4) Purchase of food,   (5) Purchase of daily necessities, 
(6) Medical treatment,     (7) Wedding or funeral,    (8) Education,    (9) House building,    (10) Repayment of other loans,   
(11) Others  
I5.What kind of funding people should rely on to expand agricultural production? 
(1) Rural Credit Cooperatives, (2) Agricultural Bank of China, (3) Postal Savings Bank of China, (4) Village bank, 
(5) Financial company,      (6) other financial institutions, (7) Friends and relatives，   (8) Village cadres， (9) Project funds， 
(10) Village mutual aid funds,    (11) Self accumulation,    (12) others 
I6.What is your expected credit size from financial institutions (yuan) ： 
(1) 5,000      (2)10,000       (3) 30,000      (4) 50,000      (5) 100,000    (6) More than 100,000 
I7.The top three most important factors that you believe to obtain a loan Sequence:                                     
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(1) Repayment ability, (2)Personal credit, (3) Villager or cadre as guarantee,  (4) Wealthier people as guarantee,(5) Mortgage, 
(6) Good information and knowledge about credit rules, (7) Good credit history, (8) Higher educational level, (9) others 
I8.Some views on microfinance 
I801 Microfinance contributes to agricultural production (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree  
I802 
I tend to borrow money from financial institutions 
for agricultural production 
(1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I803 
I tend to borrow money from friends and relatives 
for agricultural production 
(1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I804 
I tend to reduce production and not borrow money 
when agricultural production lacks funds 
(1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I805 Loans will bring pressure on agricultural production (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I806 Loans will bring pressure on daily life (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I807 
The purpose of use of funds can be kept 
confidentially  
(1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I808 Borrowing money is an embarrassing thing (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I809 
I do not know in details about the credit rules of 
financial institutions 
(1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I810 I am particularly concerned about interest rate (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I811 I am particularly concerned about loan period (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I812 I am particularly concerned about mortgage (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I813 I am particularly concerned about guarantee (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I814 I am particularly concerned about loan size (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I815 
I am particularly concerned about repayment 
pressure 
(1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I816 I am particularly concerned about repayment way (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
I817 I am particularly concerned about convenience (1)Strongly disagree, (2)Disagree, (3)No opinion, (4)Agree, (5)Strongly agree 
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Part J. Choice experiment 
 
Block 1-1 
1 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 1 year 1 year 
Interest rate 8% 8.25% 8.25% 
Loan size 50,000and 50,000 200,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium Medium High 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
2 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 5 years 1year 5 years 
Interest rate 8% 5.10% 8% 
Loan size 200,000 200,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low High Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
3 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 1 year 5 years 
Interest rate 8% 0% 8% 
Loan size 100,000 100,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High Medium Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
4 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 5 years 5 years 
Interest rate 8% 0% 5.10% 
Loan size 50,000 10,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High High High 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
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Block 1-2 
5 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 5 years 5 years 3 years 
Interest rate 8% 5.10% 5.10% 
Loan size 100,000 200,000 200,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Low Low 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
6 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 5 years 1 year 
Interest rate 0% 8.25% 8% 
Loan size 10,000 100,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium Medium Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
7 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 5 years 3 years 3 years 
Interest rate 0% 8.25% 0% 
Loan size 200,000 50,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High Low Low 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
8 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 3 years 5 years 
Interest rate 0% 8.25% 8.25% 
Loan size 50,000 200,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High Medium High 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Lump sum Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
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Block 2-1 
9 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 5 years 1 year 
Interest rate 8% 0% 5.10% 
Loan size 200,000 200,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Low Low 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
10 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 5 years 5 years 
Interest rate 0% 5.10% 8.25% 
Loan size 200,000 100,000 200,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium Low High 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
11 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 5 years 5 years 1 year 
Interest rate 5.10% 5.10% 5.10% 
Loan size 200,000 100,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium High Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
12 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 5 years 1 year 
Interest rate 0% 8.25% 8% 
Loan size 200,000 10,000 200,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High Low Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
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Block 2-2 
13 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 3 years 5 years 
Interest rate 0% 5.10% 8.25% 
Loan size 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Medium Low 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
14 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 5 years 5 years 5 years 
Interest rate 0% 0% 0% 
Loan size 50,000 10,000 200,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Medium Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
15 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Interest rate 8.25% 8% 0% 
Loan size 10,000 50,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium High Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
16 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 1 year 3 years 
Interest rate 8.25% 0% 8% 
Loan size 50,000 100,000 200,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High High High 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
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Block 3-1 
17 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 1 year 3 years 
Interest rate 5.10% 8% 8% 
Loan size 10,000 50,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Low Low 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
18 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 3 years 5 years 
Interest rate 8% 5.10% 5.10% 
Loan size 100,000 50,000 50,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium Low Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor Guarantor Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
19 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 3 years 1 year 
Interest rate 8.25% 0% 8.25% 
Loan size 100,000 50,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Medium Low 
Collateral 
method 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Installment Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
20 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 3 years 5 years 
Interest rate 0% 5.10% 8% 
Loan size 10,000 200,000 50,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High High High 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
 
 
 180 
 
 
Block 3-2 
21 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 1 year 1 year 
Interest rate 8.25% 5.10% 0% 
Loan size 10,000 50,000 50,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High Medium Low 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
22 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 1 year 1 year 5 years 
Interest rate 0% 8.25% 0% 
Loan size 200,000 200,000 100,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Low Low Medium 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Lump sum Installment Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
23 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 3 years 5 years 1year 
Interest rate 5.10% 8.25% 8.25% 
Loan size 100,000 50,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
Medium Medium High 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Installment 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
 
24 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Credit period 5 years 1 year 1 year 
Interest rate 8% 5.10% 8% 
Loan size 50,000 50,000 10,000 
Transaction 
costs 
High High High 
Collateral 
method 
Assets 
pledge 
Guarantor 
Assets 
pledge 
Repayment 
method 
Installment Lump sum Lump sum 
I would prefer: □ □ □ 
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